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ABSTRACT
Various studies have researched the relative involvement of elected women versus elected 
men in issues that are generally considered to be of primary interest to women at the 
legislative level. However, there is only a small body of research in the area of political 
science on gender and the judiciary, specifically with regard to Canada. The small 
number of female justices is a limiting factor, but the presence of women in the judiciary 
offers an important opportunity for academic study. To achieve effective results in this 
study, case law of the Supreme Court of Canada from the period of 1982-2003 will be 
examined. This study will also consider the effects of four women on the nine member 
bench, this is not only unprecedented in Canada, but elsewhere in the world. A certain set 
of cases that might be considered to be of interest to women will be analyzed to determine 
whether women judges make a difference, by bringing to their decisions new principles 
and precedents, or whether their decisions conformed to those made by male judges. This 
study utilizes tenets of feminist methodology, such as placing women’s experiences at the 
centre, contextualizing women’s lives within their social and cultural milieu, and being 
attentive to the diversity of women’s experiences. By using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods of research, this study will determine the degree of validity of the 
hypothesis that the appointment of more female justices would increase the likelihood 
that certain perspectives, shared by many women, would be available on the bench.
iii
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Introduction
The under-representation of women in law-making is a continuing concern in 
Canada, however, there has been an increase in the number of female judges and female 
public prosecutors over the past few decades (Anasagasti et al. 1999, 8). There has been 
limited research done in Canada measuring the effect, if any, women judges have had on 
the administration of justice. A decade ago, judicial scholars explained that because of the 
small number of women judges, they could not conclusively address the issue of whether 
women judges would behave differently from men judges. Fortunately for academics, the 
number of women judges has increased substantially in Canada, especially at the 
Supreme Court level.
This study assumes that gender bias exists within Canadian law due to the 
historical under-representation of female justices on the Supreme Court. It further 
speculates that female justices are more inclined to make rulings that support the rights of 
women in issues that tend to be of greater importance to women than to men. Further to 
the belief that the bench should come much closer than at present to reflecting society in 
order to maintain public confidence and legitimacy, one must distinguish two related but 
distinct claims: first, that at least in the case of women, their presence on the bench will 
bring with it a special if not uniform perspective; and second, that increased 
representation will correct existing biases. It is important and necessary to conduct a 
study on the position of women in the judicial sector because the growing presence of 
women in positions of power will contribute to a renewal of values, ideas, attitudes and 
styles of behaviour which will be beneficial to society as a whole. This assumption is 
based largely on establishing that women judges present different attitudinal traits to the 
decision-making process from those of male judges.
1
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According to Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, Canada’s first woman Supreme 
Court judge:
If women lawyers and women judges through their differing perspectives on 
life can bring new humanity to bear on the decision-making process, perhaps 
they will make a difference. Perhaps they will succeed in infusing the law with 
an understanding of what it means to be fully human (1990, 522).
This was part of a speech delivered by Justice Wilson in 1990 entitled “Will Women
Judges Really Make a Difference?” in which she dealt with the notions of bias and
neutrality. Regina Graycar notes “There was enormous publicity about her speech
including a complaint to the Judicial Council and calls for her resignation on the grounds
that she was biased” (1998, 8). The argument here seemed to be that by her mere
suggestion that women on the bench might make a difference, Justice Wilson was playing
politics and not being unbiased.
Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin also points out that jurists are human beings,
and, as such, are informed and influenced by their backgrounds, communities, and
experiences. For cultural, biological, social and historic reasons, women do have different
experiences from men (2003, 3). For example, she suggested that many judgments which
she has given could have been given by a man, however, in one particular case involving
rearing a child, Justice McLachlin put into her own words the experience of bearing and
rearing a child from a woman’s point of view. She notes “A colleague paid me the
compliment of saying that it could not have been written by a man” (2003: 3). Similarly,
feminist theorists such as Catherine MacKinnon, observe that male judges have not
traditionally been sensitive to gender issues involved in cases of rape, abortion,
pregnancy, and pornography. Professors Isabel Grant and Lynn Smith point to landmark
decisions such as Morgentaler and Daigle that have a greater impact on women’s lives
2
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than on men’s lives and to the extensive literature about the existence of gender bias in 
existing legal doctrine and judicial decisions.
In determining whether or not women in the judiciary make a difference, it is 
important to acknowledge that difference is a complex and difficult term to explain and 
measure. What remains unarticulated when we talk about women’s judgments and 
whether they will make a difference is that men are presumed to be a benchmark, the 
standard against which difference is measured (Graycar 1998, 2). This study will examine 
whether women judges have a special perspective not shared by men by looking at cases 
raising issues of gender fairness. Elaine Martin addresses several American studies which 
have tested the proposition that the presence of women judges does make a difference in 
the administration of justice (1993, 127). For example, Martin examines a study 
conducted by Cook who found that women judges portrayed more feminist attitudes on 
women’s issues, such as marital name change (Martin 1993, 166). More current research 
on women judges’ feminist positions support these early conclusions as two recent studies 
of state supreme courts suggest that courts with women members are more likely to 
produce pro-women decisions.
Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin provides four important reasons why increasing 
the representation of women on the bench has improved and will continue to improve the 
legal system. She points out that “The presence of women.. .makes the legal system less 
alien and more relevant to the female half of the population” (2003, 2). The courts should 
no longer be considered as male-dominated institutions where women are portrayed as the 
minority. Second, it is necessary to have women on the bench for symbolic reasons. 
Justice McLachlin illustrates this point by stating “In a world where one of the primary 
functions of the judiciary is to promote equality and fairness, it would be anomalous if the
3
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very instrument charged with the goal should itself exclude women from its ranks” (2003,
2). The third reason for placing more women on the bench is utilitarian. Not only does it 
promote gender equality, but modem societies cannot afford to lose the intellectual power 
and energy of half of the population. Finally, Justice McLachlin believes that having 
more women on the bench is important because of the different perspectives that women 
can bring to judging. Women judges may be more willing and able to hear and understand 
the stories of women litigants and may also bring special expertise to the adjudication 
process, gained both professionally and through life experiences. Through these four 
avenues of influence, it is hoped that women will be able to render a more gender- 
sensitive justice. This study will survey current literature on the particular perspectives 
women may bring to the role of judging and will consider these perspectives in relation to 
the traditional requirement that judges be both independent and partial.
Overview of Subsequent Chapters
This study is divided into five different chapters. Chapter one examines the 
concept of gender bias within the Canadian judicial system and examines key ideas 
frequently used in studies of gender as an incident of patriarchal practice. Regina Graycar 
discusses the notion of gender bias and notes “Every time we use an adjective to describe 
a woman judge, or a judgment written by a woman, we are implicitly distinguishing her 
from the norm and reinforcing the underlying assumption that judges are men and judging 
is a male activity” (1998: 3). Moreover, the power to decide who could be called to the 
bar and be allowed to practice law gave the law societies in Canada power to exclude 
women from the legal profession. Thus, a gender imbalance among lawyers is likely to 
lead to gender imbalances among judges.
4
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Chapter one of this study also looks at the research conducted by Canadian 
political scientists who have studied the composition of the judiciary and how this affects 
voting behaviour. There appears to be strong support for the assumption that more women 
judges will result in a legal process that is more responsive to women’s issues. The 
diversity in how judges of different gender approach an issue is important. Chapter one 
also borrows from literature on women in Canadian legislatures. The research on women 
in Canadian legislatures parallels the research on women in the judiciary to some extent. 
Multiple studies have explored whether women are better represented now that there are 
more women in Parliament (for example, Brodie, 1996; Childs, 2001; Tremblay, 1998; 
Trimble et al., 2003). In Manon Tremblay’s study on legislative behavior, she finds that 
“while women’s issues constitute a relatively minor field of interest for female Members 
of Parliament (MPs), they still represent an area which is more important for a greater 
proportion of political women than political men” (1998, 49). This part of chapter one 
argues that although women judges will not address or speak on behalf of women’s issues 
all of the time, their presence will at least increase the prospects of a more sympathetic 
hearing.
The focus of chapter two is an examination of American research and literature, 
particularly with respect to the voting behaviour of women judges in the United States. 
Moreover, this chapter highlights differences between the United States and Canadian 
legal and political systems. While the process of judging is very similar in both countries, 
differences exist and these differences must be considered. It is primarily American 
studies which have examined the impact of women in the judiciary. Barbara Palmer 
points out that “several studies in the United States have suggested that women judges are 
the strongest supporters of women’s rights claims, regardless of their ideology” (2002,
5
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92). Multiple studies have examined whether a gender difference does exist on selected 
state Supreme Courts, Federal Courts of appeal and the United States Supreme Court (for 
example, Allen et al., 1993; Cook, 1993; Davis, 1993; Davis et al., 1993). It is necessary 
to examine these American studies because they may provide insight into the gender 
differences that exist on the Supreme Court of Canada. The American studies may 
indicate a likely outcome or be the basis for making an interesting comparison that 
Canadian female justices do in fact make a difference by bringing new values and 
priorities into their decisions. This study will situate Canada in relation to what has 
already been verified in the United States.
Chapter three of this study examines feminist developmental theories and 
summarizes common themes in feminist jurisprudence. For example, Hilaire Barnett 
addresses psychologist Carol Gilligan “whose research published under the title In a 
Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, has had a profound 
impact on feminist theory” (1998, 145-6). Gilligan’s findings parallel the assertion of 
many feminist legal scholars that because the law has been dominated by male 
perspectives, an approach to legal decision making that is based on separation, rights and 
abstract rules has come to represent the correct legal method. Catharine MacKinnon’s 
dominance theory has also influenced feminist legal theory and argues that the equality 
question must be conceptualized in another manner. Principally it must be recognized that 
the central issue is neither the extent to which women are the same as or different from 
men. The central issue for MacKinnon is male power and dominance. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine various feminist legal theories and to provide support for their 
application in the decisions written by women on the Supreme Court.
6
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Chapter four of this study tests the hypothesis that there is a gender difference on 
the Supreme Court of Canada by contributing both a qualitative and a quantitative 
analysis of selected Supreme Court decisions considered to be of interest to women. To 
achieve a methodical and consistent set of cases considered to be of interest to women, 
this study expands on previous studies addressing feminists and the Courts. The 
methodology to be used in the analysis applies to both written opinions of Supreme Court 
Justices and to their specific decisions on various cases. While it is somewhat subjective, 
it was necessary to apply a degree of rigour to the opinions and decisions, thereby 
operationalizing the analysis. A simple scoring system was used to assign a score between 
-2 and 2 to each written opinion for each case. Similarly, for each Justice’s actual 
decision, there was a score assigned from -3 to 3 that reflects whether or not a given 
decision is considered to be ‘pro-woman’. These scores were tabulated across several 
cases to determine if, on average, female Justices have scores that are more ‘pro-woman’ 
than the scores for make Justices for the same cases. In analyzing both opinions and 
decisions, a weighting factor was assigned to the various cases so that those which related 
strongly to women have a higher weighting. Throughout the analysis, it was important to 
keep the scoring and measurement system in context and not make it more sophisticated 
than it needed to be to test the hypothesis, as this is a somewhat subjective area of 
analysis.
The objective of chapter five summarizes the results and draws conclusions in 
regard to the hypothesis that more women in the Supreme Court will result in important 
changes being made to the interpretation and application of Canadian law.
7
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Chapter One: Gender, Judging and the Legal System 
Historical background: The Canadian Feminist Movement
The feminist movement has disclosed sites of discrimination within the legal 
system and recommended changes to reflect women’s perspectives and has questioned 
the representation of the interests of women. Linda Trimble points out that “Because 
women are under-represented in conventional political structures such as political parties, 
legislatures, bureaucracies, and the judiciary, the women’s movement has provided an 
important avenue for political action” (1995, 275). The early feminist movement in 
Canada focused on achieving equality of basic civil and political rights, specifically in the 
areas of property ownership and voting rights (Manfredi 2000, 18). Referring to the 
feminist movement, Christopher Manfredi notes “Early activists were motivated to a large 
degree by a more general reform impulse, and viewed greater participation by women in 
social, economic and political life as an antidote to the “moral decay” they associated 
with increased immigration and urbanization” (2000, 18).
The early feminist movement adopted litigation as a tactic and achieved a 
significant victory in Edwards v. A.-G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124. The British Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), which was Canada’s highest court at the time, 
decided that women could be considered ‘persons’ qualified to serve in public life. In 
Edwards, the JCPC held that the British North America Act (BNA) should be viewed as a 
“living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits.” (1930 A.C., 124). 
This landmark decision recognized women as persons under the Canadian Constitution.
The Women’s Liberation Movement of the 1960s changed its focus from equal 
rights, to a more complete strategy of liberating women from the restrictions imposed by 
traditional notions of their role in society (Manfredi 2000, 19). Manfredi notes “This
8
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strategy provided the impetus for the establishment of the 1967 Royal Commission on the 
Status of Women, which issued 167 recommendations for improving the status of women 
in Canadian society in 1970” (2000,19). The movement in the 1960s included campaigns 
against the sexual objectification of women, rape, and family violence. It included calls 
for equal access to education, welfare, equality of opportunity and pay. These political 
issues “should be the motivating force behind feminist theory which must always be 
answerable to the needs of women in their struggle to transform patriarchy” (Weedon 
1987, 1-2). Feminist politics, litigation and theorizing during this period were concerned 
with eliminating legal biases based on sex.
By 1972, the Royal Commission led to the formation of the National Action 
Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) by thirty feminist groups to lobby for, and 
monitor the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations (Vickers 1993, 26). 
Vickers points out that “Its founding mothers knew, however, that to have a successful 
impact on the Canadian state, it was necessary to sustain and enlarge their coalition and to 
maintain a common view and an agreement on strategy” (Vickers 1993, 65). NAC was 
created with the model of the National Council of Women (NCWC) and the Federation 
des Femmes du Quebec (FFQ). NAC uses as its founding rationale the idea that it is a 
democratic organization of many women’s groups and that it represents women’s 
interests better than any other political organization or institution; in other words, NAC 
claims to be the legitimate parliament of women (Vickers 1993, 69). The NAC is perhaps 
best known as the lobby group that has vigorously fought to maintain the current 
lawlessness on abortion and which supported Dr. Henry Morgentaler in his abortion 
campaign.
9
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By the late 1970s, many feminist theorists recognized that gender blindness was 
not a sufficient route to sexual equality in the law (Binnion 1993, 141). Second-stage 
liberal feminists who were concerned about the discriminatory impact of policy and not 
just its facial terms and third-stage progressive feminists, who argue for the incorporation 
of women’s experience into public policy, observed that the impact of neutral laws was 
not always equal and that the laws based on men’s lives do not adequately incorporate the 
experience of women into public policy (Binion 1993,141). Former Justice Bertha 
Wilson notes that “there are probably whole areas of law on which there is no uniquely 
feminine perspective” (1990, 515). The National Association of Women and the Law 
(NAWL) grew out of a National Conference of women in the legal profession that took 
place in Windsor in 1974. NAWL has sponsored ten biennial conferences on issues of 
concern to women across Canada (Brockman et al. 1993, 6). In 1982, when the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms was proclaimed, the federal and provincial governments found it 
necessary to postpone the implementation of the equality provisions for women for three 
years so that they could revise sexist legislation to reflect equality in Canada. Thus, the 
delay gave governments time to bring their laws into line with the equality rights in 
section 15.
The Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) was formed in 1985 to 
seek equality for women through Charter Litigation (Manfredi 2004, xiv). The women 
who founded the organization were among the many who affected Canadian 
constitutional history by ensuring that their views were considered during the 
constitutional negotiations on the equality sections of the Charter: sections 15 and 28 
(LEAF 1996, xvi). The LEAF founders believed that the development of equality could 
not be achieved through constitutional amendment alone. These women concluded that
10
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they needed to participate in the ensuing law reform and constitutional litigation (LEAF 
1996, xvi). The Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women funded a research 
study to identify the type of agency that would enable women to both develop expertise 
on equality rights and influence the application and interpretation of those rights. The 
study concluded that “a legal action fund to concentrate on issues of sex-based 
discrimination is an essential component of an effective strategy to promote the interests 
of women in the Canadian legal system” (1984, 163). Cases come to LEAF’S attention in 
a variety of ways: through regular examination of case law digests; through an informal 
network of lawyers, academics, women’s organizations; and through the approximately 
1,000 inquiries LEAF receives from the public each year (LEAF 1996, xvii). All case 
proposals address the potential impact of a case on different groups of women and 
preference is given to cases under the Charter. In sum, LEAF has been the most activist 
and visible feminist litigating organization in Canada and has contributed to reversing 
litigation defeats, protecting important legislative victories, and expanding women’s 
rights in areas such as reproductive freedom and family law.
Lise Gotell, a women’s studies professor at the University of Alberta, is critical of 
LEAF’S litigation strategy. Gotell believes that “LEAF’S legal arguments and case 
discussions most often failed to recognize how asymmetrical power relations based on 
race, class and sexual orientation, and ability structure the lives of women differently. 
Instead, an appeal to women’s experience, as if all women shared a similar experience of 
pregnancy, motherhood, and work, and so on, grounded LEAF’S analyses” (2002, 141). 
She further suggests that feminist criticism is partially responsible for the more nuanced 
positions on behalf of women advanced by LEAF in the 1990s. She is cautiously 
optimistic that such feminist legal strategies can successfully unsettle the legal
11
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foundations currently in place. While Gotell has a valid point, it is important to 
acknowledge that without LEAF, the legal status of women in Canada would presumably 
be less than it currently is. Further, LEAF has sought to be more inclusive of the diversity 
of women’s experiences in recent years. LEAF has taken steps to include Aboriginal 
women, women with disabilities, immigrant women, women of colour, and lesbians.
Several Supreme Court decisions made it clear to feminists that superficial gender 
neutrality only renders women invisible, not equal. The first case, Murdoch v. Murdoch 
[1973] 1 S.C.R. 473. involved Irene Murdoch who found herself living in rented 
premises, receiving the court ordered $200 per month in maintenance from her husband, 
and an additional $51 from Canada’s Welfare program. Her duties were extensive and 
included (but were not limited to) sewing, cooking, cleaning, mowing, driving trucks, 
haying, dehorning, branding, and quieting horses. After years of hard work, she had been 
stripped of virtually any rights to her matrimonial property, and was left struggling to 
make ends meet. After an unsuccessful appeal in Alberta’s Supreme Court, Murdoch 
decided to appeal her case in the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court judges 
handed down their ruling and four out of five upheld the Alberta court’s decision that 
Murdoch’s contribution was “only a normal contribution as wife, to the matrimonial 
regime.” In the eyes of the law, Irene Murdoch’s efforts to build the family ranch were 
not significant enough for her to legally claim any of it.
The most obvious example of gender bias was in 1979 in Bliss v. A.G. Canada 
[1979] 1 S.C.R. 183. where the court held that discrimination based on pregnancy was not 
sex discrimination. The Court noted that “sex discrimination did not exist because even 
though the provision treats unemployed women differently from unemployed persons, be 
they male or female, it is it seems to me, because they are pregnant and not because they
12
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are women.” It went further to state that “any inequality between the sexes in this area is 
not created by legislation but by nature.” The male body in this case was used as the 
physical norm. While this decision was later reversed in Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd. 
[1989]\ S.C.R. 183. where it was concluded that pregnancy discrimination is sex 
discrimination, it appears that the experience of the Canadian feminist movement over the 
past few decades has raised important questions about the efficacy of gender neutrality, 
and more importantly raised the question of whether the legal system is capable of 
serving women.
Investigating Gender Bias in the Courts
Before examining the utility of gender analysis for the study of women in the 
judiciary, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the terms “gender” and ‘gendered 
institutions’. It is important to note that the terms “sex”, “sex roles”, and “gender” are not 
synonymous. Sociologist Margaret Anderson defines sex as a “biological identity of a 
person” (2000, 391). Sex role is a social category rooted in structural functional thinking 
and is concerned with the behavioural expectations that people attach to biological sex 
(Anderson 2000, 391). Gender, however, is a much broader concept. Anderson refers to 
gender as “socially learned behaviours and expectations associated with men and women” 
(2000, 391). Political Scientist Jilda Aliotta further suggests that “it has implications for 
the division of power in a community or organization.. .gender is more than a social 
category. It is a set of shared beliefs about ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’, ‘masculinity’ and 
‘femininity,’ and ideology” (2003, 5). Gender refers to the social construction of 
biological sex, i.e., how we take biological differences and give them social meaning. 
Aliotta refers to the American Congress as a gendered institution that presents a table of 
characteristics commonly associated with gender (see Table 1.0). This table was put
13
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together from the rich body of literature on attributed gender differences. Aliotta points
out that “These characteristics carry with them assumptions about the appropriate
distribution of power and resources” (2003, 6). Similarly, Michael Delli Carpini and Scott
Keeter explore theories of gender role socialization that are not explicitly political in
nature but may have significant political implications. They suggest that:
Girls from an early age are less interested in the ‘rules o f the game’ and notions 
of ‘abstract justice’ than are boys. Their games tend to be less conflictual than 
boys’ games, and more likely to founder if disputes arise. In addition, girls (and 
women) are more interested in and more likely to talk about personal, 
immediate, consensual issues in their conversations, while boys and men turn 
to more conflictual, abstract, and less personal topics. (2000, 33)
Applying these theories to the political world along with the various categories listed in 
Table 1.0 discussed by Aliotta, suggests that courts and judging will fall primarily toward 
the masculine end of the gender spectrum (Aliotta 2003, 7).
Feminists have been subject to criticism in their use of the term “gender bias” 
because it disguises sexual discrimination and reflects a liberal way of thinking about the 
concept. It is probably more accurate to label the gender bias in law as “sexism” because 
the bias is consistently the same way, i.e., the bias works in favour of men and to the 
exclusion and detriment of women. Joan Brockman and Dorothy Chunn point out that 
“The term is based on an assumption that the law in its ideal form is free of bias, and that 
therefore bias can be ultimately eliminated from law to create a gender neutral legal 
system” (1993, 3-4). It has become the more acceptable term because of its hint of 
impartiality. It implies that gender bias could be in favour o f  either sex. Sheilah Martin 
also notes that “Approaching gender bias in the law as a distinct issue, rather than as a 
component or consequence of women’s larger inequality, stems from the cultural esteem 
conferred on the legal system and a widespread reluctance to acknowledge that many of
14
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our current social structures are deeply dysfunctional” (1993,19). Gender bias in the law 
is not supposed to exist because its existence is contrary to the core values of the legal 
system itself including equality, fairness and impartiality.
The discussion becomes more complex because the use of the term “sexism” 
frequently engenders uncomfortable reactions from members of the bench (Brockman 
1993,14). Instead, the term “gender bias” has been used to overcome this barrier and has 
been introduced into discussions concerning the judiciary traditionally dominated by men. 
Educating judges is a sensitive issue, both because the need for education suggests a 
failure on the part of judges to live up to the judicial ideal and because education has been 
seen to be a challenge to the principles of judicial independence. In the past few years, the 
Canadian judiciary has begun to educate itself on gender equality issues, and has 
developed programs on gender bias, particularly in the criminal law area. According to 
the summary document from the department of Justice on “Gender equality in the 
Canadian Justice system”, “These programs continue to be met with some resistance by a 
minority of judges” (1992, 19). Furthermore, educational programs aimed at introducing a 
new perspective that is different from the norm is often criticized because these 
arguments for improved fairness and equality are themselves perceived to be biased.
The problem with sexual discrimination within the courts is no longer one of 
explicit acts of sexism on the part of individual judges. Rather, the problem has become 
“systemic bias.” In contrast to direct acts of discrimination, systemic bias has been found 
to exist when decisions made or actions taken are based on stereotypes about the role of 
men and women (Razack 1993, 42). A recent example of systemic discrimination 
occurred on February 22, 2004 when a B.C. court judge E.D. Schmidt sentenced Daniel 
Morris, a Kaska man, and former chief of the Liard First Nation (LFN), to two year’s
15
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
probation on four charges related to what the Liard Aboriginal Women's Society (LAWS) 
describes as "a horrific act of domestic violence." Judge Schmidt's decision, though 
supported by Kaska Tribal Council Chief Hammond Dick and other Kaska leaders, was a 
blow to many in the community who see the leniency of the sentence as a threat to the 
safety of women. The court's failure to give weight from the plea from so many Kaska 
women is a sad example of what the AJIC report describes as "systemic discrimination" 
on the basis of race and sex. This is not to suggest that the man Dennis Schmidt is guilty 
of bias against Aboriginal women. His decision encompassed compassion and sensitivity 
about Kaska people and justice, but in the person of the Judge, he serves a biased system. 
As the Judge, he is constrained to consider the part of AJIC that calls for restorative 
justice, but not to observe the equally strong wording about "the need to protect and assist 
victims, and for the use of strong measures in dealing with [spousal assault] offenders."
Kathleen Mahoney suggests that “the law of bias does not easily contemplate 
systemic bias having discriminatory impacts on individuals because of their group 
membership. The accepted wisdom is that judges as a collective are impartial and that 
occasionally, an individual judge may ‘slip up’” (1993, 90-1). Judges themselves have 
expressed concern about neutrality with respect to certain issues and ways of thinking 
which may affect their judgment. Madam Justice Rosalie Abella, currently a member of 
the Supreme Court of Canada, has maintained that “Neutrality and impartiality do not and 
cannot mean that the judge has no prior conceptions, opinions or sensibilities about 
society’s values. It means only that those preconceptions ought not to close his or her 
mind to the evidence and arguments presented” (1995, 199).
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It is important to note that gender bias should not be defined to suggest that judges
within the legal system act deliberately to harm women. The following definition of
gender bias provided by Norma Wikler has evolved and is currently in widespread use:
Gender bias refers to attitudes and behaviours on the part of participants in the 
justice system that are based on or reflect: (1) sex stereotypes about the proper 
“roles” and “true natures” of women and men; (2) cultural assumptions about 
the relative worth of women and men; and (3) myths and misconceptions about 
the social and economic realities encountered by both sexes. Gender bias is 
also found in (4) behaviours that impose a greater burden on one sex than on 
the other (1993, 50).
Similarly, Maryka Omatsu defines gender bias “as the built in tilt of the legal system 
resulting from the exclusion or near-exclusion of women from the formation of its 
principles” (1998, 233). Martin explores the various forms of gender bias, including: the 
exclusion of women because they are women; the improper use of incorrect and unchosen 
stereotypes; the use of double standards; the use of a male defined norm; the failure to 
incorporate or be sensitive to the perspectives of women; not recognizing women’s harms 
because they are done to women; being gender blind to gender specific realities; and 
using sexist language (1993, 24-5).
If gender biases are to be eliminated from judicial decision-making, it is essential 
that judges be given the appropriate knowledge to enable them to appreciate the 
perspectives and experiences of women and the consequences of stereotyping. Mahoney 
points out that “On-going social context education, a concept which many players in the 
administration of justice have endorsed, is an obvious way to address perspectives that are 
too limited” (1993, 106). While there is no single solution to the problem of gender bias 
within the legal system, Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin examines three possible 
alternatives. First, she believes that there should be a conscious effort by the government 
to attract and appoint qualified women to the bench. Justice McLachlin points out that the
17
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Judicial Appointment Commission “needs to be strong and forward-looking, explicitly 
charged with the task of making a difference” (2003, 2-3). This would mean going over 
applications to be a judge, opening up the field to all qualified lawyers whatever their 
professional background and taking active steps to encourage people who might not see 
themselves as candidates to apply (McLachlin 2003, 2-3).
A second solution to eradicating gender bias within the legal system is efforts 
made by the profession to accommodate women and remove barriers that make it difficult 
for them to excel. Justice McLachlin suggests allowing practitioners to enter the judiciary 
at one level with a realistic prospect of progressing to high office. Similarly, the 
government’s recent proposals for salaried part-time work would help bring the judiciary 
into the modem working world, where flexible working practices are becoming more 
common (McLachlin 2003, 3).
Other efforts have been made to eradicate gender bias within the legal system 
including the 1986 conference in Banff, Alberta to provide judges with education on 
gender bias within the courts. This was followed by a public lecture presented by Justice 
Wilson of the Supreme Court of Canada on the role of women as judges which endorsed a 
task force approach to the study of gender bias within the courts (Brockman et al. 1993,
8). Since then, a number of efforts by the legal profession and the judiciary to document 
and eliminate gender bias in the law have been made.
However, the problem of gender bias within the courts continues to illustrate and 
magnify the very fact that few women actually rise to positions of power, specifically the 
bench despite the fact that more and more women are gaining entry into law schools and 
the legal profession. While the rise in the number of women lawyers generally, more than 
50 per cent of law school graduates are women, are encouraging signs, “Male sole
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practitioners earned an average of $126,364 in 2002, while their female counterparts 
earned an average of $86,150. Male law firm partners earned an average of $296,830, 
compared with $263,549 for female partners” (Crosariol 2004, B12). Moreover, women 
lawyers are far more likely to seek part-time work than men, and the choice of part-time 
work became more popular as they advanced in their careers. Women seeking a move 
from full-time to part -time work often are forced to change jobs to do so. Women are 
looking for better child care-related arrangements such as predictable or flexible working 
hours (Crosariol 2004, B12). Thus, the issues that women face remain very much 
established. It appears that there is some mobility for women, but it is not the type of 
movement that one would anticipate or hope for.
If women do not interpret or make laws, laws will not reflect women’s 
perspectives and protect their interests. Referring to the composition of the judiciary in 
Canada, Mahoney points out that “It is beyond question that the judiciary as a group is 
demographically imbalanced. The vast majority of judges are well-educated, middle 
class, middle-aged, and male.. .men comprise about 84% of superior court judicial 
positions and 87% of the trial court bench” (1999, 89-90). Similarly, Regina Graycar 
points out that “Because of the long-standing exclusion of women from law, the 
substantive legal doctrines we use on a day-to-day basis were developed by men, with 
their problems and concerns in mind, and reflect men’s perspectives on the world” 
(1998, 10). Legal procedures and policy overlook injustices to women because they 
were designed by men. This has laid the foundation for gender bias within the legal 
system.
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Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behaviour in the Courts
There is a growing body of literature by Canadian political scientists who have 
examined the composition of the judiciary and how this affects voting behaviour and the 
formation of public policy (for example, Morton, Russell, and Withey, 1991; Knopff, and 
Morton 1992; Manffedi, 1993; Morton, Russell, and Riddell, 1995; Kelly, 1999; Wetstein 
and Ostberg, 1999). Research has shown that attitudes and values clearly influence the 
decision-making process in various national high courts (Ostberg 2002,236). 
Conventionally, judicial attitudes and ideology have been portrayed on a liberal 
conservative spectrum within broad categories of cases or within a particular legal issue. 
As Aliotta points out “The exclusive use of this conceptualization of judicial attitudes and 
ideologies runs the risk of obscuring other relevant ideological dimensions” (2003, 13). 
Gender may be one of these dimensions.
There has been very little research done in Canada to measure the impact of 
women in the judiciary and their influence on the administration of justice. Aliotta points 
out “It is ironic that relatively little attention has been paid to courts as gendered 
institutions and judging as a gendered profession” (2003, 5). The purpose of this section 
is to examine Canadian research on judicial behaviour and look specifically at Canadian 
studies relating to judicial attitudes as determinants of voting behaviour. These studies 
provide additional support for the proposition that increasing the representation of women 
on the bench will result in voting behaviour that is favourable to women’s interests, and 
that women judges through their differing perspectives can bring a new humanity to the 
decision-making process.
In 1994 Morton and his associates conducted a statistical study which examined 
the divisions and ideological differences among Justices on the Supreme Court of
20
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Canada. In their study entitled “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A 
Descriptive Analysis of the First Decade.”, the authors considered gender as a possible 
variable of judicial voting behaviour and concluded that “gender alone is not a reliable 
predictor of a Judge’s voting record (1995, p.35). Similarly, studies at the appeal court 
level have failed to illustrate any differences in decision-making patterns between male 
and female justices. For example, political scientists Peter McCormick and Twyla Job 
analyzed the impact of women judges on the Alberta Court of Appeal between 1985 and 
1992. They looked at whether there was an identifiable difference in the performance of 
men and women judges, even when it came to specific issues such as sexual assault 
offenses. Using Alberta appellate data as a basis on which to test their hypothesis, they 
concluded that only modest differences could be found. McCormick et al. note that “it 
does not appear that women judges make a great deal of difference, and certainly not in 
the directions that might have been expected from related research” (1993, 146). In a 
review of McCormick et al.’s study, Brockman points out that “The author’s analysis 
assumes that that if women make a difference, the difference will appear in the overall 
outcome of cases in terms of wins and losses. This androcentric framework leaves little 
room for the persuasive influence of women lawyers and judges by their presence, 
presentations, and interaction with judges” (1993, 152). Brockman goes on to note that if 
one really wanted to know whether women judges made a difference on the bench, the 
content analysis at the more qualitative level would have to be conducted. Thus, this 
study will explore a more qualitative level of analysis.
Donald Songer and Susan Johnson argue that gender might have particular 
relevance in equality cases, and that female justices on the post-Charter Court will be 
more likely than their male counterparts to rule in favour of individuals who have endured
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unequal treatment under the law (2002, 6). Similarly, political scientists Cynthia Ostberg 
and Mathew Wetstein examined judicial voting after the adoption of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms in 1982, which gave the Canadian justices a new mandate to actively 
protect civil rights and liberties. Ostberg et al. point out that “justices in the post-Charter 
era have been confronted with more controversial cases that are likely to foster and spark 
greater degrees of attitudinal expression” (2004, 1).
The purpose of their study was to explore the applicability of the full-scale 
attitudinal model in post-Charter discrimination cases. The attitudinal model has 
dominated public law literature and suggests that the “the legal rationales put forth by 
justices in their respective opinions are simply masquerades for their underlying personal 
attitudes and values which are the driving force behind most of the decisions they reach” 
(Ostberg et al. 2004, 2). Referring to the attitudinal model, Manfredi points out that it 
rests on two assumptions. He notes “One is that judges, like political actors, are goal 
oriented and seek to advance their goals through legal judgments. Second, the model 
assumes that judicial goals include policy preferences that have been shaped by the 
personal background and experiences of individual judges” (2004, 3). Judges, particularly 
on high courts, are free to determine disputes according to their attitudinally determined 
policy preferences because of the ambiguity of legal rules and provisions (Manfredi 2004,
3).
The study conducted by Ostberg et al. tests whether a salient background 
characteristic, namely gender, plays a role in explaining judicial behaviour on the Court. 
The data for their study was taken from equality decisions published in the “Supreme 
Court Reports” after the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was added to the Canadian 
Constitution from 1984-2002. Cases were included in the analysis if they had
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discrimination claims emanating from Section 15 of the Charter or discrimination claims
under federal or provincial statutory law (Ostberg et al. 2004, 7). The independent
variables examined in this study included the characteristics of the justices, namely
attitudinal liberalism, political party affiliation, and gender.
The variable of gender was included in their analysis because scholarship has
suggested that men and women may perceive equality claims from starkly different
perspectives (for example, Gilligan, 1982; MacKinnon, 1993). Feminist writer Carol
Gilligan’s work “In a Different Voice” suggests that women’s ethical sense is
significantly different from men’s because women view the world and what goes on in it
from a different perspective from men. Specifically, Gilligan believes that women think
differently from men, particularly in responding to moral dilemmas (1982, 27). Justice
Bertha Wilson notes “There is merit in Gilligan’s analysis” (1990, 520). Similarly,
Ostberg and her associate point out that “anyone familiar with the voting patterns of
female justices in the Canadian civil rights and liberties area would agree that they have
approached these disputes with a different voice” (2004,9).
The results of their study found that gender was the single most powerful
predictor of voting behaviour amongst judges when it came to cases involving equality.
This influence was evident at the highest level of statistical significance across all types
of discrimination cases. Ostberg et al. suggest that:
These findings demonstrate that in cases involving various types of 
discrimination, the gender o f the justice matters in a profound way, and women 
on the Canadian Supreme Court do indeed speak “in a different voice.” Even 
when controlling for their ideological differences, the four female justices that 
have served on the high court in the period o f the study have consistently voted 
more liberally in the equality area than their male brethren. This is a 
remarkable finding, because it runs contrary to some prior scholarship 
suggesting that there are no dramatic differences in the voting behaviour of 
male and female justices (2004, 16-7).
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Thus, it appears that this particular study illustrates that female justices speak to the 
victims of discrimination in a different and more liberal voice than their male 
counterparts and that this difference is important because the court system benefits from a 
wider perspective from women and a heightened awareness of certain issues.
Candace White updated and expanded the 1995 study conducted by Morton et al. 
examining a total of 280 Charter decisions from 1993-1996. In her analysis of legal 
rights, White concluded that a gender difference did not exist whereas “The women 
Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada appear to be significantly more sympathetic 
with fundamental freedoms claims than their male counterparts” (2001, 87). Furthermore, 
White found that “for equality claims and to a lesser extent, fundamental freedoms, there 
is a gender difference on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2001, 88). However, this 
difference appeared to be most visible when the issue being deliberated by the court was 
considered a “women’s issue”, i.e., it spoke more to women’s lived experience than it did 
to men’s experience. This study also looks specifically at cases involving women’s issues, 
but it goes beyond previous studies by examining both Charter and non-Charter cases at 
the Supreme Court level.
Studies have also examined the judicial disposition of the women on the Supreme 
Court of Canada by measuring the frequency of dissenting opinions. For example, 
political scientist James Kelly expanded on the work of Morton, Russell, and Riddell’s 
1994 study “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A descriptive analysis of the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s First Decade, 1982-1992” and included data for the 1993- 
1997 period. Kelly found that “Similar to the 1994 study, the three women judges on the 
Court continue to be the most frequent dissenters” (1999, 670). Madame Justice
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L’Heureux-Dube was the most frequent dissenter among them at 22 percent followed by 
Justice Wilson at 19 percent and Justice McLachlin at 16 percent (1999, 670-71). This 
demonstrates that women on the Court show a greater willingness to contradict the 
majority. Morton suggests that “a study of dissenting voting patterns reveals and reflects 
the existence of shared judicial philosophy (1995, 39). Similarly, American political 
scientist Linda Maule found that rates of dissent increased as the number of women 
judges increased on the Minnesota Supreme Court. She supports the view raised by 
Morton and reasons that women justices would be more comfortable breaking ranks with 
the court’s majority if they were not the only women in the court (2000, p.306). The 
differences between male and female dissent on the Supreme Court of Canada provides a 
strong argument for gender-based differences injudicial decision-making.
The Integration of Women into Political Institutions: Does Electing or Appointing 
Women Matter?
The final section of this chapter borrows from the literature on women in 
legislatures. Despite the small body of the political science knowledge on gender and the 
judiciary in Canada, it does parallel the research on women legislators to some extent 
(Martin 1993,166). Perhaps studies of the representation of women at the legislative level 
suggesting that the mere presence of women can make a difference by promoting 
women’s interests can provide some support for the proposition that women judges also 
make a difference.
The integration of women into the Canadian judiciary has been extremely slow.
In 1989, the number of federally-appointed women judges stood at a mere 8.5 percent. 
The number of women judges at the appellate court was very much the same. In 1989, ten 
of the thirteen appellate courts in Canada had either no women or one woman on their
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benches; ten years later there were still only six out of thirteen appellate courts in Canada 
with either a single woman or none at all on the bench (L’Heureux-Dube 2001, 16). It 
was not until the 1990s that women began to make progress into all levels of the 
Canadian judiciary. As of November 1, 1999, 22 percent of federally-appointed judges in 
Canada were women representing a substantial increase from November of 1989. The 
recent addition in August of 2004 of Madam Justice Louise Charron and Madam Justice 
Rosalie Abella, both of the Ontario Court of Appeal, to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
“brings a gender balance to the bench that is unprecedented not only in Canada, but 
elsewhere in the world” (Richer 2004, Al).
In contrast to the judiciary, the integration of women into the legislature began 
much earlier. Between 1970 and 1985 the number of women elected grew steadily (See 
Table 1.1). As Trimble et al. point out “it was during the last 15 years of the twentieth 
century that significant increases occurred” (2003, 31). Women’s percentage of seats in 
the House of Commons increased from less than 1 percent in 1970, to just over 10 percent 
in 1988, to slightly over 20 percent in 2000. Overall, the provinces and territories elected 
more women with 2 percent women elected as members of legislative assemblies (MLAs) 
in 1970, 12 percent in 1988, and 22 percent in 2000 (Trimble et al. 2003, 31-2). Given 
this, a substantial body of literature developed on the impact of women in provincial and 
federal legislatures. Palmer points out that “There are obvious differences between 
legislatures and judicial systems: their institutional functions, selection methods, day-to- 
day operations, and size” (2002, 2). Nonetheless, the research on legislatures can provide 
useful insight into potential institutional responses to an infusion of women in the 
judiciary (Palmer 2002, 2).
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Past research on women in the judiciary or in legislatures focused on their status 
as “tokens”. Martin points out that the term “Token is based on suggestions that women 
may feel strong pressures to conform to the dominant male model of judicial or legislative 
behaviour because of their token status” (1993, 169). Palmer also suggests “Much of this 
early work borrowed from research on the integration of women into the workplace, 
which suggested that token women were often marginalized; they experienced heightened 
pressures to perform and were expected to conform to traditional gender-role expectations 
held by their male counterparts” (2002, 3). The theory of tokenism suggested that as 
women increased in numbers and reached substantial numbers, there would be a similar 
increase in their power and authority. As more women began to gain entry into elected 
office, the effects of tokenism began to disappear. Palmer points out that “As the number 
of female legislators increased, differences between men and women in their ability to 
successfully pass legislation disappeared and women were increasingly likely to propose 
and pass legislation dealing with issues of interest to women” (2002, 3). It appeared that 
an increase in the number of women was consistent with the increase in their political 
influence and success. These findings may be applicable as well within the judiciary.
Scholarship on legislatures suggested that even the addition of small numbers of 
women can have a substantial effect on policy, particularly with regards to women’s 
rights issues. Multiple studies have analyzed the impact of women legislators in Canada 
(for example, Carroll, 1985; Erickson et al., 1991; Bashevkin, 1993; Sharpe, 1994;
Brodie, 1996; Arscott et al., 1997; Collier, 1997; Young et al., 1997; Tremblay, 1998; 
Arscott et al., 1999; Black et al., 2000; Young, 2000; Childs, 2001; Trimble et al., 2003). 
Tremblay and Boivin’s study of House of Commons debates on abortion in July 1988 
found that female MPs were more likely then their male counterparts to take pro-choice
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positions (1991,459). Linda Trimble’s study on the impact of female legislators in
Alberta between 1972 and 1991 also found that, under certain circumstances, women can
make a difference to both the style and content of legislative debate (1991, 87). Trimble
noted that the amount of attention given to women’s issues in the legislature increased
substantially after four feminist opposition MLA’s were elected in 1986. Trimble points
out that “These women had a significant effect on the tone and direction of debate; they
introduced feminist analysis of a wide range of issues, analysis that was adopted by their
male colleagues in the opposition ranks” (1995, 281). She found that the context of
legislative debate shaped opportunity for voicing a variety of women’s interests.
Burt and Lorenzin’s study of Bob Rae’s NDP government in Ontario from 1990 to
1995 also provides some evidence to support the proposition that women are more likely
than men to address women’s issues (Trimble et al. 2003, 139). Similarly, Manon
Tremblay’s study on the impact of women in the thirty-fifth Parliament (1993-1997) also
found some support indicating that female legislators are more likely than their male
counterparts to speak about women’s issues (Tremblay 1998,435-65). Thus, these studies
suggest that women legislators are likely to pursue legislation in areas of interest to
women, i.e. women get these types of issues on the agenda.
The idea that women make a difference in politics can be interpreted in two
different ways. In her work “The Concept of Representation”, Hanna Pitkin looked at
both a descriptive and a substantive interpretation. (1967, 114). She notes:
There is an important difference between representing women (numerical 
representation) and representing women’s interests (substantive 
representation). The numerical representation of women is symbolic but crucial 
because having more women in visible or powerful political positions helps 
dispel the myth that women are apolitical or uninterested in politics” (1995,
275). But the mere existence o f women’s groups or female elites does not 
ensure that the interests o f women will be articulated and viewed as politically
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relevant. The political representation of women requires more than women 
standing for other women; it requires female representatives to act for women 
(1995, 275).
The descriptive representation of women is concerned with who the representative is, i.e. 
it focuses on the representative’s socio-demographic characteristics. Because women 
constitute half of Canada’s population, they should be present in approximately the same 
proportion in decision-making bodies (Trimble et al. 2003, 3). Substantive representation 
on the other hand reflects both opinions and actions. It implies that the person elected or 
appointed commits to consistent action with a view of representing their interests. In 
short, the concept of political representation may be interpreted in two ways; as the 
politics of presence or as the politics of ideas (Trimble et al. 2003, 4).
In applying Pitkin’s theory of women’s representation to the judiciary, it is 
possible that a female Justice may represent women merely by her presence on the bench, 
since only women can descriptively represent women. It is also possible that a female 
Justice substantively represents women if, by her opinions and actions, she sustains the 
wishes, needs or interests of the female population which are deemed women’s issues 
(Tremblay 1998, 439). Referring again to Bliss v. Attorney General o f Canada [1979] 1 
S.C.R. 183., the court ruled that pregnancy was not a form of sex discrimination. This 
decision was reversed a decade later in Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
1219., in which Chief Justice Brian Dickson held that “Bliss was wrongly decided, and 
that discrimination based on pregnancy is indeed created by legislation rather then by 
nature.” While public condemnation of Bliss and its explicit reputation in section 15 
certainly played a role in its reversal, Manfredi points out that “five of the seven justices 
who decided Bliss were no longer on the Court for Brooks” (2004, 2), it could also be
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argued that the mere presence of two new women on the bench was a determinant in 
reversing the decision.
Similarly, in Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252, former Chief 
Justice Dickson’s declared that “Sexual harassment is a form of sex 
discrimination.. .Perpetrators of sexual harassment and victims of the conduct may be 
either male or female. However, in the present sex stratified labour market, those with the 
power to harass sexually will predominantly be male and those facing the greatest risk of 
harassment will tend to be female” (1989, 1284). Brockman suggests that “male judges 
change their decision-making behaviour with the addition of a woman to the bench” 
(2001, 93). It is possible that even low numbers of women have a substantial effect on 
whether or not courts decide in favour of women’s rights claims. These findings are 
similar to the research conducted at the legislative level.
It appears that the effects of numerical gains by women into male-dominated 
institutions are extremely complex. With increasing numbers of women judges and 
justices in Canada, academics are just now beginning to explore the implications of 
having multiple women on the bench. Perhaps studies on the representation of women at 
the legislative level can help shed light on the effects of women in the judiciary. The 
remainder of this study examines whether support for women’s issues increases as more 
women are added to the court and what happens as women lose their token status in the 
judiciary.
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Chapter Two: An Examination of Women in the American Judiciary 
The Framework of Judging in Canada and the United States
The purpose of chapter two is to review the women and politics literature on 
gender and the American judiciary. Specifically, it examines what is already known 
about the behaviour of women on the bench by examining four different studies on 
various levels of American courts. Because women’s representation on all levels of 
American courts have increased over the past few years, studies have been able to analyze 
the impact of multiple women on the bench. It is important to examine American studies 
because they provide insight into the gender differences that exist on the Supreme Court 
of Canada. The American studies may be a predictor of the hypothesis as it relates to 
Canadian justices, i.e., that Canadian female justices do in fact make a difference by 
bringing new values and priorities into their decisions and will position the Canadian 
results in relation to what has already been verified in the United States.
It is necessary to outline the context in which judges in Canada and the United 
States operate. Generally speaking, the process is similar in both countries, however, 
significant differences exist and these differences must be considered. One of the main 
differences between the two court systems is the structure of the court. For example, 
Canada’s system has a “hierarchical and integrated judicial system in which decisions of 
the Supreme Court are binding on all other courts, while the United States has two major 
court systems - the national and state courts” (Hiebert 1996, 129). Each state has its final 
court of appeal which usually has the last word in the state on all constitutional questions. 
Its decisions are final as to state and local law (Hiebert 1996, 129). Cases that arise from 
the state supreme courts may only be heard by the United States Supreme Court if they 
present an issue of federal law Where the state court decided the case on an independent
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and adequate state ground, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear it. It is important 
to note however, that some sections of the Bill of Rights apply directly to the states, thus 
the line between state and federal law is not always as clear as Hiebert suggests.
Moreover, American courts have given broad, almost limitless authority to the federal 
government to pursue national objectives whereas Canadian courts have tended to 
maintain a balance between federal and provincial governments. Robert Vipond points 
out that “since 1949, the Supreme Court of Canada seems to have bent over backwards to 
ensure that neither federal nor provincial governments will become too powerful” (1998, 
22). Similarly, Peter Russell notes “there is one basic principle that runs through the 
federalism cases that have been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, and that is 
balance. The Supreme Court of Canada believes that it has a duty to ensure that neither 
the federal government nor the provinces can overwhelm the other” (1987, 46). Thus, 
from a comparative judicial perspective, American courts have tended to give authority 
and power to the federal government whereas Canadian courts have tried to maintain a 
balance between the two levels of government.
It is also worth understanding how judges accede to the bench in Canada and the 
United States. In the United States, it is the responsibility of the president to nominate 
federal judges who are then subject to Senate consent (L’Heureux-Dube 2001, 16).
Former Canadian Supreme Court Justice L’Heureux-Dube points out that “In practice, 
many nominees for the federal bench undergo extensive public scrutiny. They are chosen 
in the course of a fairly partisan political process. This process affects who is willing to 
put their name forward for consideration and who the President and his advisers decide to 
put through the appointments crucible” (2001, 16). Similarly, Harold Spaeth notes 
“Presidents desire to appoint persons to the Court who reflect their own personal policy
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preferences” (1972, 9). While there have been exceptions, normally this means that the 
nominee will be a member of the President’s party (Spaeth 1972, 9). Thus, it is possible 
that differences between men and women judges are concealed by a selection process 
designed to deliver judges, whose views are compatible with those of their appointing 
president.
In contrast to the United States, appointments to the judiciary in Canada are made 
through an entirely different procedure. Candidates are selected by the Prime Minister on 
the basis of investigations and consultations made by the Minister of Justice (Countess et 
al. 2001, 2). Parliament has no authority either to recommend candidates for such 
appointments. Even though judges can now be reviewed, they cannot be vetoed. As it 
currently stands, the ad hoc committee of seven MPs and two legal laypersons can ask 
questions of the Justice Minister, but is powerless to alter or reject judicial appointments. 
The appointment of Supreme Court judges remains an unregulated prime ministerial 
prerogative (Simpson 2004, A17). L’Heureux-Dube also suggests “The process is not 
entirely secretive, but is also not folly public.. .in the past few years there has been some 
clamouring for more openness in the appointment process in Canada and calls for 
‘American style’ confirmation hearings” (2001, 16). With the appointment of two female 
justices to the Supreme Court, John Geddes points out that “it was the first time a justice 
minister has defended Supreme Court nominations before a committee.. .The Canadian 
Bar Association welcomed the appointments of Abella and Charron, but also called for a 
more open process” (2004, 27). With the addition of two new female justices, debate over 
the review process has increased considerably.
It is important to illustrate the constitutional framework in which both countries 
operate. The Bill of Rights in the United States and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
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Canada are at the core of both legal and political systems. L’Heureux-Dube points out 
that “these two documents... grew out of two very different historical contexts” (2001,
17). The United States Constitution was drafted in the summer of 1787 and immediately 
became the focus of an intense, rich debate as state by state, special conventions were 
held state by state to ratify or reject the new Constitution (Vipond 1998, 17). The Bill of 
Rights was a result of the war of independence and was further refined in the Civil War 
(McMillen et al. 1997, 85-6). Political scientist Janet Hiebert notes “The application of 
the Bill of Rights to the states, described in the American law and politics literature as the 
incorporation doctrine, has had the effect of establishing a new floor of protection for 
citizens -  a minimum of federally protected rights that the states are now constitutionally 
obliged to respect” (1996, 129). It appears that for the United States, constitutional ideals 
were bom out of revolution whereas for Canadians they grew through evolution.
In contrast to the United States, Canada negotiated its way toward independence 
with the patriation of its Constitution and the adoption of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms in 1982. The Charter has placed less emphasis on individual rights and more 
emphasis on collective interests. This is seen in various provisions throughout the 
Charter, for example rights under the Charter are not absolute. The Charter and the courts 
recognize that the government has the right to make laws for the good of most people, 
even if the law violates a Charter right or freedom. If a court finds that a law does this, 
the court will consider whether the violation can be justified under section 1. The courts’ 
interpretation of the interaction between Charter rights and section 1 limits can be of 
crucial importance to women. This can be seen in the case of Anderson v. Luoma: a 
lesbian mother separating from her lesbian partner sought maintenance for the children, 
pursuant to the British Columbia Family Relations Act. She challenged the legislation
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relying on section 1 of the Charter. Justice Dohm of the British Columbia Supreme Court
rejected the maintenance claim on the basis of his interpretation of the legislation stating:
The phrase ‘living together as man and wife’...can only mean what it says, 
namely, a man and woman living together and not married. Two persons o f the 
same gender living together misses the mark by 50 percent. The defendant in 
my view can never be a parent and it is highly unlikely that she could ever 
become a stepparent to the children (at 141).
A further difference between Canada’s Charter and the United States Bill of 
Rights stems from the process through which the Charter was added to the Constitution in 
1982. As a result of a political compromise, the notwithstanding clause, created by 
section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, was invoked in Canada to 
protect specific legislation (Kahana 2001, 256). This allows the federal or provincial 
governments to restrict the applicability of certain sections of the Charter to specific 
legislation. Tsvi Kahana points out that “the notwithstanding mechanism was actually 
used in sixteen different pieces of legislation.. .only three provinces (Quebec, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta) and one territory (Yukon) have included notwithstanding 
declarations in their legislation” (2001,255). Perhaps the most notable example of the use 
of notwithstanding clause was in Quebec. Quebec invoked the notwithstanding clause to 
shield legislation that prohibited the use of any language other than French in commercial 
signs. They invoked the notwithstanding clause to override a decision of the Supreme 
Court, Ford v. Attorney General o f Quehec[ 1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 that had found this law to 
violate freedom of expression under the Charter. It is also important to point out that 
section 33 has never been used to override section 15 in any significant way.
One of the most crucial areas where the United States and Canada differ is in their 
interpretation of equality. In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that
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affirmative action programs may violate the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment which states that:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities o f citizens o f the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person o f life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws (Spaeth 1972,
52).
As noted by L’Heureux-Dube, in Canada “equality provisions are somewhat more
expansive than the relevant portion of the Fourteenth Amendment which states that ‘no
state shall deprive any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’”
(2001, 18). Section 15 of the Charter in contrast suggests that:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit o f the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability (Constitution Act,
1982).
Unlike the United States Bill of Rights, the Canadian Charter does not simply affirm the 
right to be equal, instead it speaks of equality without discrimination. With the addition of 
the Charter, Canadians have gone beyond the stage of requiring that laws be applied 
equally, to the stage of requiring that the laws themselves treat individuals as substantive 
equals. This finally is the language of substantive equality. The paradigm of equality now 
extends far beyond the traditional human rights domain and offers new understandings in 
family law, criminal law and in how the law affects the poor and the elderly. It changes 
the way sexual orientation, sexual assault, disability, freedom of expression and 
pornography are approached (L’Heureux-Dube 2001, 18).
While it is apparent that significant differences exist between the two judicial 
systems, for the most part the process of judging is very similar in both Canada and the
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United States. In light of the fact that there is little research in Canada measuring the 
impact and influence of women in the judiciary, it is worth examining studies of women 
in the American judiciary, despite the differences between the two judicial systems. These 
American studies may provide insight into women and the judiciary in Canada and 
whether women can have a substantial effect on policy, particularly with regards to 
women’s rights issues.
In 1981, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor became the first woman added of the 
highest court of the United States. Sue Davis points out that “From her appointment in 
1981 through the 1988 court term, her voting record closely resembled that of her 
conservative colleague William Rehnquist” (1993, 134). However, in cases that related to 
women, O’Connor often went against her male colleague. As a member of the Arizona 
Senate, a state trial judge, and finally as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeal, 
O’Connor established a reputation as a strong conservative. Davis goes on to note that 
“Her political background and profound views provided a solid foundation for the 
expectation that as a member of the Supreme Court, O’Connor would cast conservative 
votes in civil liberties cases, that is, in cases involving a conflict between an individual 
and the government, she would support the latter” (1993, 135). One aspect of her 
background that was different from the rest of the justices who sat on the Supreme Court, 
was her sex. While her colleague Justice Rehnquist became a clerk for the Supreme Court 
Justice Robert Jackson after graduating law school, O’Connor, who graduated third in the 
same class, was unable to find employment (Davis 1993,135). It has been argued that 
O’Connor’s gender shaped her career by leading her into the public rather than private 
sector as well as into the state and local rather than national level. This suggests that 
perhaps O’Connor’s experience as a woman could influence her judicial decision making.
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While it is clear that ideologically speaking O’Connor is a conservative justice, it is
possible that her views may differ substantially from those of her conservative male
counterparts because of her gender.
In her study entitled “The Voice of Sandra Day O’Connor”, Davis examined
several aspects of the voting behaviour of O’Connor and other members of the Court in
order to determine whether O’Connor’s decision making reflects a uniquely feminine
voice and whether a gender difference does in fact exist on the Supreme Court. Davis
examined cases involving specific issues decided with full opinion during the 1981
through 1991 terms. The objective throughout this study was to determine whether legal
scholar Suzanna Sherry’s feminist theories in jurisprudence had any merit. Davis notes
“Sherry related a feminine perspective in jurisprudence to the classical republican
tradition in political philosophy. In contrast to the modem paradigm, which is liberal,
individualistic, atomistic, non-technological, abstract, and rule-based, the classical
paradigm is communitarian, holistic, teleological, and contextual, rather than rule-based”
(1993,136). Sherry determined that:
The exclusion of women from the legal system has had a profound impact: the 
modem paradigm has dominated political and legal theory as a result o f male 
domination of the public sphere.. .the influx o f large numbers o f women into 
that sphere might radically alter the chances o f re-integrating the classical 
paradigm or at least change the likely balance o f the resolution o f the tension 
between the two paradigms” (1989, 579).
Moreover, Sherry examined Justice O’Connor’s opinions in cases in which the rights in
question belonged to individuals as members of communities rather than as autonomous
units. Sherry argued that O’Connor has tended to support individual rights only when
they involve community membership, thus the justice does not support the rights of
criminal defendants. Sherry places an emphasis on the community and concludes that
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O’Connor’s opinions, particularly at the point where they differ from those of Justice 
Rehnquist, suggests that Justice O’Connor has a uniquely feminine perspective in her 
decision making process (Sherry 1989, 592).
The study conducted by Davis first examined Sherry’s theory that O’Connor 
disagreed with Rehnquist in particular ways that illustrated her emphasis on 
communitarian values. The objective for Davis was to determine whether O’Connor was 
more likely than Rehnquist to support the claimant by casting a liberal vote in cases 
relating to full membership in the community. Thus, Davis analyzed a comparison of the 
votes in cases involving civil rights and the establishment clause (Davis 1993, 137). 
Second, Davis wanted to test Sherry’s proposition that O’Connor’s support for rights that 
are interdependent, distinguish her from her conservative male colleagues. Davis notes 
that “The construction of separate scales for civil rights and criminal procedures makes it 
possible to compare O’Connor’s support for claimants in each area relative to the other 
justices. If she parts company with the other conservatives in cases involving equality, the 
scales should show an appreciable difference in her position relative to the other justices” 
(1993, 137). Finally, Davis tests the proposition that O’Connor’s views contradict the 
other conservatives in the area of civil rights but converge regarding rights of criminal 
defendants. Thus, Davis’ hypothesis suggests that O’Connor should have written a higher 
percentage of special opinions in cases involving civil rights than she has in criminal 
procedure cases (Davis 1993, 137).
Davis’ results indicated that Sherry’s findings were accurate in one sense. While it 
is clear that O’Connor is a conservative member of the court, she is more supportive of 
claims that involve equality than she is of claims brought by criminal defendants. 
Furthermore, O’Connor’s decision making was more liberal than Rehnquist regarding
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civil rights, but she was also more liberal than he was in the area of criminal rights. 
O’Connor was also more likely to disagree with the majority in cases involving civil 
rights; this was manifested in the higher rates at which she has written special opinions. 
These findings could suggest that O’Connor’s voice on the Supreme Court is distinctly 
feminine. However, Davis concluded that if women judges speak in a different voice as 
Sherry’s theory has proposed, the proof will be found only by studying more than one 
jurist (Davis 1993, 139).
In 1993, President Bill Clinton’s appointment of the second woman, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, to the Supreme Court provided a new opportunity for academic study 
(Cushman et al. 2000, 15). In contrast to Justice O’Connor, Palmer points out that 
“Justice Ginsburg had been called the Thurgood Marshall of the women’s movement” 
(2002, 1). Ginsburg was the director of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project and argued 
six sex-discrimination cases before the Supreme Court, winning five of those cases 
(Palmer 2002, 1). Referring to Ginsburg, Palmer points out “Before arriving on the bench, 
her approach to women’s rights issues was well known” (2002, 1). All of this raises the 
question of whether a second female justice on the Supreme Court has any impact on how 
women on the bench treat women’s rights cases.
In her study entitled “Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Supreme Court’s 
Reaction to Its Second Female Member”, Barbara Palmer assesses the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of women’s rights cases since Ginsburg’s appointment. Palmer tests four 
different hypotheses throughout her study. In her first hypothesis, Palmer suggests that 
the two women on the Court will write more opinions in women’s rights cases than their 
male colleagues. Second, Palmer suggests that Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg will rank 
among the top justices in their support for women’s rights claims. Third, Palmer states
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that the Supreme Court’s support for women’s rights claims will increase after the 
addition of Justice Ginsburg. Fourth, Palmer suggests that individual judges will not react 
to the addition of the second women justice with uniform increases in support of women’s 
rights issues (2002, 4-5).
The data used for Palmer’s analysis were created by conducting a LEXUS search 
with key terms “Fourteenth Amendments and women,” “Equal Pay Act,” and “sex- 
discrimination.” Palmer defines women’s rights issues to include “all sex-discrimination 
cases decided during the 1969-2000 terms, based on the Fourteenth Amendment and Fifth 
Amendments, Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, Title IX of the Education 
Amendments, and the Equal Pay Act” (2002, 5). These cases include issues of sex- 
discrimination and sexual harassment in the work place and in educational settings, 
affirmative action, parental rights, jury service, social security benefits, and access to 
education (Palmer 2002, 5).
With regard to Palmer’s first hypothesis suggesting that the two women on the 
Court will write more opinions in women’s rights cases than their male colleagues,
Palmer found that the two women on the Court have written the majority opinion in half 
of the twelve women’s rights cases decided since 1993. In the remaining six cases in 
which the male justice wrote the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring 
opinion in one, and Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in another, and Justice 
O’Connor wrote a dissent in yet another (2002, 5). This could suggest that, similar to 
studies conducted at the legislative level, women at the judicial level can also be quite 
vocal when it comes to women’s rights cases. Moreover, this could suggest that as more 
women are added to the bench, their ability to shape legal policy also increases (Palmer 
2002, 6).
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Palmer’s second hypothesis suggesting that Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg 
would rank among the top justices in their support for women’s rights claims was also 
largely confirmed. Justice Ginsburg had the highest rate of support of all of the justices at 
91.7% (Palmer 2002, 6). While Justice O’Connor ranks fifth, she still has a support rate 
of over 80% in sex-discrimination claims and there is a clear distinction between 
O’Connor and the justices ranked in the bottom half.
Palmer also finds evidence that both Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg approach 
women’s rights claims differently than they do in other areas of law. As noted earlier in 
Davis’ study, O’Connor tends to vote with the more conservative wing of the Court. 
Palmer points out that “An analysis of her overall agreement rates in all cases decided by 
full opinion from 1993-1999 shows that she voted most often with Justice Rehnquist; they 
agreed 81.6% of the time. But in women’s rights cases, they only voted together 63.6% of 
the time” (2002, 6-7). Moreover, Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg generally voted 
together 66.6% of the time; however, in women’s rights cases, they voted together 90.9% 
of the time, i.e. 10 out of 11 times (2002, 7). The research on women at the legislative 
level has illustrated that women will cross party lines to work together to pass legislation 
concerning women, Palmer has demonstrated that this also appears to be the case to a 
certain extent on the Supreme Court.
In her third hypothesis, Palmer suggests that Court support for women’s issues 
would increase after Justice Ginsburg’s appointment, but not to the same degree that it 
did after Justice O’Connor’s appointment. As Palmer points out “when there were no 
women on the Court, the Court took the pro-equality position 63.0% of the time, which 
suggests that even without women on the bench, the Supreme Court had a relatively high 
level of support for sex-discrimination claims. After the arrival of Justice O’Connor, the
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Court’s level of support increased 11.1%, to 74.1%. With a single woman on the bench,
the Court voted in support of women’s rights almost three-fourths of the time” (2002, 7).
However, Palmer’s fourth hypothesis was also largely confirmed. With the addition of
Justice Ginsburg who was well known for her support in women’s rights cases, the
Court’s level of support remained the same (Palmer 2002, 7).
Thus, the addition of a second woman to the Court did not have the kind of effect
that Justice O’Connor’s appointment did, lending support for hypothesis four suggesting
that individual judges will not react to the addition of the second woman justice with
uniform increases in support for women’s rights issues (2002, 8). Palmer ascribes to the
cases themselves as a reason for the leveling off of the Court’s support for women’s
issues. Palmer notes:
The court tends to hand down a “landmark” decision with a sweeping ruling 
when it opens up a new issue or recognizes a new right, as it did in Roe v.
Wade.. .Cases that come to the Court in the wake o f these kinds o f decisions 
tend to deal with narrow and more complex questions regarding the application 
of this new right, as the Court tries to fill in gaps (2002, 10).
However, Palmer points out that there is evidence that sex discrimination is one area of 
law that does not conform to the traditional pattern of a sweeping ruling followed by 
narrower, more complex questions. While there are areas of law where the evolution of 
the issues is clear, i.e. abortion, Palmer notes that this kind of pattern is not nearly as 
obvious in sex-discrimination cases (2002, 11). Moreover, Palmer notes that important 
differences exist between the particular groups of male justices and their voting behaviour 
over time. Those justices who could remember an all-male bench became increasingly 
supportive of sex-discrimination claims as women were added to the Court. However,
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among the men who had always served with a woman, the impact of a second female 
justice was decidedly mixed (Palmer 2002, 10).
While research has illustrated that the reaction to the first woman in the judiciary 
can be supportive towards women’s issues, as demonstrated by Davis in her study of 
O’Connor, Palmer shows that the Court’s overall support for women’s rights claims did 
not increase in the wake of the arrival of Justice Ginsburg. However, Palmer did 
demonstrate that the two women justices are among the Court’s strongest supporters of 
women’s rights issues and act as the spokespeople in this area, writing half of the Court’s 
majority opinions in this area of law since Justice Ginsburg’s appointment (Palmer 2002, 
10).
In an earlier study Palmer addresses the notion of whether women judges speak in 
a different voice. She notes “there is clearly less consensus in this body of literature over 
the question of whether or not women judges exhibit a different voice and their ability to 
make these kinds of substantive changes to traditional legal reasoning” (2001, 96). Much 
of the research in the United States on whether women in the judiciary speak in a 
different voice has focused on Justice O’Connor. Early assessments suggested that Justice 
O’Connor did exhibit a unique feminine perspective (see for example Sherry, 1986; 
Behunak-Long, 1992). However, others have argued just the opposite as demonstrated by 
Davis. Palmer notes that considerably less research has been done on Justice Ginsburg, 
but preliminary results have suggested that her jurisprudence does not reflect a different 
or feminine voice (2001, 95). Thus, this study will attempt to evaluate women judges’ 
jurisprudence to obtain a more complete appraisal o f their influence on legal policy 
change.
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A third American study worth examining is Allen and Wall’s study on women 
who have served on state supreme courts. This study examines the 59 women who have 
served on the highest courts in 41 states and the District of Columbia. There have only 
been a few instances in which two or more women served together on the bench, and only 
the Minnesota Supreme Court is made up of a majority of women where four of seven 
justices are female. The authors’ analysis of the Minnesota state supreme court may offer 
some indication as to whether or not there will be more sensitivity to gender dynamics on 
the Canadian Supreme Court. Similar to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the two new 
Canadian Supreme Court justices, Louise Charron and Rosalie Abella will bring the 
number of female justices to four out of nine, a virtual gender balance (Wente 2004,
A 19). While the number of women justices in this study is not large enough to allow a 
determination of what would happen if women were a majority in the judiciary, the small 
number of women does provide a unique opportunity to assess their behaviour on the 
bench.
Allen et al. examine four role orientations of judges in order to explain judicial 
decisions: the Representative role, the Token, the Outsider, and the Different Voice.
These role orientations have been used to describe the various roles of women who serve 
on state Supreme Courts (Allen et al. 1993,158). The Representative role has been used 
to study the behaviour of women at the legislative level. As noted earlier, Pitkin discusses 
the notion of political representation and the issue of representation of women. Allen et 
al. point out that “Adapting this notion to female justices leads to the assumption that a 
Representative incorporates a woman’s viewpoint in legal matters directly impacting on 
women as a category, such as cases involving damages for sexual assault. This results in a 
‘pro-women’ voting record on women’s issues cases” (1993,158). In a study conducted
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by Martin entitled “Judicial Role Orientations and Feminism”, survey responses to 
hypothetical women’s issue cases revealed that female judges who called themselves 
feminists were twice as likely as all other respondents to advance pro-woman positions 
(1993, 15). The few studies that have analyzed behaviour in actual cases revealed that 
women were far more likely than their male counterparts to cast pro-women votes on 
feminist issues (Allen et al. 1993,158).
The Token role suggests that women who are isolated in male-dominated 
institutions may change their behaviour in order to conform to the dominant majority, i.e. 
they apply the role orientation of the Token. As Allen et al. point out “[women] avoid 
drawing attention to the characteristic that sets them off as a minority member, and obtain 
legitimacy in the group’s eye” (1993,158). In the judicial institution, Tokens tend to 
move toward a centrist position on the court, they see themselves as reasonable people 
who listen to both sides of the argument and vote for the sounder set of legal principles 
(Allen et al. 1993,158). Token female justices are distinguished by voting records that lie 
within the central area of any spectrum and do not demonstrate behaviour that 
differentiates them from other justices (Allen et al. 1993,158).
In contrast to the Token role is the Outsider role. Instead of staying within the 
central area of the continuum, Outsiders disregard institutional traditions (Allen et al. 
1993,158). They would therefore address audiences outside the institution and exhibit 
comparatively extreme voting behaviour (Allen et al. 1993, 159). Current literature 
supports the idea that the Outsider label is used to describe female political elites. For 
example, studies conducted by Werner and Backtold found that personality characteristics 
might lead one to expect this type of behaviour from women judges (Allen et al. 1993,
159). Allen et al note “Werner and Backtold found that women who were the first of their
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class to enter a specific political arena had high scores on intelligence, dominance, 
adventurousness, unconventionality, and radicalism. The authors conclude that this set of 
women having rejected one set of societal norms, are not likely to be constrained by the 
norms associated with the institution to which they have gained admittance” (1993, 159). 
Moreover, the traits that Werner et al. describe are similar to traits found among 
individuals who are not reluctant to go against group norms. Judges possessing high self 
esteem have been found to deviate from institutional norms more frequently than those 
who lack self-esteem (Allen et al. 1993, 159).
The fourth role orientation is the Different Voice, a term coined by Carol Gilligan 
based on the notion that women think differently from men, adopting a different approach 
to morality (Allen et al. 1993,159). Allen et al. point out that “If female justices have a 
different view of morality and place a higher value on relational concerns than their male 
counterparts, there will be an absence of common ground between women and men on 
the bench” (1993,159). Thus, female justices would demonstrate extremism and isolation 
in dissenting behaviour. However, as noted earlier by Palmer, research findings 
supporting the Different Voice role have varied considerably. While some women judges 
have made off-the-bench remarks that suggest the presence of a different voice, other 
research disputes these findings and found only partial support for the notion that women 
judges bring a different perspective to judging (Allen et al. 1993,159).
In order to document the voting behaviour of female justices on state supreme 
courts, Allen et al. required an adequate number of non-unanimous decisions to analyze.
A sample of 24 female justices who have served on 50 courts in 21 states was selected 
(1993,159). Allen et al. note that “The potential for high dissent rates was ensured by 
examining courts known to produce a substantial number of split decisions” (1993, 159).
47
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Allen et al. explored state court decisions in three issue areas including women’s issues, 
criminal rights, and economic liberties. The criminal rights and economic liberties were 
necessary to allow an assessment of three role orientations, Token, Outsider, and 
Different Voice. The addition of women’s issues cases provided an opportunity to test 
whether women state supreme court justices act as Representatives (Allen et al. 1993,
160).
Their findings indicate that women state Supreme Court justices act as 
Representatives when confronted with issues that are of immediate concern to women. 
These findings are compatible with literature that reports that women political elites 
engage in strongly pro-women decisional behaviour. Their research also supports the 
hypothesis that a large number of women state supreme court justices behave as 
Outsiders. The distribution of scores provided scant support for the proposition that 
women justices adopt a Token role; the data provided stronger support for the Outsider 
hypothesis. For example, in the area of criminal rights, three quarters of the women’s 
scores were extreme, as opposed to only 31.2 percent of the men’s scores and for 
economic liberties, nearly three quarters of the women’s scores are extreme while only 
29.8 percent of the men’s scores fit this classification (Allen et al. 1993,162). A smaller 
number of women manifested behaviour indicative of the Different Voice Role. For 
criminal rights and economic liberties, three times as many women as men fall into the 
Different voice category (Allen et al. 1993,164).
All things considered, Allen et al. found that women justices tend to act as the 
most pro-women members of the court on issues of immediate concern to women. 
Women tend to occupy positions at the extreme liberal end of the political spectrum and 
they tend to engage in both extreme and isolated dissenting behaviour in criminal and
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economic cases (Allen et al. 1993,165). Results from the investigation of women’s issues 
cases also indicated that female justices do in fact influence the structure of the law 
(Allen et al. 1993,165). The results for the Minnesota state supreme court, the first high 
court in which women achieved majority status indicated that none of the women on the 
court adopted the Token role orientation. For criminal rights cases, three out of four 
women were Outsiders, while none of the men displayed that behaviour. In terms of 
economic liberties, two of the women were Outsiders while only one man fit the role. 
Only one women on each scale demonstrated the Different Voice, while only one man on 
the economic liberties scale did so (Allen et al. 1993,162).
Overall, this study demonstrated that female justices do influence the structure of 
the law with respect to women’s issues, i.e. women justices are more likely than men to 
be the most pro-women members of their court on women’s issues (Representatives).
This study also illustrated that women may be educating male justices and the broader 
legal community through their dissents. However, Allen et al. state that whether these 
women contribute a different voice or whether they are making a distinctive contribution 
to precedents in criminal and economic case precedents is a question that other academics 
may want to pursue (1993,165). It is also worth noting that former Canadian Supreme 
Court Justice, Bertha Wilson, fell into all four categories. Thus, whether these categories 
are really all that meaningful, could be questioned.
A fourth American study draws similar conclusions to the Allen and Wall study, 
predominantly with respect to their finding that a gender difference does exist, but only in 
two of three subject areas examined. Davis, Haire and Songer examine voting behaviour 
on the federal intermediate appellate judiciary in employment discrimination, criminal 
rights procedure, and obscenity cases. Davis et al. note that “The U.S. courts of appeals
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play a vital role in interpreting federal law, enforcing norms and creating public policy. 
Because the Supreme Court can review only a limited number of cases from the lower 
federal courts of appeals, the decisions of the courts of appeals are final in an 
overwhelming majority of cases” (1993,130). Moreover, the authors note that studies 
have shown that the appellate courts have substantial decision-making discretion (Davis 
et al. 1993,130).
Feminist legal theory has suggested that women judges would be expected to vote 
differently from their male counterparts in ways that reflect a tendency to emphasize the 
right to full membership in a community rather than individual rights against the 
community (Davis et al 1993, 131). When communitarian values and individual rights 
conflict, women judges would be expected to support the former. To measure whether 
women will transform the law in ways that feminist legal scholars predict, Davis et al. 
drew from samples containing more than 3,000 published opinions for both search and 
seizure cases and employment discrimination cases. The sample contained 1,283 votes in 
search and seizure cases and 519 votes from employment discrimination cases. The 
samples included the votes of 9 female and 122 male judges in obscenity cases, 15 
females and 237 males in search and seizure cases, and 16 female and 188 males in 
employment discrimination cases (Davis et al. 1993, 131).
In employment discrimination cases, a vote was classified as conservative if  it 
supported either the defendant or, in cases involving a male challenging an affirmative 
action plan, the plaintiffs position. A vote was classified as liberal if it supported the 
plaintiffs charge of discrimination in all other cases. In Search and Seizure decisions, 
votes were classified as conservative if they upheld a search or allowed the use of 
challenged evidence. Votes held that a challenge was unreasonable or that challenged
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evidence could not be used was classified as liberal. For obscenity cases, votes were 
classified as either supporting or opposing a restriction on the use and dissemination of 
the materials in question (Davis et al. 1993, 131). Cross-tabulations by the sex of the 
judge for each of the three types of cases were conducted.
The results indicated that statistically significant differences between men and 
women judges were evident in two of the three areas examined. The employment 
discrimination cases illustrated that women were more likely than their male counterparts 
to support claimants. For search and seizure cases, women were more likely than their 
male colleagues to support the claims of criminal defendants. In obscenity cases, 
however, there were no significant differences in the behaviour of male and female judges 
(Davis et al. 1993, 132). The results of this study provide some support for the 
proposition that women judges bring a different perspective to the bench, although it 
failed to produce any evidence that such concerns provide the basis for women’s votes in 
obscenity cases. Davis et al. suggest that “Although the results in two of the three areas 
examined are consistent with the proposition that women judges bring a different 
perspective to their decision-making, drawing conclusions may be problematic” (1993, 
133).
Davis et al. suggest five different reasons for the lack of evidence of women’s 
unique voice. First, it is possible that the psychological and legal theories of difference 
are simply inaccurate. Women may tend to support the claimant in employment 
discrimination cases because they are likely to have experienced such discrimination 
directly, or have encountered gender-related differences throughout their lives. Second, 
while a different voice may be evident, it may not reveal itself in analyses of voting 
behaviour. Davis et al. point out that “Additional research is needed before any
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conclusions can be drawn regarding the extent to which, if at all, women judges differ 
from their male colleagues” (1993, 133). Third, it is possible that differences between 
men and women judges are neutralized by the very nature of law. Because women judges 
are still relatively new and make up a small percentage of the bench, women judges are 
likely to be particularly conscious of the importance of maintaining their reputations as 
neutral decision makers and to faster collegial decision-making, which is often perceived 
as a female preference. Fourth, Davis et al. note that “a generational phenomenon may 
mask any possible gender differences. Women currently serving on the federal courts 
attended law school and pursued careers in an environment thoroughly controlled by men, 
in which any hint of a different approach would most likely have been considered 
evidence of women’s lack of capacity to acquire legal skills and understand the law” 
(1993, 133). Finally, Davis et al. believe that it is possible that differences between men 
and women judges injudicial decision-making are obscured by a selection process 
designed to produce judges, male or female, whose views are compatible with those of 
their appointing president (1993, 133).
Overall, the findings presented in this study suggest that any evidence of women’s 
unique voice will emerge only when women are trained and socialized in an environment 
that welcomes diversity in values and approaches to decision-making. Davis et al. note 
“Only future research examining career patterns and socialization of women judges, as 
well as their voting behaviour and opinions, will make it possible to assess the nature and 
extent of women’s impact on the legal system” (1993,133). Thus, despite the problems 
involved in attempting to define the differences between men and women judges; these 
four American studies provide some support for the proposition that women judges are 
changing the American legal system to reflect women’s different life experience. While
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these studies offer little empirical support for the theory that women judges will speak in 
a different voice, the thrust of the findings generally support the position that women 
judges are making a unique contribution to America’s legal system. However, this 
contribution appears to be most evident with respect to issues involving gender fairness.
In addition to using a quantitative analysis of votes, this particular study will build 
upon the American literature by conducting a qualitative assessment of jurisprudence, i.e., 
this study will be analyzing specific cases relating to women’s issues. Unlike the 
American studies discussed in this chapter, this study will be using some of the basic 
tenets of feminist methodology, such as placing women’s experiences at the centre, 
contextualizing women’s lives within their social and cultural milieu, and being attentive 
to the diversity of women’s experiences. Thus, if a different voice is evident amongst 
female justices, it will reveal itself in a qualitative assessment of jurisprudence, rather 
than an analysis of voting behaviour.
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Chapter Three: An Examination of Feminist Legal Theories
A substantial body of literature does exist on gender and the legal system which is 
concerned largely with the ways gender and law interrelate, i.e. the impact of law on 
women, women as legal actors and women as the subject of law (Binion 1993,140). 
Within this field of study is the subfield of feminist jurisprudence, an area of analysis 
which examines discourse on the relationship between women’s experience and 
theorizing on law and legal institutions. Gayle Binion points out that “Feminist 
jurisprudence...includes the myriad ways women’s experience affects perspectives on 
potentially all subjects of law and its processes” (1993,140). Feminist theorizing 
concerning human behaviour and social institutions is based on actual experience, not 
abstract questions. Patriarchal power structures within the legal system determine who is 
capable of doing what, for whom and for how much, what human beings are and what 
they might become (Weedon 1987,1). Feminism is concerned with changing these power 
structures between men and women in society.
Despite their differences in schools of thought, feminist legal theorists are united 
in their basic belief that society is shaped by and dominated by men. Feminist 
jurisprudence provides an analysis and critique of women’s position in patriarchal society 
and explores the nature and extent of women’s oppression. It examines the role of law in 
maintaining and perpetuating patriarchy. Thus, feminist legal theory has two key 
components. The first is an examination and critique of the theoretical issues concerning 
the relationship between law and gender. The second component involves the application 
of a feminist analysis and perspectives to key areas of law, for example, family, 
reproductive freedom, pornography and discrimination, with a focus on law reform. 
Chapter Three is an attempt to explore different strands of feminist legal theory that have
54
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
developed throughout the years. It will look more specifically at feminism and how it 
applies to ethics. There are multiple views recognizing women as equals before the law, 
and recognizing that women are differently situated from men regarding economic 
opportunities, vulnerability to violence, and biology.
It is difficult to define and identify what makes an approach to ethics feminist. 
Feminist legal theorist Claudia Card defines feminist ethics as the “attempt to highlight 
the differences between how males and females experience and interpret their respective 
situations in life, to provide strategies for human agents to deal with the dilemmas arising 
in the private as well as in the public spheres and to deconstruct any ethic and ethical 
conduct that bolsters any systemic subordination of women and other human beings” 
(1991,17). Thus, it appears that feminist approaches to ethics have the ability to create 
gender-equal rather than gender-neutral ethics, i.e., an ethical theory which generates 
non-sexist ethical practices for both men and women.
While feminist legal theory and feminist ethics became quite popular in the 1980s 
after the emergence of the Women’s Liberation Movement of the 1960s and 1970s, 
literature surrounding the gendered nature of ethics can be traced back much earlier. For 
example, in The Subjection o f  Women, 19th century utilitarian philosopher John Stewart 
Mill argued that society had set up a double standard which not only assessed ethics and 
ethical conduct differently for women and men, but also specified and imposed upon 
women a set of virtues and intellectual powers that served only to reinforce society’s 
patriarchal structure. Referring to the natural differences between men and women, Mill 
notes:
For, however great and apparently ineradicable the moral and intellectual 
differences between men and women might be, the evidence of their being 
natural differences could only be negative. Those only could be inferred to be
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natural which could not possibly be artificial-the residuum, after deducting 
every characteristic of either sex which can admit of being explained from 
education or external circumstances. The profound knowledge of the laws of 
the formation of character is indispensable to entitle any one to affirm even that 
there is any difference, much more what the difference is, between the two 
sexes considered as moral and rational beings; and since no one as yet, has that 
knowledge, no one is thus entitled to any positive opinion on the subject (1993,
157).
Thus, for Mill, one set of virtues must apply equally to both men and women. However, 
Mill goes on to point out that “in an otherwise just state of things, it is not, therefore, I 
think, a desirable custom, that the wife should contribute by her labour to the income of 
the family”(1993,157). While he recommends that wives should stay home for the good 
of the family, no legal or social restrictions can equitably be put on women who attempt 
to deviate from the norm.
Most feminist ethicists during the 20th century considered ethics to be gendered 
and looked at two different assumptions. The first assumption is based on the notion that 
relationships and connectedness with others develop and strengthen the sense of self. The 
second assumption assumes that the more particular, concrete, partial and emotional 
knowledge is, the more likely it is to represent reality as it truly is (Card 1992, 32). In her 
book entitled Feminist Ethics, Alison Jagger best summarizes the feminist position in 
ethical speculation as it developed during the 20th century, pointing out that traditional 
Western ethics failed women in five interrelated ways. The first way that traditional ethics 
has failed women is by favouring the rights and interests of men over those of women 
(Jagger 1992, 363). For Jagger, ethical speculation has demonstrated little concern for 
women’s as opposed to men’s interests and rights. Second, Jagger believes that traditional 
Western ethics dismissed as ethically uninteresting the problems arising in the “private 
sphere,” the realm in which women cook, clean, and care for the young, the aged, and the
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sick (1992,363). Third, this body of thought implies that, on average, women are not as
ethically developed as men. Fourth, Jagger points out that traditional western moral
theories overvalue culturally masculine traits, such as independence, autonomy,
separation, mind, reason, culture, transcendence (excellence), war, and death; and
undervalue culturally feminine traits, such as interdependence, community, connection,
body, emotion, nature, immanence (within the soul), peace, and life (1992, 364), Finally,
this body of ethical speculation favours culturally masculine approaches to ethical
reasoning which places importance on rules, universality, and impartiality over culturally
feminine ways of ethical reasoning which emphasize relationships, particularity
(appreciating the uniqueness of each situation), and partiality, i.e., showing personal
preference. Thus, for Jagger, a feminist approach to ethics entails women resisting and
overcoming their continuing oppression under patriarchy.
One of the most influential feminist ethicists is Carol Gilligan. Gilligan has
stressed that traditional Western ethical theory is inaccurate because it ignores and
trivializes those characteristics of personality and virtues culturally associated with
women. In her book In a Different Voice, Gilligan studies eighty men and women and
how they react to various hypothetical and non-hypothetical situations. Gilligan’s theory
of moral development suggests that women tend to think and speak in a different way
than men when they confront ethical dilemmas. Gilligan contrasts a feminine ethic of care
with a masculine ethic of justice. She argues that these gender differences in moral
reasoning are due to contrasting images of self. For example, as part of her research,
Gilligan asks different women what morality means to them. She found that:
The common thread that runs through these statements is the wish not to hurt 
others and the hope that in morality lies a way of solving conflicts so that no 
one will hurt. This theme is indendently introduced by each of the women as
57
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the most specific item in their response to a most general question. The moral 
person is one who helps others: goodness in service, meeting one’s obligations 
and responsibilities to others, if possible without sacrificing oneself (1982, 65- 
6).
The overall answers by these women are sometimes muted, often halting, but together 
they reveal a common image which she believes guides women throughout their lives. 
The responses show a feminine fusion of identity and intimacy. Gilligan believes that 
women’s greater need for relationships is due to a distinct feminine identity formed early 
in life. The greater need for relationships in turn leads to the ethic of care (Gilligan 1982, 
62-3).
Gilligan also finds that men select a vocubulary of self-reference that is clearly 
individualistic. The male “I” is defined by separation. Men define themselves by their 
accomplishments and their individual climb to the top, whereas women picture 
themselves as part of a closely knit nework of intimates; they are the center of a web of 
connectedness (Gilligan 1982,48). Gilligan and her collegue Susan Poliak studied the 
differing importance that men and women assign to relationships by examing stories that 
students created after looking at ambiguous pictures of people. The researchers used a 
fantasy-theme technique because although many people find it difficult to respond to a 
direct question about how they see themselves, they will unconsciously project their 
motives and images of self into the characters they describe (Gilligan 1982,41). Gilligan 
describes her study and points out that “Two of the pictures show a man and a woman in 
close personal affiliation-the couple on the bench in the river scene, and two trapeze 
artists grasping each other’s wrists, the man hanging by his knees from the trapeze and 
the woman in mid-air. Two pictures show people at work in impersonal achievement 
situations-a man sitting alone at his desk in a high-rise building, and two women, dressed
58
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in white coats working in a laboratory” (1982,41). The research was based on a
comparison between the two stories written about these sets of pictures. Gilligan and
Pollock found that “the men in the class, considered as a group, projected more violence
into situations of achievement.. .in contrast, the women saw more violence in impersonal
situations of achievement than in situations of affiliation” (1982,41). Gilligan and
Pollock also found that the circumstances which stimulated fearful thoughts were
different between men and women. For example, it was revealed that men feared intimate
situations, while women were afraid of isolation and being alone. Gilligan summarizes
the gender differences she and Susan Poliak discovered:
Men and women perceive danger in different ways -  men seeing danger more 
often in close personal affiliation than in achievement and constructing danger 
to arise from intimacy, women perceiving danger in impersonal situations and 
continuing danger to result from competitive success. The danger men describe 
in their stories of intimacy is a danger of entrapment or betrayal, being caught 
in a smothering relationship or humiliated by rejection and deceit. In contrast, 
the danger women portray in their tales of achievement is a danger of isolation, 
a fear of standing out or being set apart by success, they will be left alone 
(1982, 42).
Thus, for Pollock and Gilligan, the differences in fears between men and women - being 
stranded and being caught, give rise to different portrayals of achievement and affiliation. 
This in turn leads to different modes of action and different ways of assessing the 
consequences of choice.
Gilligan’s underlying hypothesis is that most women speak in a different, but not 
inferior moral voice. She believes that most academic fields have tried to treat women as 
if they were men. Those who have studied moral and intellectual development have 
assumed that the male experience is the typical way childish views of right and wrong 
grow adult ethical thinking. When women do not adhere to the normative path laid out by 
men, the conclusion has generaly been that something is wrong with women (Gilligan
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1982,18). Gilligan notes for example, “the very traits that traditionally have defined the 
goodness of women, their care and sensitivity to the needs of others, are those that mark 
them as deficient in moral development” (1982,18). To understand the basis of Gilligan’s 
hypothesis, it is necessary to briefly look at the research of her colleague, Lawrence 
Kohlberg who measured ethical maturity by analyzing responses to hypothetical moral 
dilemmas. In one of the cases studies Kohlberg used, a man named Heinz considers 
whether or not to steal a drug which he cannot afford to buy in order to save the life of his 
wife. Gilligan describes the hypothetical situation and notes “In the standard format of 
Kohlberg’s interviewing procedure, the description of the dilemma itself-Heinz’s 
predicament, the wife’s disease, the druggist’s refusal to lower his price-is followed by 
the question, ‘Should Heinz steal the drug?”’ (1982,26). Kohlberg was able to isolate six 
distinct stages of moral thought, each stage building on previous thinking. Kohlberg 
stated unequivocally that the universal principle of justice is the highest claim of morality 
(Gilligan 1982,26). Gilligan notes that “Kohlberg implies that only if women enter the 
traditional arena of male activity will they recognize the inadequacy of this moral 
perspective and progress like men toward higher stages where relationships are 
subordinated to rules (stage 4) and rules to universal principles of justice (stages 5 and 
six)” (1982,18).
Gilligan used Kohlberg’s criteria to judge moral sophistication, however, she 
became uncomfortable with the way women are categorized in his model of development. 
Gilligan believes that it is easier for men to respond decisively to Kohlberg’s hypothetical 
case studies because men are more comfortable using set prescriptions and formulas to 
line up each person’s rights. Women by contrast are uncomfortable responding to 
hypothetical moral situations and ask for more information about characters history, and
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their relationships (Gilligan 1982,19). Gilligan is bothered by Kohlberg’s theory because 
it places characteristics of loyalty, compassion, and care for the individual on a lower 
stage than individual rights and justice. Gilligan also criticizes Kohlberg whose theory is 
developed using a male perspective and tested on an all-male sample. In response to 
Kohlberg’s theory and to the 1973 Supreme Court ruling in the United States legalizing 
abortion as creating a situation in which women would have to make a major choice on 
moral grounds, Gilligan received twenty-nine research referrals from abortion and 
pregnancy counseling centers (Gilligan 1982, 72). Gilligan notes “In the initial part of the 
interview, the women were asked to discuss the decision they faced, how they were 
dealing with it, the alternatives they were considering, their reasons both for and against 
each option, the people involved, the conflicts entailed, and the ways in which the 
decision affected their views of themselves and their relationships with others” (1982,
72). As predicted, these women discussed their choice within a care orientation rather 
than a framework of justice. Women who participated in Gilligan’s study used the 
language of selfishness and responsibility, which defines the moral problem as one of 
obligations to exercise care and avoid hurt (Gilligan 1982, 73).
While Gilligan’s theory offers an interesting perspective of differences between 
masculine and feminine moral develpment, Gilligan’s theory is not without its critics. 
Feminist critics such as Sheila Mullet believe that linking women and caring encourages 
the perspective that because women care, they should care no matter what the cost to 
themselves. Care in a male-dominated society is detrimental to women and is part of the 
problem rather than its resolution (Mullet 1988, 119). Mullet examines three factors 
which adversely affect caring for another person with whom has a relationship. The first 
factor is the economic dependence of the person who is doing the main nurturing and
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emotional maintenance of her partner. The second factor suggests that it is understood to 
be part of one person’s role to provide most of the emotional support while the third 
factor is the restriction of women to caring roles, espcially of wife and mother, with little 
occasion to develop other parts of their being, which results in a loss of sense of self 
outside these roles (Mullet 1988, 119), Unlike Gilligan, Mullet believes that an ethics of 
care approach fails to recognize the distortions of caring which result from the oppressive 
structures in which women live.
Claudia Card has also examined problems associated with Gilligan’s theory and 
with the caring orientation of feminist ethics. Card believes that an individual’s 
relationship with others can underwrite their ethical duties toward them. Card notes for 
example “Isn’t it the fact that people with whom an agent has an emotional relationship 
comprise only a tiny fraction of the people in the world? Shouldn’t one’s ethical 
obligations extend beyond that tiny fraction?” (1991,257-8). Furthermore, she is also 
concerned that a caring relationship can become abusive to one or both parties. Card 
points out that “Contrary to patriarchal myth, I have found that women’s strongest bonds 
to be with other women, despite the double binds of patriarchy that do so much to pit us 
against one another. Yet people who are bonded to others can also be abusive to them. 
The realization of women’s capacity to compromise with evil is disillusioning. Yet its 
undeniable history requires us to take it seriously and reflect on its implications” (1999, 
4). Thus, for Card, the main reasons to take seriously women’s capacity for evil are to 
move beyond myths of female innoncence in their relationships with each other and to 
confront their responsibilities for past and potential damage to victims (Card 1999, 4).
Another widely regarded feminist legal theorist who emerged in the 1980s was 
Catharine MacKinnon, who convinced many legal scholars that the legal rectification of
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subordination by means o f sex cannot possibly take place through laws that are neutral as
to sex (Goldstein 1992, 30). In her first book, entitled Sexual Harassment o f Working
Women: A Case o f Sex Discrimination, MacKinnon developed the theory of sexual
harassment with multiple lawyers and activists. MacKinnon notes for example that “A
rule or practice is discriminatory, in the inequality approach, if it participates in the
systemic social deprivation of one sex because of sex.. .the unfairness lies in being
deprived because of being a woman or a man, a deprivation given meaning in the social
context of the dominance or preference of one sex over the other” (1979, 117-118).
MacKinnon points to factors such as pregnancy or sexuality which would be among the
first to trigger suspicion and scrutiny, rather than the last (MacKinnon 1979, 118). Thus,
the conceptualization of sexual harassment as a legal theory to address the situation that
many women encounter in the workplace is a good example of the power of feminist
legal theory to transform women’s lives.
In Feminism Unmodified, MacKinnon discusses the sameness/difference theory of
sex equality and illustrates how it dominates sex discrimination law and policy and
underlies its discontents. For MacKinnon in the approach to sex equality that has
dominated politics, law, and social perception, equality is an equivalence, not a
distinction, and sex is a distinction. Sex discrimination laws bind gender equality by
difference doctrinally. Thus, sex discrimination becomes a contradiction. MacKinnon
looks at two alternative paths for women within this dominant approach. She notes:
The leading one is: be the same as men. This path is termed gender neutrality 
doctrinally and the single standard philosophically.. .To women who want 
equality yet find that you are different, the doctrine provides an alternative 
route: be different from men. This equal recognition of difference is termed the 
standard benfit rule or special protection rule legally, the double standard 
philosophically (1987, 40).
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The underlying concern for MacKinnon, is not which of these paths to sex equality is 
preferable in the long run, or more appropriate. To treat issues of sex equality as issues of 
sameness and difference is to take a particular approach (MacKinnon 1987,41). 
MacKinnon coins this the difference approach because it is concerned with sex 
difference. MacKinnon’s concern with the difference approach is that it takes up the very 
important problem of how to get women access to everything women have been excluded 
from, while also valuing everything that women are or have been allowed to become or 
have developed as a consequence of their struggle (1987, 42). Thus, MacKinnon criticizes 
the work of Carol Gilligan on gender differences in moral reasoning and argues that for 
women to affirm difference, when difference means dominance as it does with gender, 
means to affirm the qualities and characteristics of powerlessness (MacKinnon 1987,44). 
MacKinnon notes that “Women value care because men have valued us according to the 
care we give them (1987,44). Women think in relational terms because our existence is 
defined in relation to men.
The alternative dominance approach looks at existing law and examines the 
reason why equality law exists in the first place. MacKinnon notes that “The dominance 
approach centers on the most sex-differential abuses of women as a gender, abuses that 
sex equality law in its difference garb could not confront” (1987,45). Its project is more 
substantive and jurisprudential than formulaic, which is why it is difficult for the 
mainstream discourse to dignify it as an approach to doctrine or to imagine it as a rule of 
law. It proposes to expose that which women have had little choice but to be confined to, 
in order to change it (MacKinnon 1987,45). The dominance approach is concerned with 
the inequalities of the social world from the standpoint of the subordination of women to 
men.
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MacKinnon also discusses the issue of sexual abuse of women by men. 
MacKinnon notes “Rape, battery, sexual harassment, sexual abuse of children, 
prostitution, and pornography, seen for the first time in their true scope and 
interconnectedness, form a distinctive pattern: the power of men over women in 
society...it is the woman who has not been sexually abused who deviates” (1987, 5). The 
reason feminism has exposed this reality is that feminism is built on believing women’s 
accounts of sexual use and abuse by men (MacKinnon 1987, 5). MacKinnon goes on to 
point out that:
The pervasiveness of male sexual violence against women is therefore not 
denied, minimized, trivialized, eroticised, or expected as marginal or episodic 
or placed to one side while more important matters are discussed.. .The fact 
that sexual violence is a sexual practice is faced. A new paradigm begins here, 
one that fits the reality of the experience to be explained... All the ways in 
which women are suppressed and subjected-restricted, intruded on, violated, 
objectified-are recognized as what sex is for women and as the meaning and 
content of femininity (1987, 5).
MacKinnon believes that because the inequality of the sexes is socially defined as the
enjoyment of sexuality itself, gender inequality appears consensual. MacKinnon suggests
that “Dominance, principally by men, and submission, principally by women will be the
ruling code through which sexual pleasure is experienced” (1987,6). Thus, MacKinnon
believes that whatever is sexually arousing is, empowering for women is revealed as a
strategy in male rule (MacKinnon 1987, 8).
While there appears to be multiple views regarding women-centered ethics, and
this chapter has only begun to scratch the surface of feminist legal theory, the singular
goal among these theorists is the elimination of gender inequality, the liberation of
women and to help as many women as possible to move toward the goal of gender
equality with men. In this discussion of feminist ethics, the aim was to introduce some of
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the background to feminist ethics and some of the main ideas both in terms of how 
feminists might construct moral theories, the particular case of an ethics of care, and one 
way in which feminists might approach moral discussion where there are different and 
dissenting voices. The remaining part of this study will test Gilligan’s theory and apply it 
to selected Supreme Court decisions in Canada to determine whether a different voice is 
apparent amongst male and female justices on the Court.
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Chapter Four: Research Design and Methodology
The Canadian Supreme Court provides an ideal setting for exploring whether 
women judges render decisions that support women’s interests or rights to a greater 
degree than do male judges. The Supreme Court plays a key role in interpreting federal 
law and applying evolving societal attitudes to public policy, even though it reviews only 
a limited number of cases. Moreover, it is the court of last resort, and thus, the justices are 
the ultimate arbiters of all legal disputes and their decisions are not subject to review by a 
higher authority (Ostberg et al. 2004, 3). Second, Canadian justices are appointed officials 
who serve lifetime tenures and do not aspire to higher political office. Justices possess a 
substantial degree of political independence from other branches of government (Ostberg 
2004, 3). This judicial independence allows justices to express attitudes through their 
judicial votes and in their opinions. Finally, because the Court has decided a host of high 
profile cases pertaining to women, the Supreme Court provides an ideal testing ground for 
examining whether women judges make a difference. It is clear that these disputes have 
garnered widespread public attention and generated some of the most bitter criticism from 
academic scholars and politicians because the Court seems to have taken a very activist 
stance in some of its rulings.
One of the most salient cases that triggered a firestorm of controversy was the 
case of 7? v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. The central issue in this case was whether 
section 251 of the Criminal Code of Canada, which stated that women wishing to have an 
abortion were required to obtain a certificate from a therapeutic abortion committee of an 
approved hospital, infringed or denied the rights and freedoms guaranteed by ss.2(a), 7,
12, 15,27 and 28 of the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms. For Justice Wilson, 
this was the most important decision to date in Canada dealing with woman’s privacy
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rights. Anderson points out that “There certainly is no question that Wilson thought 
deeply about the abortion issue and her judgment shows it” (2001,229). While four male 
judges in two separate judgments agreed with Wilson that the provisions offended the 
procedural guarantees of life, liberty, and security of the person in section 7, Wilson 
examined the section 7 guarantees substantively, a much more controversial approach 
(Anderson, 2001 229). In her judgment, Wilson was giving notice that unlike her male 
colleagues, she would not be satisfied to send the law on abortion back to legislative 
review for further procedural analysis. Wilson was determined to establish as a 
constitutional matter that it is highly unlikely any formulation could be found which 
would not substantially interfere with a woman’s freedom of choice (Anderson 2001, 
229). Such cases feature fundamental questions pertaining to high-stakes issues 
surrounding human dignity and equality. They are likely to engender conflict among 
members of society and the Court, and thus become useful test cases for examining the 
influence of gender on the Supreme Court.
Scholars in the fields of women and judicial politics can learn much from this 
research both theoretically and empirically. This is because it not only strives to further 
document the performance of woman judges, but it also looks at the more fundamental 
question of whether women judges speak with a different voice by conducting a content 
analysis at the more qualitative level. It is surprising that no research to date in Canada 
has tested the relevance of case facts in the area of women’s issues. This study seeks to 
engage awareness by drawing on the growing body of literature that asks questions about 
the impact that the increasing number of women judges might be having on the legal 
system itself.
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As noted in Chapter One, there is overwhelming evidence that women legislators 
are likely to pursue legislation in areas of interest to women, such as family policy and 
women’s rights issues. It appears that women promote the addition of these types of 
issues to the agenda. While agenda-setting on the Supreme Court differs considerably 
from agenda setting in the House of Commons, it can be argued that the closest 
equivalent between the two institutions might be opinion writing. Women in legislatures 
are actively involved in the drafting of legislation reflecting women’s issues. It is possible 
that women on the Court, similar to women in the legislature, are actively involved in the 
drafting of opinions regarding women’s issues in the form of writing either a majority, 
concurring or dissenting opinion. This work seeks to expand the analysis by bringing in 
the research on women in legislatures to generate hypotheses regarding the potential 
impact of women justices. Thus, the underlying hypothesis guiding this research is that 
women in the Supreme Court of Canada make a difference by substantively 
representing women, that is to say, they sustain women’s issues by their opinions 
and their actions. This underlying hypothesis can be divided into three categories. 
The first is that women justices will rank among the top justices in their overall 
support for women’s rights claims. Second, the Court could disproportionately call 
upon the women justices to speak for the Court in the form of opinion writing. This 
study will show that the women on the Court write more opinions in support of 
women’s rights cases than their male colleagues. Finally, this study will critically 
analyze the judgments of men and women judges on the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The judgments are compared against common themes of feminist jurisprudence as 
discussed in Chapter Three to determine whether female justices on the Supreme Court 
approach disputes involving women’s issues with a different voice and whether they
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capture the distinct experiences of women of different races, ethnic groups, classes, ages 
and sexual orientation. This study will also look at whether a MacKinnon-like analysis is 
applied or given judicial consideration.
The first step is to identify a methodical and consistent set of cases that are 
considered to be of interest to women. The data for this analysis were created by 
attempting to replicate and expand the sample of cases used by Morton and Allen in their 
study addressing feminists and the courts. Morton et al. note that “Studies have varied 
significantly in the cases they relied upon.. .case selection varied with respect to time 
frame, level of court (trial or appeal), types of litigation (Charter or non-Charter) and 
policy area” (2001, 58). This study utilizes cases from the study conducted by Morton et 
al. and examines further case law of the Supreme Court of Canada not included in their 
study from the period of 1982-2003 (See Table 4.0). This study incorporates both Charter 
and non-Charter cases. Non-Charter cases are included into this study to allow a greater 
number of cases involving women’s issues to be examined.
A difficult component of this study is to find a definitive set of cases that are 
considered to be related to women’s issues. Susan Carol defines “women’s issues” as 
those “where policy consequences are likely to have a more immediate and direct impact 
on significantly larger numbers of women than men.. .women’s issues, first of all remain 
intimately linked to social policies, and secondly, are not necessarily synonymous with 
feminist issues” (1985, 15). This definition encompasses many, although not all, issues of 
concern to the feminist movement. Carol goes on to note that “Given the emergence of 
the feminist movement as pluralist proof that many women perceive they have interests 
distinct from those of men, the question of whether governing institutions have 
represented these interests adequately becomes important” (1985,15). If the political
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system, dominated at the elite level by men, has failed to represent the distinctive interests 
of women, then the question of concern becomes one of how these interests may be better 
represented (Carol 1985, 15).
In keeping with this definition, this study will use cases in which 1. LEAF or any 
other women’s organization is involved as an intervener in Supreme Court cases and 2. 
the issue is a well known policy concern affecting women (such as sexual assault). For 
example, from 1993 to 2000 Canada averaged more than 27,000 reported cases of sexual 
assault per year, with women as victims in approximately 85 percent of those assaults 
(Manfredi 2004, 113). Between 1982 and 2000, the Supreme Court of Canada decided 
thirty-three cases involving sexual assault; all thirty-three of these cases will be examined 
in this study. Moreover, if the case is discussed in the study conducted by Morton and 
Allen, then it will automatically qualify as a case concerning women.
There were nine identified policy areas recognized as being women’s issues in the 
study conducted by Morton and Allen These policy areas included violence against 
women, family law support and custody cases, abortion and fetal rights, discrimination, 
standing and interventions, tax and benefit programs affecting pregnancy/child care 
expenses and support payments, pornography, immigration and the penal system. 
Immigration will be excluded from this study as a policy issue affecting women because 
only two such cases were listed in the study conducted by Morton and Allen, both of 
which were decided by the Federal Court of Appeal. Standing and Interventions will also 
be eliminated from this study as a policy area affecting women because only three cases 
were listed in the study by Morton and Allen; all three were taken from various courts of 
appeal. Again, this study will only be examining Supreme Court decisions. Instead, cases 
dealing with sexual orientation will be incorporated into this study. Although the idea of
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defining lesbian and gay rights as women’s issues could be questioned, notably with 
regard to men, lesbians have historically been very close to the feminist movement, 
particularly before the emergence of the lesbian and gay movement in Canada. Moreover, 
lesbians remain present at the core of the Canadian feminist movement (Smith 1999,40). 
Thus, cases relating to sexual orientation dealing with gay and lesbian rights at the 
Supreme Court level will be included in this study. By using a specific set of cases 
relating to women’s issues, this study will provide an additional key area in which to 
study support for the proposition that women on the bench will result in opinions that is 
favourable to women’s interests.
Methodology
The core analysis tests the hypothesis that female justices on the Supreme Court
of Canada are more likely to render decisions that support women’s interests or rights
than are male justices. The independent variable in this study is the sex of each justice,
i.e. whether the justice is male or female. The dependent variable is the judicial decisions
and opinions of each justice. The analysis is based on two main characteristics that are
assessed for the seventy-three cases being examined. The first characteristic is the extent
to which a decision made by a justice is supportive of women. A score is given to each
justice, male or female, who makes a decision on each case. The score is on a 5-point
scale from -2 to +2, as follows:
Decision strongly unsupportive of women’s interests or rights: -2 
Somewhat unsupportive of women: -1 
Neutral: 0
Somewhat supportive of women: +1 
Strongly supportive of women: +2
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The second characteristic is whether the case being assessed has a moderate or 
strong impact on women. The assigned weightings are:
Moderate interest: 1
Strong interest: 2
Each score associated with the first characteristic is multiplied by the weighting to derive 
a result for each decision made by each justice. These results are then totaled and 
averaged to determine the overall result, which will be viewed separately for cases of 
moderate and strong impact for women, and as an overall aggregate. For example, sexual 
assault, pornography and spousal abuse are all considered forms of violence against 
women and were given a weighting of 2 because a strong case can be made that no issue 
is more salient to the Canadian women’s movement than violence against women, 
especially in the form of sexual assault. As Shannon Sampert points out in an article 
entitled “The Song Remains the Same: Sexual Assault Myths in Canada”, “Rape is one of 
the most traumatic events that can happen to a person” (2002, 30). Abortion and fetal 
rights were also given a weighting of 2 because reproductive choice, particularly in the 
form of access to contraception and legal abortion, is one of the defining issues of the 
post-Second War women’s movement (Manfredi 2004,64). Similarly, discrimination 
cases were also given a weighting of 2 because the women’s movement has made 
impressive gains in the substantive equality campaign. Although all LEAF’S interventions 
in the Supreme Court have involved equality-based arguments, five cases have been 
especially concerned with the definition of equality and discrimination. These are 
Andrews (1989), Janzen (1989), Brooks (1989), Weatherall (1993), and BC Public 
Service Employee Relations Commission (1999). On the other hand, cases involving 
sexual orientation were given a weighting of 1. This is because cases involving sexual
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orientation can be questioned as a women’s issue, notably with regard to men. While 
lesbians remain actively involved in the Canadian feminist movement, sexual orientation 
cannot be defined exclusively as a woman’s issue. Family law support and custody cases, 
and tax and benefit programs affecting pregnancy/child care expenses and support 
payments, were given either a weighting of 1 or 2 depending on whether women were the 
central focus of the case.
While the core analysis is based on the above, a separate set of factors will be 
assessed and will be the basis for a secondary analysis. This separate analysis will be 
focused on applying a more qualitative set of judgments, based on the information 
provided in Table 1.0 in chapter one of this study. Most studies of women judges in the 
United States have focused on comparing their decisions to those of their male 
counterparts as discussed in chapter two. Political scientists can be expected to be 
concerned with policy outcomes. However, this almost exclusive emphasis on votes risks 
obscuring more subtle differences in behaviour. Thus, where a justice writes a specific 
opinion, either a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion, it will be assessed to 
determine the extent to which it fits more into a masculine or a feminine perspective.
The various characteristics in Table 1.0 have been identified by Aliotta as being 
more likely to be associated with a male versus a female justice (left versus right column) 
and carry with them assumptions about the appropriate distribution of power and 
resources. The intent is to use these characteristics to assess the extent to which a given 
justice expressed specific opinions in the course of dealing with a case that indicate their 
masculine or feminine traits and whether or not, as Gilligan put it, women speak in a 
different voice. Where this information is available for a given justice in a specific case, a 
score between -3 and +3 will be assigned based on the above factors, where -3 indicates
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strong adherence to the masculine characteristics, and +3 indicates strong adherence to 
the feminine characteristics.
Operationalizing Success: Determining Whether a case is a Win or Loss for Women
The primary approach for operationalizing success for women’s issues in this 
study is based on LEAF’S position or other feminist advocacy organizations that share 
LEAF’S values and beliefs, for example, NAC, the Aboriginal Women’s Council, the 
Native Women’s Association of Canada, and Action de Femmes. Do the justices on the 
Supreme Court of Canada support LEAF’S position? LEAF was chosen not necessarily 
because LEAF is representative of feminist litigation, but because in many ways LEAF 
has worked to establish the ground work for feminist legal discourse. Moreover, LEAF 
presents itself and is known as the legal arm of the feminist movement in Canada. Thus, 
both economy and experience favour operationalizing success in terms of whether the 
court accepts the position advanced by a feminist litigant (Morton and Allen 2001,65). If 
a case does not involve a feminist intervener, but is a well-known feminist policy 
concern, such as rape or battered-wife syndrome, then it is included. Alternatively, if a 
case is discussed in Morton and Allen’s study, then it automatically qualifies as a feminist 
case. In the same sense, it is important to acknowledge that in making a difference, 
judges cannot only be concerned with women’s reality, but also the varying degree and 
diverse experiences of children, men, people with disabilities, people of colour, people 
who are poor, members of Canada’s First Nations, and all types of human experiences 
which may form the background against which law is applied.
To determine whether a case is a win or a loss for women, Morton and Allen have 
calculated the success rates using four possible outcomes. An offensive win means that 
there will be a positive change in the policy status quo. In Morgentaler for example, the
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mling demonstrated that the courts could now bring about a new status quo that would 
never have emerged from ordinary politics, and yet cannot be overturned politically 
because of the many advantages that the status quo enjoys in the political process. 
Keegstra is an example of a defensive win. The Supreme Court adopted its rationale for 
its Keegstra decision, thereby laying the foundation for LEAF’S successful defense in 
Butler a year later, i.e. pornography is a form of hate speech targeted at a different section 
15, minority women (Morton and Allen 2001, 66). Thus, a defensive win lays the 
foundation for future feminist claims. Offensive losses occur when there is nothing to lose 
in terms of policy that it had before. For example, in Symes it did not leave women any 
worse off than they were before. Finally, a defensive loss is much more serious. In 
Seaboyer, it made it more difficult to prosecute sexual assault cases than it had previously 
before (Morton and Allen 2001, 66-68).
Limitations on the Study of Women Judges
Untangling the effect of increasing numbers of women in the judiciary is a 
complex task. In both core and secondary analyses, the methodology has limitations.
First, the relatively small number of women on the Supreme Court for some of the cases 
being reviewed may attribute a significance to the decisions made by women that may not 
be representative of women at large, or that may have provided a different result if there 
had been four or five women from a cross-section of backgrounds on the Supreme Court. 
The only action that could be taken to compensate for this would be to include only cases 
where a specific minimum number of women presided on the court. However, this would 
eliminate many cases that focus specifically on women’s issues, and would likely reduce 
the effectiveness of this study. On balance, it was decided to include cases even if there
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was only one female justice, with the expectation that the possible negative impact of this 
would be counteracted by the inclusion of a substantial number of cases.
Second, the rankings and weightings discussed above are somewhat subjective. 
Even if a larger scale were used in either analysis or in the weighting, it would still be 
difficult to accurately assign the ranking or weighting in each case. As a result, while the 
numerical values determined for each case or in aggregate for several cases should not be 
interpreted as accurate measures relative to one another, the general trend that they 
indicate is of research value when testing the hypothesis.
Third, the selection of cases for the analysis is subjective. While the intent has 
been to select a sufficient number of representative cases, it is almost certain that a 
different set of cases could make the results somewhat stronger or weaker. Again, the 
objective is to detect the general trend as it relates to the hypothesis, rather than to derive 
scientific results that provide an accurate numeric measure. On the above basis, a 
spreadsheet was developed where the subjective assessment of each decision by each 
justice in the cases provided could be entered. It is used for both the primary and 
secondary analysis.
Fourth, the gendered nature of legal institutions and the complexity of the decision 
making process is likely to take years before academics are able to assess the impact of 
diversity on courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. In studying women judges, it would 
be naive to expect a handful of newly appointed women judges to transform courts and 
the legal system, or even to articulate a distinctly feminine voice. Moreover, the gendered 
nature of the law school experience and many aspects of legal practice have been well 
documented (Aliotta 2003,10). Thinking and acting like a lawyer often requires thinking 
and acting in a style that is masculine. Thus, newly appointed or elected women judges
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are likely to enter the judiciary already thoroughly socialized to the masculine nature of 
the legal profession. It may require many women moving through law school and into 
positions of power in legal education and the legal profession before an impact will be 
felt in the judiciary.
Finally, as noted earlier, it is essential when studying the impact of women on the 
judiciary to look beyond decisions and votes. The research to date has focused 
exclusively on comparing women’s decisions to those of their male colleagues, without 
analysis of the judicial decisions themselves. It is necessary in a study such as this to 
examine differences in the way female and male justices approach the judicial process as 
well as their styles of participation within the decisions themselves.
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Chapter Five: The Supreme Court’s Support for Women’s Rights Claims 
Results:
There were three hypotheses proposed before the research work was started. The 
first predicted that women justices would rank among the top justices in their overall 
support for women’s rights claims. Second, the Court could disproportionately call upon 
the women justices to speak for the Court in the form of opinion writing. And finally, 
women justices would speak in a different way from male justices when they confront 
ethical dilemmas. The results that apply to these hypotheses will be reported. Following 
the results, there will be discussion and qualitative assessment of some of the policy areas 
and specific cases that fall into these areas.
Hypothesis 1: Voting Behaviour
Table 5.0 shows the percentage of cases in which each justice took a “pro­
equality” position in women’s rights cases since 1982. The first hypothesis is largely 
confirmed. The results indicate that in the 75 cases examined in this study, the women on 
the Court voted in favour of women’s rights issues at a significantly higher rate than men. 
Of the 75 cases, 65 were given a weighting of 2, resulting in a maximum/minimum score 
of +4/-4 for those cases. The 10 cases with a weighting of 1 had a maximum/minimum 
score of +21-2. The result of combining these is a composite maximum/minimum of 
+3.73/-3.73 for the core analysis. The overall result shown in Table 5.0 is an average 
score of 2.44 for female justices, whereas the average for male justices is considerably 
lower at 1.09.
Upon review of the 8 individual policy areas, Table 5.1 demonstrates that women 
appear to be the stronger supporters of women’s rights issues in 6 these policy areas 
examined, while in the other 2 areas there was no difference between men and women. A
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key factor was that these 2 areas had a combined total of only 3 cases; it is quite possible 
that a larger number of cases in these areas would have led to a score that differentiated 
decisions by female justices from those by male justices. It is worthwhile to report the 
results in each of the 8 areas.
In the area of violence against women, the total number of cases examined is 39. 
With the weighting applied, the female average is 2.91 versus the male average of 1.4. 
Similarly, in the 6 family law support and custody cases examined, the female average is 
1.86 whereas the male average is 1.16. In the 7 cases involving abortion and fetal rights, 
the total female average is 2.53 while the male average is 1.89. The two policy areas with 
the most noticeable differences in voting behaviour between male and female justices are 
discrimination, and tax and benefit programs affecting pregnancy. In the 14 
discrimination cases examined, the female average is 1.29 whereas the male average is - 
0.49. Likewise, in the area of tax and benefit programs affecting pregnancy, the female 
average is 2.33 whereas the male average is -1.71 based on 3 cases. In the two cases 
involving pornography, male and female justices had an average of 4.00. Similarly, in the 
one case involving the penal system, male and female justices had an average of 4.00.
Another view of the results is achieved by separating cases by weighting. For the 
10 cases involving a weighting of 1, Table 5.2 shows that the female average is 1.36 
whereas the male average is 0.92. The maximum and minimum scores possible for these 
cases are +2.00 and -2.00 respectively. The 65 cases with a weighting of 2 have a 
maximum and minimum possible score of +4.00 and -4.00 respectively. For these cases, 
the female average is again higher than the average for male justices, with the female 
average being 2.61 and the male average being 1.12.
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Hypothesis 2: Opinion Writing
As Table 5.3 shows, it appears that the women justices have become the Court’s 
“spokespeople” in women’s rights cases. Thus, hypothesis 2 is also largely confirmed. 
While the number of majority opinions written by female justices is 19 versus 36 for the 
male justices, these numbers must be examined on a percentage basis because of the 
unequal number of majority opinions from females versus males. The results show that in 
the cases studied, 11.9% of all decisions by female justices on the Court, were majority 
opinions in favour of women’s issues. This compares to 8.3% of the decisions written by 
male justices. When concurring decisions favouring women are considered, 13.8% of the 
decisions by female justices fell into this category, compared to only 4.6% of the 
decisions made by male justices. There also appears to be a large discrepancy between 
male and female justices in dissenting opinions favouring women. In this case, 11.9% of 
all decisions made by female justices were dissenting opinions favouring women, while 
only 1.8% of the decisions made by male justices were dissenting opinions favouring 
women.
What is quite remarkable is the number of dissenting opinions that have been 
written by female Justices L’Heureux-Dube and McLachlin in support of women’s issues. 
Justice L’Heureux-Dube has been the strongest dissenter and has consistently and 
frequently dissented in favour of women’s issues. Throughout her tenure, Justice 
L’Heureux-Dube had considerable success in bringing Justice McLachlin over to her way 
of thinking. Justice L’Heureux-Dube and Justice McLachlin dissented together in 
women’s rights cases including (Symes [Case 61], Thibaudeau [Case 63], Miron v. Trudel 
[Case 44], Gould [Case 24]). Both L’Heureux-Dube and McLachlin have dissented 
together against a majority composed entirely of their male colleagues. Similarly, Justice
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L’Heureux-Dube and Justice Arbour dissented together to support women’s equality in 
Gosselin v. Quebec [Case 23], While Justice Arbour’s orientation towards women’s 
issues is more difficult to evaluate, it is suggestive of a positive stance. Justice Arbour’s 
support for women’s issues involves a limited number of cases. It does include an 
influential dissent alongside Justice Iacobucci in Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. 
Canada [Case 36] in support of women’s issues. The dissent argued that customs 
legislation, by allegedly targeting gay and lesbian erotica, violates freedom of expression 
on its face as well as in its application. However, whether gender itself explains this 
dissent is unclear, since Arbour joined two male colleagues in voting against McLachlin 
and L’Heureux-Dube. What this suggests is that women on the Court, like women in the 
House of Commons and in provincial legislatures are quite vocal on women’s rights 
issues. It also implies that as the number of women has increased, their potential ability to 
shape legal policy has also increased.
The results for individual justices, and the rankings of their overall scores, were 
also computed. Not surprisingly, Justice L’Heureux-Dube, who is female, has the highest 
rate of support of all the justices. Using the weighted scores, in the 69 cases that Justice 
L’Heureux-Dube took part in, Table 5.4 shows that Justice L’Heureux-Dube has an 
average score of 2.94. This ranks Justice L’Heureux-Dube first, as demonstrated in Table 
5.5. Although some academics and politicians have criticized her for not taking the 
Court’s jurisprudence far enough, it is clear that Justice L’Heureux-Dube is one of the 
Court’s strongest supporters of women’s rights claims in terms of her voting record. 
Similarly, two other female justices, Justice McLachlin and Justice Wilson also ranked 
among the top supporters of women’s issues in this study, providing further support for 
hypothesis 1. Justice Wilson has an average of 2.50, ranking her second overall. Justice
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McLachlin is considered one of the Court’s more conservative justices in her approach to 
legal decisions; however, this study indicates that in cases involving women’s issues, 
Justice McLachlin ranks fifth with a score of 2.25. Justice Arbour, the only female justice 
not yet mentioned in regard to these rankings, was in tenth place in the overall list of 
seventeen justices, with a score of 1.27. While Justice Arbour did not support women’s 
rights claims as strongly as Justices L’Heureux-Dube, Wilson and McLachlin, her support 
rate remains over 60% and there is a clear break between her and the justices ranked in 
the bottom half. Moreover, in seven of the eleven cases decided by Justice Arbour, her 
decisions indicated at least moderately strong support for women.
With regard to male justices, what is the most striking is the voting record of 
Justice Gonthier. Despite being more conservative than most of his peers, Gonthier took a 
“pro-equality” position in the 75 women’s rights cases examined, often voting alongside 
Justice L’Heureux-Dube. Justice Gonthier has an average score of 2.11 (maximum 3.73). 
This gives Justice Gonthier a ranking of sixth overall. Similarly, Justice Dickson and 
Justice Beetz both appear to be gender-sensitive and showed a deep sensitivity to 
concerns facing women. Justice Dickson has an average score of 2.43, placing him third, 
ahead of Justice McLachlin in his support for women’s issues and only slightly behind 
Justice Wilson. Justice Beetz also appears to be a strong proponent of women’s equality. 
His average score is 2.33, placing Justice Beetz fourth overall. It should be noted that 
Justice Dickson and Justice Beetz only ruled on a combined 20 cases. It could be argued 
that Justice McLachlin has a higher rate of support for women’s issues because she has 
ruled on 61 cases. Another interesting observation is Justice Iacobucci’s voting record. 
Justice Iacobucci was considered one of the court's left wing justices, frequently taking an 
activist stance and holding government legislation to stringent tests under the Charter of
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Rights. However, this study indicates that Justice Iacobucci ranks thirteenth in his overall 
support of women’s issues, placing him in the bottom five. His average score is 0.88. 
Justices LeBel, Major, Sopinka and Lamer are the four justices who rank the lowest in 
their support of women’s issues and were more likely to vote against the majority in order 
to oppose a “pro-women” position. Justice LeBel (who decided 9 cases) has the lowest 
score overall. He has an average score of 0.22, ranking him seventeenth. Justice Lamer 
(who decided 51 cases) and Justice Major (46 cases) both had average scores of 0.24, 
tying them tied for fifteenth. Justice Sopinka (43 cases) has an average score of 0.40, 
ranking him fourteenth overall. Thus, Table 5.5 provides additional support for the 
proposition that women justices are more supportive towards women’s issues than their 
male counterparts.
Table 5.5 also shows the rankings of the justices without the weightings being 
applied, i.e., as if  each case had a rating of 1. The difference in rankings between this and 
the scores when the weightings are applied is minimal. In fact, the top 3 judges in the list 
are ranked the same with and without weightings, and 10 of the judges do not show any 
change in their ranking. Seven of the 17 justices had a change in rating. In 5 of these 
cases, the change was only one ranking up or down. In the other 2 cases, the ranking 
changed by 2 but the actual change in the score was very minimal. Because the changes 
in ranking are very minor, the results used for the ranking without the weighting applied 
are not reported in detail.
It should be noted that any justices who were involved in fewer than 5 decisions 
across the 75 cases were excluded from the ranking in Table 5.5, to reduce the likelihood 
that a very small number of cases would skew the results. Also, it should be noted that 
while the overall composite maximum/minimum score for cases of weighting 1 and
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weighting 2, across all judges and all cases is approximately +3.73/-3.73, the 
maximum/minimum for a specific justice may be slightly lower or higher, depending on 
how many cases of each weighting that justice participated in. However, given the 
minimal differences in the ranking based on weighting, and the fact that justices with 
fewer than 5 cases were eliminated totally from the results being reported and analyzed, 
this is not a significant concern.
Hypothesis 3: A Different Voice?
There also appears to be strong evidence that the women on the Court behave 
differently in women’s rights cases than they do in other areas of law. Hypothesis 3 is an 
attempt to explore the extent to which female justices on the Supreme Court approach 
disputes involving women’s issues with a different voice and to determine whether a 
MacKinnon-like analysis is applied or given judicial consideration. The results in this 
study indicate that hypothesis 3 is also largely confirmed. The second set of columns in 
Table 5.0 shows the characteristics scores of both male and female justices. Thus, the 
secondary analysis summary reveals that the female justices on the Court have an overall 
average of 1.32 (maximum/minimum possible score is 3.00/-3.00). This is considerably 
higher than the male justices whose average is 0.12 on the same scale.
The results by policy area in Table 5.1 provide further support for hypothesis 3. 
The female justices on the Supreme Court are far more likely to adopt a contextual style 
of judging, focusing more on relationships and connection, than their male counterparts. 
Moreover, works by Catharine MacKinnon were cited in judgments by the women on the 
court. This was specifically prevalent in the area of violence against women, including 
both sexual assault and spousal abuse. The female average in this area was considerably 
higher than the male average. As indicated in the second column of Table 5.1, the women
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on the court have an average of 1.29 versus the male average o f -0.13. In the area of 
family law support and custody cases, the female average is again higher than the average 
of the male justices on the court, although not as significantly. Of the six cases examined 
in this area of law, the women on the Court have an average score of 1.38 as 
demonstrated in Table 5.1 whereas the male average is 1.25. In the cases involving 
abortion and fetal rights, the female average in the secondary analysis is also much higher 
than their male colleagues at 1.25 whereas the male average is 0.30 on the same scale.
The minimum/maximum possible score for this result is +3/-3.
In Morgentaler [Case 45] for example, Justice Bertha Wilson in her concurring 
opinion took a more contextual approach to her judgment focusing on the modem 
woman’s struggle to assert her dignity and worth as a human being. At the other end of 
the spectrum were two male justices, William McIntyre and Gerard La Forest, who based 
their judgment on the Charter’s silence on the question of abortion rights. Again, this 
provides strong support for the proposition that female judges are more sympathetic 
towards women’s issues, especially in the area of abortion.
Moreover, in the policy area dealing with discrimination, women justices on the 
Court have a score of 0.93 whereas the men on the court have a much lower average of 
0.12. In the area of sexual orientation, the women on the court have a score of 2.00 
whereas the men on the court have a score of only 0.90. In the two cases involving 
pornography, the male and female average is the same for the secondary analysis at 2.00. 
And in the one case involving the penal system, the male score is higher with a score of 
2.00 whereas the female average is lower at 0.00. Again, in these latter 2 areas the results 
need to be viewed in the context of a very small sample set, given the very small number 
of cases.
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A further gender difference is evident in the area of tax and benefit programs 
affecting pregnancy and child expenses and support payment. This is another policy area 
where male justices have a negative score: the women on the court have an overall 
average of 2.50 whereas the men on the court have a average of -1.29. In this particular 
policy area, it appears that the women on the court attempt to recognize that the majority 
of parents who live in financially difficult circumstances with very little power over their 
former spouses’ actions or economic resources, are women. Thus, it appears that the 
women on the court do recognize that the consideration of women’s diverse experiences 
has been sadly lacking in this area of law. The results indicate that women justices have 
incorporated a sensitivity to the experiences of women into their judicial decisions more 
readily than their male colleagues.
Similarly, in Winnipeg Child and Family Services [Case 72], Justice McLachlin 
(writing for the majority) received a ranking of 2 in the secondary analysis of this case. 
She acted consistently with LEAF’s position. Two men on the court dissented and took a 
more instrumental approach to their judgment. Justices Sopinka and Major received a -2 
in the detailed case analysis because when they ruled that the state does have an interest 
in trying to ensure the child's health. Again, this provides additional support for the 
proposition that women on the court are more inclined to incorporate the needs of women 
into their analysis while the men on the court are more rule-focused.
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Discussion:
Given the relatively small number of cases in this analysis, any conclusions drawn 
must be viewed as being indicative of male versus female approaches to interpreting the 
law, rather than as absolute differences based on scientifically measured values. However, 
there are some trends that do merit attention. It is evident is that the women on the Court 
are among the Court’s strongest supporters of women’s rights claims. They also tend to 
speak for the court in this issue area, writing many of the Court’s majority, concurring 
and dissenting opinions in support of women’s rights. Justice L’Heureux-Dube has been 
the most frequent dissenter in women’s rights cases, especially in cases involving equality 
rights. For example, the first use of the term “substantive equality” in a Supreme Court of 
Canada decision can be found in L’Heureux-Dube’s dissent in Symes v. Canada [1993]
(at 786). Similarly, in Eldridge [1997] and Vriend [1998], the court declared that section 
15 guarantees “substantive” as well as “formal” equality. More recently, in Gosselin v. 
Quebec [2002] the Court split 5-4 on the question of whether Quebec’s welfare policies, 
which tied welfare payments to participation in work and training programs for 
individuals under 30, ran afoul of the Charter’s section 15 equality guarantees. While 
Justices LeBel and Bastarache did not dissent on all issues, both Justices Arbour and 
L’Heureux-Dube did dissent on all accounts in favour of women. The latter argued that 
s.7 imposes a positive obligation on governments to provide social assistance adequate to 
meet basic needs, and that the Quebec Court violated s.7 as well as s. 15. While in the 
majority in Gosselin, Chief Justice McLachlin has been another consistent dissenter in 
cases involving women (Symes {1993}, Thibaudeau {1995}, Miron v. Trudel {1995}, 
Gould v. Yukon Orders o f  Pioneers {1996}). Peter McCormick notes “McLachlin’s 
consistent dissents are a hint about what the next decade might look like” (2000, 135).
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Thus, a woman justice may be educating male justices and the broader legal community 
through her dissenting opinions. These dissents may gain increased authority and the 
legal community may adopt them as a controlling precedent.
In this regard, the women justices have become leaders in this area beyond their 
opinion writing and voting behaviour. Women on the court who have since retired have 
made a point of speaking and publishing about the status of women since their arrival on 
the Court (for example, L’Heureux-Dube 1999, L’Heureux-Dube 2001, Wilson, 1990). 
Moreover, since her retirement in June of 2004, former Justice Louise Arbour has taken 
up duties as The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. As part of this 
role, Arbour has been outspoken about violence against women and its causes and 
consequences. Thus, it does appear that there are some cross-institutional trends. Women 
tend to be the strongest supporters of women’s issues and actively work to shape policy in 
this area. This trend appears in provincial legislatures, provincial courts of appeal, the 
House of Commons, and the Supreme Court, regardless of ideology.
It is important to note, however, that ideology is in fact one of the best predictors 
of Supreme Court decision making. Even in cases involving women’s rights, ideology 
does make a difference. The most liberal members of the court, such as L’Heureux-Dube 
and Wilson, are the strongest supporters of women’s rights while the most conservative 
members, such as Justices Major, Sopinka, Lamer and La Forest rank at the bottom. 
However, this analysis also provides strong evidence for the proposition that-at least in 
the area of women’s rights-there is something other than ideology playing a role in 
justices’ votes. For example, Justice McLachlin is generally considered a moderate- 
conservative; but as this analysis illustrates, her general ideological disposition is not an 
accurate predictor of her votes in women’s rights cases. The research on women in
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legislatures has demonstrated that women often cross party lines to work together to pass 
legislation concerning women. This also appears to be the case, at least to some extent, on 
the Supreme Court of Canada. Moreover, while women tend to be the most supportive of 
women’s rights, it cannot be assumed that institutional change, whether it be in the 
legislature or the court, is merely a function of numerical increases in the presence of 
women.
Furthermore, ideology does not explain the changes in the male justices’ voting 
behaviour as more women were appointed to the Court. After Justice Wilson’s 
appointment, conservative justices demonstrated large increases in their support rates. As 
previously noted, at issue in Bliss were provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act 
that treated benefit applications based on pregnancy differently from regular applications 
or disability-based claims. The Court rejected Stella Bliss’s assertion that these 
differential rules discriminated on the basis of sex, since in principle it applied to both 
men and women. When this decision was made, the Court was composed entirely of male 
justices. However, with the appointment of Justice Wilson in 1982, the Bliss decision 
was reversed in Brooks v. Canada Safeway as Justice Dickson equated pregnancy 
discrimination with sex discrimination. It appears that the presence of Justice Wilson had 
a considerable effect on many of the male justices who were the first to serve with a 
woman justice. Moreover, Justice Gonthier, who is considered to be one of the Court’s 
more conservative justices, increased his support rate for women, often voting alongside 
Justice L’Heureux-Dube in support of women, while other conservative justices, such as 
Lamer, La Forest and Sopinka decreased their support rates. In other words, ideology 
cannot completely account for these voting tendencies.
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As noted in Chapter Three, Carol Gilligan leads a strand of feminist thought 
which claims that women have different psychological traits from men. This results in a 
distinct style of judging which could in turn create a major difference to the legal 
profession and the interpretation of the law. Thus, hypothesis three was an attempt to 
explore the more complex assertion that women judges speak about issues in a different 
voice. Gilligan’s theory was chosen, not because her theories are necessarily 
representative of feminist legal analysis, but because in many ways her work has 
established the ground work for other feminists. Similarly, Catharine Mackinnon is an 
often quoted source in feminist legal discourse. This analysis supports the hypothesis that 
women justices are more likely to take into account the bigger picture. They also 
approach judging with a female “ethic of care” approach rather than the “ethic of rights” 
approach taken by male justices as indicated in the second column of Table 5.2.
Moreover, books by feminist legal theorist Catharine MacKinnon, a frequent consultant 
to LEAF, and LEAF factums found their way into judgments and were frequently used by 
many of the female justices on the Court.
The remaining section of this chapter reviews five of the eight different policy 
areas outlined in Chapter Four of this study: violence against women, family law support 
and custody, tax and benefit programs affecting pregnancy, abortion and fetal rights, and 
discrimination. It reviews of selected decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada from 
each of these policy areas. The penal system will not be discussed in this analysis because 
there was only one case and there was no evidence of a different voice. Similarly, only 
two cases were examined with regard to pornography where both men and women 
justices had an equal score. Only minor differences were evident with regard to sexual 
orientation. This section of Chapter Five demonstrates to some extent, that women
91
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
justices do in fact take on a Gilligan-like approach with differing voices in their 
judgments. Likewise, MacKinnon’s theories are given judicial consideration in many of 
the cases discussed.
Violence Against Women: Rape, Sexual Assault and Spousal Abuse
As noted in Chapter Three of this study, MacKinnon discusses the issue of rape 
and expands on the mythology surrounding consent which is “supposed to be women’s 
form of control over intercourse, different from but equal to the custom of male initiative” 
(1989, 174). MacKinnon distinguishes women who are chaste and virginal from those 
who have acquired sexual experience, the “prostitutes” for whom consent is irrelevant.
For these women, consent is secondary, and for MacKinnon, this includes married 
women. MacKinnon notes “most women get the message that the law against rape is 
virtually unenforceable as applied to them” (1989, 175). MacKinnon would argue that the 
court would buy into stereotypical assumptions that if a woman has engaged in sexual 
intercourse before, then it is more likely that she consented to have sex with the accused. 
R. v. Ewanchuk: Case #21
At issue in R. v. Ewanchuk (1999) was the application by lower courts of a 
relatively new set of Criminal Code provisions about consent in sexual assault. These 
provisions defined “consent” as “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in 
the sexual activity in question” (Criminal Code, section 273.1 [1]). Steven Ewanchuk had 
been acquitted at trial of sexually assaulting a seventeen-year-old woman who had come 
to see him about possible employment. The complainant said no when the accused tried 
to touch her breasts, but she remained silent as he continued to touch her and did not 
leave his trailer when the touching continued. Both the trial court judge and a majority of 
the Alberta Court of Appeal concluded that she had implicitly consented to the sexual
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activity. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the trial and appellate court decisions
and entered a conviction of sexual assault. While the majority decision written by Justice
Major focused on committed applications of the traditional rules of evidence, Justice
L’Heureux-Dube’s concurring judgment focused on Gilligan’s ethic of care approach
and very little on the legal issues. Instead, she talked about “myths and stereotypes” and
cited Catharine MacKinnon’s Toward a Feminist Theory o f the State. In her concurring
judgment, she notes:
Myths o f  rape include the view that women fantasize about being rape victims; 
that women mean 'yes' even when they say 'no'; that any woman could 
successfully resist a rapist if  she really wished to; that the sexually experienced 
do not suffer harms when raped (or at least suffer lesser harms than the 
sexually 'innocent'); that women often deserve to be raped on account of their 
conduct, dress, and demeanour; that rape by a stranger is worse than one by an 
acquaintance. Stereotypes of sexuality include the view of women as passive, 
disposed submissively to surrender to the sexual advances o f active men, the 
view that sexual love consists in the 'possession' by a man o f a woman, and 
that heterosexual sexual activity is paradigmatically penetrative coitus (at 82 ) .
L’Heureux-Dube went on to criticize the trial judge, Justice John McClung, who she
believed had focused inapprporiately on the complainant’s lifestyle, appearance and lack
of physical resistance.
The final reasons for judgment in the case came from Justice McLachlin. She
noted:
I also agree with Justice L'Heureux-Dube that stereotypical assumptions lie at 
the heart o f what went wrong in this case. The specious defence o f implied 
consent (consent implied by law), as applied in this case, rests on the 
assumption that unless a woman protests or resists, she should be "deemed" to 
consent (see L'Heureux-Dube J.). On appeal, the idea also surfaced that if  a 
woman is not modestly dressed, she is deemed to consent. Such stereotypical 
assumptions find their roots in many cultures, including our own. They no 
longer, however, find a place in Canadian law (at 103).
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Thus it appears that the women on the court took a more contextual approach to their
judgments, focusing more on myths and stereotypes, while the men on the court focused
their discussion rather narrowly on the immediate legal issues of the case.
R. y. Seabover: R, v. Gavme: Case #58
A similar case came to the Supreme Court and led to the new law applied in the
latter case, eight years prior to Ewanchuk. Steven Seaboyer and Nigel Gayme were
charged with two separate sexual assault charges. In the first case, Steven Seaboyer was
charged with evidence of bruises and other physical injuries suffered by the complainant.
In the second case, Gayme was charged with sexual assault of a fifteen-year-old
acquaintance. Gayme’s counsel raised the defences of consent and honest belief in
consent, and argued that the complainant had been the sexual aggressor. The defence
lawyer wanted to bring in the complainant’s prior sexual history. At issue was the
constitutionality of the “rape-shield” provisions of the Criminal Code o f Canada. A
seven-justice majority led by Beverley McLachlin declared that section 276 constituted
an unjustified infringement of an accused’s right to a fair trial guaranteed by section 7
and 11(d) of the Charter. Although LEAF’s arguments apparently had little impact on
Justice McLachlin, they were important to Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s dissent. L’Heureux-
Dube recounted a number of myths related to sexual assault which had persistently
informed the application of the criminal law in this area. Again citing MacKinnon’s
Towards a Feminist Theory o f the State, she notes:
Rape myths still present formidable obstacles for complainants in their 
dealings with the very system charged with discovering the truth. From 
the making of the initial complaint, down to the determination of the 
issue at trial, stereotype and mythology are at work lowering the number 
of reported cases influencing police decision to pursue the case thereby 
decreasing the rates of arrest and finally distorting the issues at trial and 
necessarily the results (at 585).
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L’Heureux-Dube added that:
in all o f the hypothetical situations outlined in the Appellants' factums, 
evidence o f sexual history and/or sexual reputation is either totally irrelevant, 
admissible pursuant to the exceptions provided for in s. 276. or. in the 
alternative, o f very low probative value and highly prejudicial to the interests 
o f the administration o f justice . . .  [Emphasis added] (at 684).
Thus, the value of Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s judgment lies in creating a judicial record 
capturing the essence of the position taken by different women’s groups. While Justice 
McLachlin did not support L’Heureux-Dube in this particular case, it is interesting to note 
that eight years later McLachlin would find herself in the majority in Ewanchuk 
supporting L’Heureux-Dube’s concurring opinion. McLachlin may have been trying to 
distance herself from the majority judgment in Seaboyer. Nonetheless, in both character 
and substance, L’Heureux-Dube’s dissent demonstrated a more contextual approach, 
representing an important landmark in Canadian legal history.
Norbers v. Wvnrib: Case #48
A further case involving the issue of consent is Norberg v. Wynrib. This case 
involved a private action for damages against a physician on the grounds of sexual 
assault, professional negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. Laura Norberg had become 
addicted to painkillers. Dr. Morris Wynrib had treated her once before and agreed to write 
her prescriptions in exchange for sex. She asked him to help her for her addiction and he 
told her to just quit; she sued Dr. Wynrib for sexual assault. With Ms. Norberg conceding 
that no physical force had ever occurred, Dr. Wynrib successfully tendered the defence of 
consent in both lower courts. At issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was the meaning of 
consent in the context of power-dependency relationships. The Supreme Court 
unanimously decided the appeal in Laura Norberg’s favour. However, each justice came
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to their decision in a different manner. While Justices La Forest, Gonthier and Cory
focused on the battery claim, both Justices McLachlin and l’Heureux-Dube focused on
the nature of the physician-patient relationship. In her concurring opinion, McLachlin
writing for herself and L’Heureux-Dube pointed out that:
Women are particularly vulnerable to the exploitation and abuse o f this trust 
relationship. It elevated the standard o f care expected from physicians in their 
personal relationship with patients, it made consent to sexual relations in the 
physician patient context difficult to prove, and it allowed for adequate 
compensation for women exploited sexually by their physicians (at 258).
While L’Heureux-Dube did not cite MacKinnon directly, her opinion is consistent with
MacKinnon’s assumption that the law not only silences women by not including their
point of view, but it deliberately conceals women’s views through objective standards of
justice constructed out of masculine assumptions. Moreover, McLachlin and L’Heureux-
Dube’s concurring opinion also shows elements of Gilligan’s theory in that their
judgment is relationship-focused and is contextual in nature. Justice Sopinka also
provides further support for Gilligan’s analysis: he expressed his preference for a case-by-
case approach “in which the question of consent is ultimately a factual one that must be
determined on the basis of all the circumstances of a particular case”. Thus, Justice
Sopinka took a more rule-focused and instrumental approach to his judgment; this is in
stark contrast to the decision written by the women of the court.
R. v. O 'Connor: Case #49
A final case worth discussing in this analysis is O ’Connor. At issue in O 'Connor
was a Roman Catholic Bishop in British Columbia accused of sexually assaulting four
Aboriginal women during his tenure. His counsel obtained a court order requiring the
Crown to disclose the complainants’ medical, therapeutic, education and employment
records, and when the Crown delayed its compliance with the order, the trial court stayed
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the proceedings against O’Connor. The Crown appealed and won. O’Connor took the
case to the Supreme Court.
The two issues the Supreme Court had to consider were first, the disclosure of
medical and therapeutic records by the Crown and second, the disclosure of medical and
therapeutic records by third parties. The Court was in agreement on the first issue with
L’Heureux-Dube writing the majority. She argued that the Crown does not have the
obligation for disclosure because the records are personal and private matters. Where the
Court was divided was on competing claims against which this right should be balanced.
L’Heureux-Dube wrote the dissenting opinion along with McLachlin, Gonthier and La
Forest adding the right to equality without discrimination. She noted:
It is a common phenomenon in this day and age for one who has been sexually 
victimized to seek counselling or therapy in relation to this occurrence. It 
therefore stands to reason that disclosure rules or practices which make mental 
health or medical records routinely accessible in sexual offence proceedings 
will have disproportionately invasive consequences for women, particularly 
those with disabilities, and children. In particular, in determining questions o f  
disclosure o f records o f persons allegedly assaulted in institutions where they 
get psychiatric assistance, the courts must take care not to create a class of 
vulnerable victims who have to choose between accusing their attackers and 
maintaining the confidentiality o f their records (at 121).
Again, L’Heureux-Dube takes a more contextual approach in her judgment providing
further support for Gilligan’s theory. Moreover, Justice McLachlin retreated somewhat
from her position in Seaboyer. In contrast, Justice Lamer (who wrote for the majority)
approached the issue differently, arguing that the only competing claim was a
constitutional right to privacy. The key difference between the approaches of Lamer and
L’Heureux-Dube was that Lamer focused on the accused’s right to make lull answer and
defence, whereas L’Heureux-Dube emphasized the impact of protection of the witness’s
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privacy rights. There also appears to be merit in MacKinnon’s theory in that the law in 
this case failed to recognize women’s experience.
Spousal Abuse
Spousal abuse is another area that remains a hidden and persistent problem 
because of the power and control held by the abuser. Although there are some studies that 
suggest men and women are both capable of violence, female victims suffer more 
physically, emotionally, and financially from abuse (Boyle 1998, 174). Two cases have 
garnered widespread attention regarding spousal abuse and battered women’s syndrome 
and provide additional support for the proposition that women justices speak with a 
different voice.
R. v. Lavallee andR. v. Malott: Cases #34 & #74
The appelant in R. v. Lavallee, was of a battered woman in a volatile common law
relationship who killed her partner late one night by shooting him in the back of the head
as he left her room. It occurred after an argument during which she had been physically
abused and was fearful for her life. She had frequently been a victim of physical abuse.
Justice Wilson allowed the submission and consideration of expert evidence regarding
violence against women. The testimony was considered necessary in order to alter the
current legal norms to include and respond to the needs and reality of battered women. A
psychiatrist with expertise in the field of battered women prepared an assessment which
was used in support of her self-defence. It was his opinion that it was the final desperate
act of a woman who sincerely believed that she would be killed that night. Writing for the
majority, Wilson noted:
Expert testimony is admissible to assist the fact-finder in drawing inferences in 
areas where the expert has relevant knowledge or experience beyond that o f the 
lay person. It is difficult for the lay person to comprehend the battered wife
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syndrome. It is commonly thought that battered women are not really beaten as 
badly as they claim, otherwise they would have left the relationship.
Alternatively, some believe that women enjoy being beaten, that they have a 
masochistic strain in them. Each of these stereotypes may adversely affect 
consideration o f a battered woman's claim to have acted in self-defence in 
killing her partner. Expert evidence can assist the jury in dispelling these myths 
(at 152).
Justice Wilson recognized that judges are not all knowing and need to be educated about
circumstances and situations with which they may have little or no experience. This
particular decision is consistent with Gilligan’s theory and focuses more on relationships,
connection, and context in deciding what is just and fair.
A similar case came to the Supreme Court eight years later when the Supreme
Court re-visited the "battered woman syndrome" as a defence to the charge of murder
where the deceased had been the "batterer." Margaret Malott had been in a 19-year
abusive relationship with the deceased. He had "physically, sexually, psychologically and
emotionally" abused her. He had also taken their son away from her and gone to live with
a girlfriend. On the day of his death, he forced her to drive him to a medical centre to
obtain "prescription drugs for use in his illegal drug trade." For protection, she had taken
a handgun from his gun cabinet. When the drugs were unobtainable he turned ugly. She,
having in mind previous treatment in similar circumstances, took out the gun and shot
him. What was probably influential in the jury's mind in convicting her, was the fact that
"she then took a taxi to his girlfriend's home, shot her and stabbed her with a knife." The
Supreme Court of Canada, in a 6 - 0 decision upheld the conviction but took the
opportunity to discuss the defence o f  "battered woman syndrome." Justice L'Heureux-
Dube points out that:
The judgment o f the Court in Lavallee is the first major decision that the Court 
has taken into consideration not only inherent differences in gender but that 
there are differences in the thinking of battered and non-battered women. Just 
as men and women do not think alike on many subjects, so it is not possible
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that un- battered woman can necessarily understand the thinking of battered 
women. In order to assist those of us who, fortunately, are not in the situation 
o f the battered woman to understand her thinking, we require someone to 
explain her thought process to us. Psychiatric evidence of the effects and 
consequences o f long term abuse provide a way we can see her plight through 
her eyes (at 38).
While the men on the court focused more on the legal issues of self-defence, both Justices 
Wilson and L’Heureux-Dube considered the condition of the “battered woman”. They did 
not focus solely on the physical and sexual abuse but considered the entire circumstances 
which prevented the woman from leaving. Justice Wilson, in Lavallee, included lack of 
job skills, the presence of children to care for, and fear of retaliation. In Malott, Justice 
L'Heureux-Dube added a woman's need to protect her children from abuse, a fear of 
losing custody of her children, pressures to keep the family together, weaknesses of social 
and financial support for battered women, and no guarantee the violence would cease, 
simply because she left. Again, this provides further support for Gilligan’s theory that 
women justices approach decision-making in a different voice.
Family Law: Women’s Economic Disadvantage and the Gender-Based Division of Labour
Another policy area worth examining is family law and the implications it has for 
women. Six cases involving various aspects of family and social policy came to the 
Supreme Court in 1988-2000. Four of these cases, Moge v. Moge (1992), Symes v.
Canada (1993), Thibaudeau v. Canada (1995), and Gordon v. Goertz (1996) dealt with 
relationship breakdown. These cases are particularly important because both Justice 
McLachlin and Justice L’Heureux-Dube dissented in support of women, arguing that 
women’s experiences have been sadly lacking in terms of applying them to the 
interpretation of this area of law.
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Mose, Svmes. Thibaudeau and Gordon: Cases #42. #61. #63 & #22
The Moges married in the 1950s and immigrated to Canada in 1960. They
separated in 1973 and divorced in 1980, with Mrs. Moge acquiring custody of the
children and receiving monthly child and spousal payments. In 1989 her husband, Mr.
Moge obtained a court order terminating support, but the Manitoba Court of Appeal set
aside that judgment and awarded Mrs. Moge spousal support for an indefinite period. Mr.
Moge appealed to the Supreme Court, where LEAF intervened to support dismissal of the
appeal. The issues that the Supreme Court had to deal with were two-fold: first, the
principles for assessment of economic disadvantages and advantages arising from
marriage and marriage breakdown; and second, the nature of the obligation to become
economically self-sufficient. Justice L’Heureux-Dube wrote the majority opinion in
support of women and discussed the gendered division of labour and female
responsibility for child care. She noted:
Historically, or at least in recent history, the contributions made by women to 
the marital partnership were non-monetary and came in the form of work at 
home, such as taking care of the household, raising children, and so on. Today, 
though more and more women are working outside the home, such 
employment continues to play a secondary role and sacrifices continue to be 
made for the sake o f domestic considerations. These sacrifices often impair the 
ability o f the partner who makes them (usually the wife) to maximize her 
earning potential because she may tend to forego educational and career 
advancement opportunities. These same sacrifices may also enhance the 
earning potential o f the other spouse (usually the husband) who, because his 
wife is tending to such matters, is free to pursue economic goals. This 
eventually may result in inequities (at 863).
Similarly, Justice McLachlin in her concurring opinion emphasized the need to
compensate the wife for her contributions to the marriage and focused on the permanent
economic disadvantage she suffered as a consequence. Thus, both Justice L’Heureux-
Dube and Justice McLachlin acknowledged that the gender-based division of labour has
been used to socially define women as secondary earners who are likely to limit their
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work force participation, which is in turn associated with the systemic devaluation of
childcare, cleaning and other domestic work. Their judgments are consistent with
Gilligan’s theory and emphasize their ability to look beyond the legal rules and focus
specifically on the life circumstances of the women before them. It is also important to
look at Justice Wilson’s method of constitutional interpretation known as the contextual
approach. In speeches referring to Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.) Wilson explained
the method and notes that:
I distinguished what I referred to as an abstract interpretative approach from a 
contextual approach. Under the abstract approach, the underlying value sought 
to be protected y a given section of the Charter is determined at large. Under 
the contextual approach inquiries into the nature o f a right are rooted firmly in 
the context o f case. I pointed out that a right or freedom may have different 
meanings in different contexts. Security o f the person, for example, might 
mean one thing when addressed to the issue o f over-crowding in prisons and 
something quite different when addressed to the issue of noxious fumes from 
industrial smokestacks. It was entirely probable that the value to be attached to 
it in different contexts for the purpose o f the balancing under s. 1 might also be 
different. I concluded therefore that the importance o f the right or freedom had 
to be assessed in context rather than in the abstract and that its purpose had to 
be ascertained in context. This having been done, the right or freedom must 
then, in accordance with the dictates o f the Court, be given a generous 
interpretation aimed at fulfilling that purpose and securing for the individual 
the full benefit o f the guarantee (at 1355).
Justice Wilson used context in the same manner as it typically used in feminist literature.
One feminist author has written for example that:
I argue that it is in women’s interest to refuse to subscribe to, or commit 
themselves to, any single meaning o f equality. Feminist advocates need to learn 
to use the equality discourse on behalf o f women in as many and in as diverse 
situations as the term can bear. The needs and experiences o f women will 
dictate the meaning o f equality in each particular context. It is these needs and 
experiences which should be brought into the open and promoted, not some 
reified idea o f equality” (1987, 186).
Thus, for Justice Wilson, Canadian Courts should not adopt the U.S. practice of reading
internal, principled limits into the definitions of rights themselves. Instead, the existence
of section 1 enabled her to directly make a choice between competing social policies on
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the basis of social-science data. Wilson’s contextual approach, downplayed the search for 
abstract or textual constitutional principles.
Symes and Thibaudeau represent two cases in which the women of the court in an 
all male majority, dissented in favour of women’s issues. At issue in Symes was whether 
self-employed professionals could deduct child-care expenses as business expenditures 
under the Income Tax Act (ITA). Symes argued that the ITA’s failure to permit the 
deduction of child-care expenses from business income violated section 15 of the Charter 
because of its unequal impact on women. Iacobucci wrote the majority decision 
suggesting that “the exclusion did not involve adverse discrimination against women, 
because, although it was clear their share of the child care burden in the society was 
disproportionate, the plaintiff had not established that women bore a disproportionate 
share of child care expenses” (at 775). Thus, Iacobucci approached the dispute from a 
legalistic perspective toward the ITA. In contrast, Justice L’Heureux-Dube and Justice 
McLachlin dissented from their male colleagues and saw the case as challenging an 
important obstacle to the attainment of substantive equality for women. L’Heureux-Dube 
writing for herself and Justice McLachlin took a contextual approach and stated “Child 
care expenses should not be disallowed as a business expense under section 18 as being 
personal in nature. While for most men, the responsibility of children does not impact on 
the number of hours they work or affect their ability to work, a women’s ability even to 
participate in the workforce may be completely contingent on her ability to acquire child 
care” (at 699).Thus, Symes is a good example of a case where the male majority exhibits a 
lack of understanding of the reality of women’s lives. It is interesting to note that the men 
on the court assumed that childcare is split evenly between both parents.
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Similarly in Thibaudeau v. Canada, a case where the scheme of taxation and 
deductions for child support payments was challenged under the equality provision of the 
Charter, again in dissent, McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dube attempted to illustrate how an 
analysis which treated the former spouses as a couple for tax purposes failed to comply 
with the reality of most custodial parents. The women of the court recognized that women 
living in financially difficult situations have very little power over their former spouse’s 
actions or economic resources. The assumption that the family law system could address 
the custodial parents’ concerns did not account for the difficulties whether practical, 
financial, or emotional involved in seeking redress through the scheme. Part of the 
problem was that the men misconstrued the situation of divorced couples. Thus, the 
positions taken by both Justice L’Heureux-Dube and Justice McLachlin in Symes and 
Thibaudeau in opposition to an all male majority provide further support of Gilligan’s 
analysis and support MacKinnon’s theory to some extent that gender bias exists within 
the Canadian judicial system.
A final case worth addressing in this area of law is Gordon v. Goertz. This case 
involved a bitter custody battle between Janet Gordon and Robin Goertz, who had 
divorced after twenty years of marriage. Gordon planned on moving to Australia with her 
daughter to enter a three-year Master’s program in Orthodontics. Her application was 
successful and she and her daughter moved in February of 1995. Robin Goertz appealed 
unsuccessfully to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and again to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. The issue in front of the Supreme Court was the interpretation of the best 
interests of the child test under sections 16 and 17 of the Divorce Act. This case was 
considered a win for women with nine members of the Court supporting the outcome. 
Justice M cl .ctchlin on bchaiI of the court concluded:
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in the end, the importance o f the child remaining with the parent to whose 
custody it has become accustomed in the new location must be weighed against 
the continuance of full contact with the child's access parent, its extended 
family and its community. The ultimate question In every case is this: what is 
in the best interests o f the child in all the circumstances, old as well as new? (at 
l Kj l  ) .
In her concurring judgment, L’Heureux-Dube also emphasized that the best interests of 
the child are served by protecting the position of the custodial parent. She writes 
“Important as contact with non-custodial parent may be, it should be noted that not all 
experts agree on the weight to be given to such contact in assessing the best interests of 
children” (at 110). Both women acknowledged that the concept of the best interests of the 
child should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the constitutional goal of 
promoting women’s substantive equality. Through their unique approach to decision­
making, the women on the Court brought elements of Gilligan’s theory to their 
understanding of the law.
Abortion and Fetal Rights: The Ambivalence of Choice
A trilogy of cases came to the Supreme Court of Canada in the late 1980s 
concerning the rights of the fetus. Morgentaler, Daigle, and Borowski were three 
controversial cases that dealt with the dilemma of abortion and with women’s privacy 
rights. Similarly, Winnipeg Child and Family Services (CFS) also dealt with balancing the 
rights of a woman and her fetus. Two cases will be discussed in this analysis: the 1988 
Morgentaler decision in which the Supreme Court struck down the provisions of the 
criminal code on the grounds that they offended basic freedoms entrenched in the 
Charter; and the 1997 Winnipeg Child and Family Services (CFS) decision in which the 
Court ruled that the state does not have the right to interfere with a woman’s pregnancy 
against her will, even if her behaviour threatens her fetus. These two cases had
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tremendous implications for the existence of fetal rights in Canadian law. The
Morgentaler decision was for Wilson was perhaps the most important decision to date in
Canada dealing with woman’s privacy rights as against the state (Anderson 1999, 227).
R. v. Moreentaler: Case #45
Henry Morgentaler had first begun performing abortions in a Montreal clinic in
1968. Morgentaler had been charged and then acquitted by a jury in 1973, with the
acquittal overturned by the Quebec Court of Appeal in 1974 (Anderson 1999, 227). In
June of 1983, Morgentaler was charged when he opened a clinic in Winnipeg and was
charged the following month at his Toronto clinic. As his defence, Morgentaler argued
that the abortion law violated Charter rights. He was acquitted by the lower courts and the
crown appealed. The Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, and Morgentaler
appealed to the Supreme Court in 1986. The case was heard over four days, but the
judgment was not released until late January of 1988 (Anderson 1999, 228). At the time
of the decision, Justice Wilson was still the only woman on the Supreme Court.
In a 5-2 decision, the Court ruled that the abortion law did violate s. 7 of the
Charter and the five-judge majority divided three ways on why the law was invalid. The
men on the Court took a rule-focused approach to their decision. For example, in their
dissenting opinion McIntyre and La Forest looked behind the text of the Charter to the
original understanding of its meaning and decided the matter on narrow procedural
grounds. McIntyre notes:
I express no opinion on the question o f whether, or upon what conditions, there 
should be a right for a pregnant woman to have an abortion free o f legal 
sanction. No valid constitutional objection to s. 251 o f the Criminal Code has, 
in my view, been raised and, consequently, if there is to be a change in the law 
concerning this question it will be for Parliament to make. Questions of public 
policy touching on this controversial and divisive matter must be resolved by 
the elected Parliament. It does not fall within the proper jurisdiction o f the
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courts. Parliamentary action on this matter is subject to judicial review but, in 
my view, nothing in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms gives the 
Court the power or duty to displace Parliament in this matter involving, as it 
does, general matters o f public policy (at 258).
Both McIntyre and La Forest believed that the framers of the Charter stayed neutral on
the issue of abortion and therefore judges had no authority to create rights. They took an
interpretivist position and maintained judicial self-restraint. Justices Beetz and Estey
focused their attention on the delays women faced in securing permission for a legal
abortion as a result of the procedural mechanisms contained in 251. In their view, these
delays created additional risks to women’s health and this threatened their section 7 right
to physical security of the person. Justices Dickson and Lamer broadened this procedural
approach to include psychological and emotional integrity within the meaning of security
of the person.
Justice Wilson, unlike her male colleagues, believed that it would be a waste of 
Parliament’s time redrafting procedural aspects of the abortion law only to be told that it 
would violate a woman’s substantive right to abortion. Wilson took a non-interpretivist 
approach and examined section 7 guarantees substantively. The direct wording which 
opens her judgment generates a compelling abstract framework for the analysis that 
follows:
At the heart o f this appeal is the question whether a pregnant woman can, as a 
constitutional matter, be compelled by law to carry the foetus to term. The 
legislature has proceeded on the basis that she can be so compelled and, indeed, 
has made it a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment under s. 251 o f the 
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, for her or her physician to terminate the 
pregnancy unless the procedural requirements o f  the section are com plied with.
My colleagues, the Chief Justice and Justice Beetz, have attacked those 
requirements in reasons which I have had the privilege o f reading. They have 
found that the requirements do not comport with the principles o f fundamental 
justice in the procedural sense... I think that the Court must tackle the primary 
issue first. A consideration as to whether or not the procedural requirements for 
obtaining or performing an abortion comport with fundamental justice is purely 
academic if  such requirements cannot as a constitutional matter be imposed at
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all. If a pregnant woman cannot, as a constitutional matter, be compelled by 
law to carry the foetus to term against her will, a review o f the procedural 
requirements by which she may be compelled to do so seems pointless.
Moreover, it would, in my opinion, be an exercise in futility for the legislature 
to expend its time and energy in attempting to remedy the defects in the 
procedural requirements unless it has some assurance that this process will, at 
the end of the day, result in the creation o f a valid criminal offence. 1 turn, 
therefore, to what I believe is the central issue that must be addressed (at 162).
For Justice Wilson, the debate did not revolve around the administrative structures and
procedures of the challenged legislation, but rather it directly engaged the right of a
woman to have an abortion. (Anderson 1999, 229). Justice Wilson advocated the
trimester-based approach laid out in Roe v. Wade in the United States. She notes for
example:
After the first trimester, the compelling state interest in the mother's health 
permits it to adopt reasonable regulations in order to promote safe abortions -  
but requiring abortions to be performed in hospitals, or only after approval of 
another doctor or committee in addition to the woman's physician, is 
impermissible, as is requiring that the abortion procedure employ a technique 
that, however preferable from a medical perspective, is not widely available (at 
170).
Wilson goes on to discuss what it means to be female and suggests:
It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to such a 
dilemma not just because it is outside the realm o f his personal experience 
(although this is, o f course, the case) but because he can relate to it only by 
objectifying it, thereby eliminating the subjective elements o f the female 
psyche which are at the heart o f the dilemma (at 171).
Wilson’s analysis suggests that in a matter so intimately connected with women’s bodily
integrity and freedom of conscience, any state interference must of necessity infringe
constitutional guarantees. She believes that the state is required not to approve but to
respect the personal decisions made by its citizens as a fundamental element of their
individual privacy (Anderson 1999, 230). Overall, Wilson did not rule out the possibility
of a law against abortion in the later stages of pregnancy, and she accepted the legitimacy
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of protecting the fetus. Thus, there appears to be a clear distinction on the Court between 
Wilson’s point of view and the view shared by the men on the Court. While Wilson took 
a more contextual approach to her judgment, the men on the Court portrayed a more rule- 
focused and dominant approach to their judgment, providing further support for 
Gilligan’s theory.
Winnipeg and Child and Family Services (CFS): Case #72
Most discussions of fetal rights relate to whether a woman should be able to 
request an abortion, and thus terminate the life of her fetus. However, there are other 
situations where this balance of rights is important. The significance of fetal rights is not 
limited to the abortion arena, as illustrated in the case of Winnipeg and Child and Family 
Services (CFS). Martha Shaffer points out that “The acceptance of fetal rights under the 
Charter will influence how we conceptualize pregnancy, how we perceive pregnant 
women, and how we perceive the role of the State in regulating pregnancy” (1994, 61). 
The case of Winnipeg and Child and Family Services (CFS) looks specifically at whether 
the state had the right to forcibly take a woman into custody in order to prevent her from 
damaging the fetus.
At issue in Winnipeg and Child and Family Services (CFS) was a 21 year old 
woman, D.G., who was 5 months pregnant and hopelessly addicted to glue & solvent 
sniffing. She had previously given birth to three children; at least two of them were 
permanently harmed in the womb as a result of her addiction. They became wards of the 
State immediately after they were bom. Social workers from Winnipeg Child and Family 
Services (CFS) had tried repeatedly to obtain help for the woman, but she had refused 
treatment. Once, she was willing to accept help, but there was none available at the time. 
Family Services applied for a court order to force her to spend the rest of her pregnancy
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in a medical facility. The lower court judge ordered that she be taken into the custody of 
social-welfare authorities. The Manitoba Court of Appeal overturned the Judge's order. 
Part of their argument was that any damage to the fetus would have been done in the first 
trimester, and she already was 5 months pregnant, near the end of her second trimester. 
Winnipeg Child and Family Services appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Canada 
and the Supreme Court of Canada ruled by a 7 to 2 majority that the State does not have 
the right to interfere with a woman's pregnancy against her will, even if her behavior 
threatens her fetus.
Madam Justice Beverley McLachlin wrote the decision for the majority. She 
supported LEAF’S position that this case could seriously erode women’s equality rights. 
LEAF intervened to discourage the Supreme Court from creating a coercive regime under 
which judges would mandate how women conduct their lives and manage their 
pregnancies. Justice McLachlin concluded that any attempt to forcibly treat a pregnant 
woman would violate “the most sacred sphere of personal liberty -  the right of every 
person to live and move in freedom.. .A pregnant woman and her unborn child are 
one.. .To make orders protecting fetuses would radically impinge on the fundamental 
liberties of the mother, both as to lifestyle choices and as to where she chooses to live” (at 
30). She expressed concern that if the State were found to have a right to interfere with a 
pregnancy, then women who smoke cigarettes or who exercise strenuously might be the 
next to be taken into custody. This could cause the problem to be driven underground and 
pregnant women might refuse counseling and medical help out of fear of being confined; 
some might even resort to having an abortion in order to continue their addiction.
In contrast, Justices John Sopinka and John Major issued a dissenting judgment 
stating that intervention against the wishes of a pregnant woman should be possible if
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there is a reasonable probability that her behavior would cause "serious irreparable harm 
to the unborn child...In any event, this interference is always subject to the mother's right 
to end it by deciding to have an abortion...When a woman chooses to carry a fetus to 
term, she must accept some responsibility for its well-being and the state has an interest in 
trying to ensure the child's health... In my opinion, the state has an enforceable interest in 
ensuring, to the extent practicable, the well-being of the unborn child and the appeal 
should be allowed” (at 66). While Justice McLachlin did not assert that fetuses could 
never be legal persons, McLachlin was consistent with LEAF’S argument that neither 
common law nor civil law of Quebec recognizes the unborn child as a legal person 
possessing rights. Thus, unlike her male colleagues Justices Sopinka and Major, Justice 
McLachlin grasped that this is an issue of fundamental rights for women.
Discrimination: The Definition of Equality
While inequality is a continuing state for many different groups in society, the 
mandate in this particular analysis addresses the inequalities experienced by women. 
Women as a group, compared with men as a group, have experienced widespread and 
pervasive discrimination. Women have suffered sex-based discrimination in specific and 
concrete areas of their lives such as physical safety, access to fulfilling and fairly paid 
work, family and childcare responsibilities, reproductive choice, and economic security. 
Two Supreme Court decisions will be discussed in this analysis that have been especially 
concerned with the definition of equality and discrimination. These are Gould v. Yukon 
Order o f Pioneers (1996), and BCGSEU v. PSERC (1999). These cases are indicative of a 
gender difference that exists on the Supreme Court and provide further support for the 
proposition that women justices are more supportive of women’s issues than their male 
counterparts.
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Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers: Case #24
This particular case came to the Supreme Court in 1996 and involved a woman
who was denied membership in a fraternal organization because she was female. Gould
applied for membership in the Yukon Order of Pioneers, a fraternal order whose primary
objectives are social, historical and cultural, with its paramount concern being the welfare
and well-being of its members. According to its constitution, the Order is dedicated to the
advancement of the Yukon Territory, the mutual protection of its members, the uniting of
these members in the strong tie of brotherhood, the preservation of the names of all
Yukon Pioneers on its rolls and the collection and the preservation of the literature and
incidents of Yukon's history. The historical materials on the Order and its members
collected by the Order are made available to the public. Gould’s application for
membership was denied on the ground that she was female. She filed a complaint with the
Yukon Human Rights Commission. The Board concluded that the discrimination was
allowed under s. 8(a) of the Yukon Act, a provision which prohibits discrimination "when
offering or providing services, goods or facilities to the public". The Supreme Court of
the Yukon Territory set aside the Board's decision and the Court of Appeal upheld that
judgment. Both courts found that Gould’s exclusion from membership in the Order did
not amount to prohibited discrimination under s. 8(a). The case went to the Supreme
Court of Canada and was an overall loss for women with Justice La Forest and Justice
Iacobucci concluding that discrimination was not evident in this case and Justices
McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dube dissenting in favour of women’s equality.
Writing for five other male justices on the Court, Justice Iacobucci argued that:
The fact that an organization labels what it offers as a "membership" rather 
than a "good or service" is not determinative. The appropriate characterization, 
and the question of whether s. 8(a) or (c) is engaged, is, as a legal question, one
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for the relevant decision-making body to determine. With regard to the 
appellants' position, I would not deny that a collection or creation process 
could constitute a service offered to the public: this could be so if, for instance, 
the process itself took place in the context o f a public relationship. However, as 
a reading of the agreed statement o f facts confirms, that is not this case. It is 
evident to me that the service offered to the public in this case is the end 
product, namely, the historical data or documents produced. And it is clear that 
the Order provides this product to the public without discrimination (at 16).
Thus, Justice Iacobucci approached the case from a rule-focused perspective looking 
specifically at the legal questions of 8(a) and (c) of the Order. Justice La Forest in a 
concurring opinion, also reverted to a more conservative and narrow jurisprudence. He 
notes:
The appellant contends that through the exclusion of women from the Order, 
the history o f the Yukon will consequently be distorted by creating a male bias.
To this I reply that forcing a private organization to compile history in a 
particular way would have serious implications for the freedom of association 
and of expression of those who join a particular group for that purpose. The 
very essence o f our Canadian society is determined by the diversity which is 
permitted to flourish. Those who wish to present a different view o f history are 
free to do so. The Order does not purport to provide the definitive history o f the 
Yukon (at 76).
In contrast, the women on the Court approached their decision from a more web-centered 
framework. Justice McLachlin dissents on the basis that the Order provides sufficient 
benefits of a public nature and importance that membership itself constitutes a service 
offered or provided to the public that women as well as men should be eligible to enjoy 
(171). L'Heureux-Dube writes a separate dissent holding that correctness is not the 
standard of review where the Board's decision is not based on general questions of law, 
but rather the application of law to the facts. The Board could reasonably conclude on the 
evidence that the history collection, preservation, and publication activities of the Order 
represent work done for the benefit of the public, and there is no reason to sever the 
preparation of the historical record from the communication to the public (at 93). Thus,
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there appears to be a clear difference in judgments between male and female justices on
the Court. While the men approached the decision from a more dominate and rule-
focused perspective, the women on the Court placed more emphasis on relationships by
discussing the exclusion of women from membership as discriminatory.
BCGSEUv. PSERC: Case #7
This particular case involved the participation of women in nontraditional
occupations. Tawney Meiorin, a female forest fire fighter in BC, had worked in this male
dominated profession for over two years with good reviews. The BC government decided
that all fire fighters had to pass a set of tests to show that they could physically do the job.
Tawney passed all but one test. Although women and men have a different capacity to
process oxygen, only one running test was used, and it had been designed using male test
subjects. The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that there was no discrimination
because the aerobic capacity standard was necessary for the safe and efficient
performance of Tawney Meiorin’s duties as a fire fighter. The appeal went to the
Supreme Court and two issues were examined. The first issue addressed whether the BC
Court of Appeal was correct in concluding that the BC government had not discriminated
against the complainant and the second issue focused on the legal test for determining
discrimination under human rights legislation.
Agreeing with the argument advanced by LEAF that the purpose of human rights
legislation is to remedy systemic discrimination, Justice McLachlin established that there
was a compelling case for revising the analysis of discrimination and a three-pronged test
was implemented as a result. Writing for the majority, Justice McLachlin notes:
This case, where Ms. Meiorin seeks to keep her position in a male-dominated 
occupation, is a good example o f how the conventional analysis shields 
systemic discrimination from scrutiny. This analysis prevents the Court from
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rigorously assessing a standard which, in the course o f regulating entry to a 
male-dominated occupation, adversely affects women as a group. Although the 
Government may have a duty to accommodate an individual claimant, the 
practical result o f the conventional analysis is that the complex web o f  
seemingly neutral, systemic barriers to traditionally male-dominated 
occupations remains beyond the direct reach of the law. The right to be free 
from discrimination is reduced to a question o f whether the "mainstream" can 
afford to confer proper treatment on those adversely affected, within the 
confines o f its existing formal standard. If it cannot, the edifice of systemic 
discrimination receives the law's approval. This cannot be right (at 42).
In this judgment, Justice McLachlin completely agreed with the position advanced by
LEAF. The judgment went on to accept LEAF’S perspective that lower standards might
be necessary to resolve systemic discrimination. Manfredi notes that “McLachlin moved
the Court away from the sensitive accommodation of differences standard implicit in
Justice McIntyre’s Andrews judgment and toward denying the very relevance of certain
differences” (2004, 60). Her reasoning in BCGSEU demonstrates significant evolution in
her understanding of equality rights and provides further support for Gilligan’s different
voice theory.
With the possible exception o f  the penal system, pornography, and sexual 
orientation, the five policy areas discussed in this chapter demonstrate that there is a 
gender difference on the Supreme Court o f  Canada and that wom en justices do speak in a 
more contextual manner when deciding cases. This analysis indicates that women on the 
Court do make a difference in law and that in m ost policy areas. In many o f  the cases 
discussed above, it became evident that the men on the Court were unable to view  the 
arguments from a w om en's perspective while the wom en on the Court understood these 
issues more clearly. This was particularly evident in the area o f  family law. Thus, there 
does appear to be some merit in Gilligan’s analysis. Moreover, the qualitative evidence
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presented in this paper does support the proposition that wom en judges are making a 
difference in the legal system.
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C onclusion
The results from this investigation of women’s issues cases suggest that female 
justices do i n f l u e n c e  the structure of the law. On the question of whether female justices 
make a difference in the legal system, and more significantly, if they substantively 
represent women, the answer is generally positive. While both female and male justices 
speak and act to support women’s issues on the Supreme Court of Canada, legal opinions 
by female justices were proportionally more supportive of women’s issues than those 
delivered by their male colleagues. In situations where women attach more importance to 
women’s issues than men, it can be argued that an increase in the number of women in 
the judiciary would achieve greater representation of women’s issues in the Canadian 
legal system. This is consistent with the literature conducted on women in legislative 
politics as demonstrated in Chapter One of this study.
The empirical findings are also consistent with the American studies outlined in 
Chapter Two, which found that women judges are more supportive of women’s issues 
than their male counterparts. This was demonstrated in the core analysis summary in 
which women justices were far more likely to vote in favour of women’s issues than their 
male counterparts. However, it is also important to point out that judges do not simply 
vote and determine who wins and loses, but also produce written explanations for their 
decisions through opinion writing. A quantitative analysis of votes can produce a 
conclusion that is quite different from a qualitative assessment of jurisprudence. 
Moreover, women justices also wrote a higher percentage of majority, concurring and 
dissenting opinions in support of women’s issues. This suggests that as the number of 
women has increased, their potential to influence legal policy has also increased. Unlike
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the American research, this study also looked at whether women judges make a difference 
by conducting a content analysis at the more qualitative level, i.e., this study examined 
specific decisions of judges to determine whether a gender difference does in fact exist. 
Specifically, this study analyzed selected Supreme Court decisions and compared these 
decisions to the feminist theory of Carol Gilligan to establish whether women judges 
were incorporating this theory into their rulings. As indicated in the secondary analysis of 
this study, women justices approach disputes with a more contextualized, personalized 
and subjective style, whereas the male justices took on a more rational, objective and 
more legalistic approach to their decisions. This suggests that there is merit in Gilligan’s 
analysis and that the women on the Court do approach disputes differently from men 
because of their unique experiences as a woman. This was perhaps most evident in the 
area of family law in which the women of the Court demonstrated in their written 
opinions that the Court needed to broaden the scope of the realities women face. While 
the women justices appeared to understand these issues more clearly, the men by contrast 
wrote the majority opinions in a “male voice”, one that was more abstract and principled.
In light of these findings, it is worthwhile to explore the likely impact of four 
women justices on the Supreme Court of Canada, which is the current makeup of the 9- 
member Court. This is a breakthrough for women in the justice field and brings a gender 
balance to the bench that is unprecedented not only in Canada, but elsewhere in the 
world. In addition to Justices McLachlin and Deschamps. Justice Louise Charron and 
Justice Rosalie Abella, both of the Ontario Court of Appeal, bring the number of women 
on the nine member court to four, including its Chief Justice. Justice Abella is considered 
a feminist and champion of minority rights while Justice Charron by contrast is seen as a 
middle-of-the-road choice and more inclined to follow the rules of the law. Jeffrey
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Simpson notes for example that “Justice Abella will take the philosophical slot of Louise 
Arbour, who was establishing a reputation as the court’s most activist, liberal 
judge... Judge Charron is more in the occasionally deferential mould of Frank Iacobucci” 
(2004, A17). Justice Abella encouraged new policies to increase the hiring of women and 
minorities (Geddes 2004,27). Moreover, she wrote the landmark 1998 Rosenberg ruling 
that extended spousal benefits to gay couples. On Dec. 9,2004 in a Reference to the 
Supreme Court on Same-Sex Marriage, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Ottawa 
has exclusive jurisdiction to decide who has the right to get married in this country. The 
decision means that same-sex marriages performed in seven provinces and one territory 
are legal and must be recognized. Moreover, the ruling states that the word “marriage” in 
s. 91 (27). now applies to same-sex couples. Both Justices Abella and Charron have 
previous track records that strongly suggested that they would support the Prime 
Minister’s plan to broaden the definition of matrimony to include same-sex couples and 
may have had an impact on the Court to some extent.
While it is too soon to determine the exact impact four women justices will have 
on the judicial system, this study does lend support to the proposition that there will be 
more sensitivity to gender dynamics on the Supreme Court. Decision-making by the 
women justices will look at the law in its broader gendered social context. Law Professor 
Susan Boyd notes for example that “There’s a stronger likelihood of that when you have 
anyone from a group that has not been as represented fully in the legal system in the past” 
(Richer 2004. Al), Thus according to the findings of this study, increasing the number of 
women justices on the Supreme Court will make a difference in the outcomes and rulings 
of issues involving gender fairness.
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It is also important to note that men on the Court can also be quite sensitive to
women’s concerns. For example, Chief Justice Dickson showed deep sensitivity to
women in Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd. by broadening the understanding of what
constitutes sex discrimination. Similarly, Justice Beetz showed sensitivity to one of the
most difficult issues for women in R. v. Morgentaler. Moreover, in many of the cases
discussed in this study, the men in the Court made reference to LEAF arguments and
factums. Referring to both of these men, former Justice L’Heureux-Dube points out that:
Not only were these male judges gender-sensitive, they strove to remain aware 
and responsive to the rich diversity o f experiences which make up our society.
Chief Justice Dickson, in preparation for and in the undertaking what he 
considered a revolutionary role for the judiciary in applying and upholding the 
Charter, constantly sought to educate himself about the social issues and 
experiences which the Charter was meant to address (1999, 287),
Thus, it is important to acknowledge that just as women do not form a monolithic or
homogeneous group and there are certainly women who view moral questions in terms of
justice, duty and rights, men are not a totally homogeneous group and can also be
sympathetic and understanding to concerns facing women.
However, this study has argued that increased representation of women into
political institutions that is representative of their numbers in society now places women
on a more equal playing field than has ever previously been the case, and at the very least
provides these women justices with the opportunity to speak about women’s issues in a
manner that is more balanced. All of this suggests that the integration of more women
into the Canadian judiciary will foster positive changes in the outcome of women’s rights
cases. This study does lend support to the notion that the four women currently on the
Court will recognize and incorporate their unique experiences as women into their
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decision-making and will result in the jurisprudence that further protects and promotes the 
rights of women.
121
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 1.0 




Rule Focused Relationship Focused
Dominate Collaborate
Power Over Power to
Competition Cooperation
Hierarchy Web-Centered
Speak out Listen well
Public Sphere Home Sphere
Breadwinning Caregiving
Source: Jilda M. Aliotta, “Gender and Judging: Some thoughts Toward a Theory” (2003)
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Table 1.1
Percentage of Women Elected or Appointed, 
















0.4 1/264 9.6 27/282 20.6 62/301
Senate 4.5 4/88 11.9 12/101 36.6 34/93
Prov/Terr 2.3 15/639 12.2 92/752 22.3 165/738
ALL
WOMEN
2.0 20/991 11.5 131/1135 23.1 261/1132
Source: Trimble and Arscott, “Still Counting: Women in Politics Across Canada” (2003).
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Table 4.0
Supreme Court Cases Identified as Being Feminist in Content
1982-2003
CASE YEAR LAW INTERVENER POLICY AREA
*A.G. 2000 Criminal Law LEAF Sexual Assault
A. (L.L.) 
v.Beharriel





Action Travail 1987 Can. HRA ActionFemm Discrimination
Adams 1995 Crim.Code Sexual assault
Andrews 1989 Charter, 15 LEAF n/a
Arndt v. Smith 1997 Abortion/Women’s 
Health
*BCSGEU 1999 Human 
Rights Code
LEAF Discrimination
* Bernard 1988 Charter Sexual Assault
Borowski 1989 Charter, 7,15 LEAF Abortion
*Boston 2001 Family Law 
Act
LEAF Family law support
Brooks 1989 Man. HRA LEAF Discrimination
Butler 1992 Charter, 2b LEAF Pornography
Can Newspapers 1988 Charter, 2b, 
l id
LEAF Sexual Assault









Daviault 1994 Charter, 1,15 Sexual Assault







Gordon 1996 Divorce Act LEAF Family law- 
custody
*Gosselin 2002 Charter, 15 NAWL W elfare/Equality




*Hess/Nguyen 1990 Charter Sexual Assault
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*Heywood 1994 Charter Sexual Assault
2000 Criminal Law Sexual Assault
Janzen 1989 Man. HRA LEAF Discrimination
*Jones 1994 Charter Sexual Assault
Keegstra 1990 Charter, 2b, 
l id
LEAF Censorship
*L (D.O.) 1993 Charter Sexual Assault
*L. (W.K.) 1991 Charter LEAF Sexual Assault




*Levogiannis 1993 Charter Sexual Assault
* Little sisters 2000 Charter, 15 LEAF Sexual
Orienation/Equality
*M. (M.L.) 1994 Criminal
Code
LEAF Sexual Assault
*M v .H 1999 Charter, 15 LEAF Sexual
Orienation/Equality








Moge 1992 Divorce Act LEAF Family law-support
*Mills 1999 Charter 7,15 LEAF Sexual Assault
* Miron v. 
Trudel
1995 Charter, 15 Discrimination
Morgentaler 1988 Charter, 7,15 Abortion
Morgentaler 1993 Con. Act 
1867
CARAL Abortion
*Newfoundland 2004 Charter 15 Discrimination
NWAC 1994 Charter, 2b NWAC Discrimination
Norberg Tort LEAF Sexual assault















*R.A.R. 2000 Criminal Sexual Assault
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Schachter Charter 15, 
24
LEAF Ul-parental leave
Seaboyer 1991 Charter, 7, 
l id
LEAF Sexual assault
Sharpe 2001 Charter 2 (b) Child Pornography














Thibaudeau 1995 Charter, 15 SCORE, NAC, 
LEAF
Tax-Child Support
Tremblay 1989 Charter, 7, 15 LEAF Abortion
*Trociul 2003 Charter, 15 Discrimination
*Vriend 1998 Charter, 15 LEAF Sexual Orientation
* Walsh 2002 Charter, 15 Discrimination






* Whitley 1994 Criminal
Code
LEAF Sexual Assault
Willick 1994 Divorce Act Family law support
Winnipeg CFS 1997 Mental health LEAF Abortion
*Winnipeg CFS 2000 Charter, 7 Child Protection
Source: Morton, F.L., and Avril Allen. “Feminists and the Courts.” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science. 34, no.l (2001): 55-84.
* Added cases
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APPENDIX 1
Analysis of Suprem e Court Decisions Based on Gender
Legend for Justices:
Majority opinion favouring women, by a female justice
Concurring opinion favouring women, by a female justice
Dissenting opinion favouring women, by a female justice
Majority opinion favouring women, by a male justice
Concurring opinion favouring women, by a male justice
Dissenting opinion favouring women, by a male justice
Gender Codes: Female
Male m
Results by Case Core Analysis Secondary
CASE 1
R. v. A.G. (2000) Weighting
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender













# of females and scores 12
# of males and scores 10 20
CASE 2 Weighting
A. (L.L.) v. Beharriel (1995)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m






















# of females and scores -1 -2
# of males and scores -6 -12
CASE 3 Weighting
Action Travail (1987)
Policy Area: Discrimination Win for Women
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Justice Lamer 
Justice Wilson 
Justice Le Dain 
Justice La Forest





# of males and scores 12 24
CASE 4
R. v. Adams (1995)




Justice Lamer m 2
Justice La Forest m 2
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2
Justice Sopinka m 2
Justice Gonthier m 2
Justice Cory m 2
Justice McLachlin f 2
Justice lacobucci m 2
Justice Major m 2
Score
# of females and scores
Gender
m
# of males and scores 14 28
CASE 5
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989)
Weighting








# of females and scores





m 2 4 m
m 2 4
f 2 4
m 1 2 m
f 2 4
CASE 6
Arndt v. Smith (1997) 
Policy area: Fetal Rights 
Decision-maker 
Justice Lamer 
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# of males and scores 7 -1 -1 3
CASE 7 Weighting 2
BCSGEU v. PSERC (1999)
Policy Area: Discrimination Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness 
Justice Lamer m 2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 









Justice McLachlin 4 f
Justice lacobucci 4
Justice Major m 2 
Justice Bastarache m 2 




# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 7 14 28 0
CASE 8 Weighting 2
R. v. Bernard (1988)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness 
Justice Dickson m -2 
Justice Beetz m 1 









Justice: Wilson ::: 4 f
2 m
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f  2 4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 5 -1 -2 3
CASE 9 Weighting 2
Borowski v. (Canada) (1989)
Policy Area: Abortion Moot
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness 
Justice Dickson m 0 
Justice McIntyre m 0 
Justice Lamer m 0 
Justice Wilson f  0 
Justice La Forest m 0 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 0 









# of females and scores 2 0 0 0
# of males and scores 5 0 0 0
CASE 10 Weighting 2
Boston v. Boston (2001)
Policy Area: Family Law Support Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness 

















# of males and scores 6 -3 -6
CASE 11
Brooks v. Canada Safeway (1! ay (1989) 
Policy Area: Discrimination 
Decision-maker I Gender










Justice La Forest 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube










# of females and scores
# of males and scores 16
CASE 12
R. v. Butler (1992)
Policy Area: Pornography 
Decision-maker 
Justice Lamer 
































# of males and scores
CASE 13
Canadian Newspapers Company Ltd. (1988) 
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# of females and scores 2 4 8 0
# of males and scores 4 8 16 1
CASE 14 Weighting 2
Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W. (2000)
Policy Area: Child Protection Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice McLachlin f 2 4
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f -1 -2 f
Justice Gonthier m -1 -2
Justice Major m -1 -2
Justice Bastarache m -1 -2
Justice Binnie m -1 -2
2 4 f
# of females and scores 3 3 6 2
# of males and scores 4 -4 -8 0
CASE 15 Weighting 2
R v. Carosella (1997)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 -4
Jsutice La Forest m 2 4
m m m  m i i b 2 4 f
Justice Sopinka m -2 -4 m
Justice Gonthier m 2 4
Justice Cory m -2 -4
Justice McLachlin f 2 4
Justice lacobucci m -2 -4
Justice Major m -2 -4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 7 -6 -12 1
CASE 16 Weighting 2
R. v. Cook (1997)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m 2 4
Justice La Forest m 2 4
Justice: L'Heureux-Dube: : : : f 2 4 f
Justice Sopinka m 2 4
Justice Gonthier m 2 4









Justice Major m 2 4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 7 14 28 0
CASE 17 Weighting 2
R. v. Darrach (2000)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
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Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice McLachlin f 2 4
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 4
m 2 4 m
Justice lacobucci m 2 4
Justice Major m 2 4
Justice Bastarache m 2 4
Justice Binnie m 2 4
Justice Arbour f 2 4
Justice LeBel m 2 4
# of females and scores 3 6 12 0
# of males and scores 6 12 24 1
CASE 18 Weighting 2
R. v. Daviault (1994)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 -4 m
Justice La Forest m -2 -4 m
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f -2 -4
m 2 4 m
Justice Gonthier m 2 4
Justice Cory m -2 -4 m
Justice McLachlin f -2 -4
Justice lacobucci m -2 -4
Justice Major m 2 4
# of females and scores 2 -4 -8 0
# of males and scores 7 -2 -4 4
CASE 19 Weighting 2
R. v. Davis (1999)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
m 2 4 m
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 4
Justice Gonthier m 2 4
Justice McLachlin f 2 4
Justice Major m 2 4
Justice Binnie m 2 4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 0
# of males and scores 4 8 16 1
CASE 20 Weighting 2
R. v. Esau (1997)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 -4
2 4 f
Justice Sopinka m -2 -4
Justice Gonthier m -2 -4
f 2 4 f
Justice lacobucci m -2 -4
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Justice Major m -2 -4 m
# of females and scores 2 4 8 2
# of males and scores 5 -10 -20 1
CASE 21 Weighting 2
R. v. Ewanchuk (1999)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m 2 4
. I in tir .ii 1 '1 lin irw ir-fo t-ih ff---------- f  2 4 f
Justice Gonthier m 2 4




Justice lacobucci m 2 4
Justice Major m 2 
Justice Bastarache m 2 




# of females and scores 2 4 8 2
# of males and scores 7 14 28 1
CASE 22 Weighting 1
Gordon v. Goertz (1996)
Policy Area: Family Law-custody Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m 2 
Justice La Forest m 2
2
2
JUStIGS L MQUrQUX-UUDQ T Z
Justice Sopinka m 2 
Justice Gonthier m 2
2
2
Justice Cory m 2 2
f
Justice lacobucci m 2 2
Justice Major m 2 2
# of females and scores 2 4 4 2
# of males and scores 7 14 14 0
CASE 23 Weighting 2
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney Seneral) (2002)
Policy Area: Welfare/Equality Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice McLachlin f  -2 -4 f
3t f  2 4 f
Justice Gonthier m -2 
Justice lacobucci m -2 




m m m m m M M M ™  1 2 m
Justice Binnie m -2 -4
f 2 4 f
m 1 2 m
# of females and scores 3 2 4 3
# of males and scores 6 -6 -12 2
CASE 24 Weighting 2
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Gould v. Yukon Order of Pion« ers (1996)
Policy Area: Discrimination Loss for Women
Decision-maker \ Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice La Forest m -2
-4
-4 m
f 2 4 f
Justice Sopinka m -2 
Justice Gonthier m -2 




m t m n - ijh f 2 4 f
Justice lacobucci m -2 -4 m
Justice Major m -2 -4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 2
# of males and scores 7 -14 -28 2
CASE 25 Weighting 2
R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen (1991))
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women
Decision-maker | Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice Wilson f -2 
Justice La Forest m -2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f -2 
Justice Sopinka m -1 







,i f 2 4 f
# of females and scores 3 -2 -4 2
# of males and scores 4 -3 -6 1
CASE 26 Weighting 2
R. v. Heywood (1994)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice La Forest m 2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 






Justice Cory m -2 
Justice McLachlin f 2 
Justice lacobucci m -2 





# of females and scores 2 4 8 0
# of males and scores 7 -6 -12 2
CASE 27 Weighting 2
R. v. J.-L.J. (2000)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker \ Gender \ Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 
Justice McLachlin f 2 
Justice lacobucci m 2 
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Justice Bastarache m 2 4
2 ........ 4 m
Justice Arbour f  2 4
# of females and scores 3 6 12 0
# of males and scores 4 8 16 1
CASE 28 Weighting 2
Janzen v. Party Enterprises Lt ± (1989)
Policy Area: Discrimination Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
m 2 4 m
Justice Beetz m 2 
Justice McIntyre m 2 
Justice Wilson f  2 
Justice La Forest m 2 






# of females and scores 2 4 8 0
# of males and scores 4 8 16 1
CASE 29 Weighting 2
R. v. Jones (1994)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice La Forest m 2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 





m 2 4 m
Justice Cory m -2 
Justice McLachlin f  2 
Justice lacobucci m 2 





# of females and scores 2 4 8 0
# of males and scores 7 -2 -4 2
CASE 30 Weighting 1
R. v. Keegstra (1990)
Policy Area: Censorship Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
m 2 2 m
Justice Wilson f  2 
Justice La Forest m -2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 
Justice Sopinka m -2 
Justice Gonthier m 2 







# of females and scores 3 2 2 1
# of males and scores 4 0 0 1
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CASE 31 Weighting 2
R.v. L. (D.O.) (1993)
|Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women |
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
m 2 4 m
Justice La Forest m 2 4
Justice: LWedreux-Duhe f  2 4 f
Justice Sopinka m 2 
Justice Gonthier m 2 
Justice Cory m 2 
Justice McLachlin f  2 






m m m m w /w /y m 2 4 m
# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 7 14 28 2
CASE 32 Weighting 2
R.v. L. (W.K.) (1991)
|Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
| Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
|Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 4
Justice Sopinka m 2 
Justice Gonthier m 2 
Justice Cory m 2 





m 2 4 m
Justice lacobucci m 2 4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 0
# of males and scores 5 10 20 1
CASE 33 Weighting 2
R. v. La (1997)
| Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women |
\Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m 2 
Justice La Forest m 2
4
4
f  2 4 f
m 2 4 m
Justice Gonthier m 2 
Justice Cory m 2 
Justice McLachlin f  2 
Justice lacobucci m 2 






# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 7 14 28 1
CASE 34 Weighting 2
R. v. Lavallee (1990)
I Policy Area: Spousal Abuse Win for Women ||
I Decision-maker \ Gender \ Supportiveness \ Score Gender
Justice Dickson m 2 












m 2 4 m
Justice Gonthier m 2 
Justice McLachlin f  2
4
4
# of females and scores 3 6 12 1
# of males and scores 4 8 16 1
CASE 35 Weighting 2
R. v. Levogiannis (1993)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m 2 
Justice La Forest m 2
4
4
Justice L'Heureux-Dube : ::: f  2 4 f
Justice Sopinka m 2 
Justice Gonthier m 2 




# of females and scores 1 2 4 1
# of males and scores 5 10 20 0
CASE 36 Weighting 1
Little Sisters Book and Art Em Dorium v. Canada (2000)
Policy Area: Sexual Orientation Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice McLachlin f 1 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f  1 




m 2 2 m
Justice Major m 1 
Justice Bastarache m 2
1
2
m 1 1 m
Justice Arbour f 2 
Justice LeBel m 2
2
2
# of females and scores 3 4 4 0
# of males and scores 6 9 9 2
CASE 37 Weighting 2
R. v. M. (M.L.) (1994)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m 2 
Justice La Forest m 2 




m 2 4 m
Justice Gonthier m 2 
Justice Cory m 2 
Justice McLachlin f  2 
Justice lacobucci m 2 
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# of females and scores 2 4 8 0
# of males and scores 7 14 28 1
CASE 38 Weighting 1
M. v. H. (1999)
Policy Area: Sexual Orientation Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m 2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 





Justice McLachlin f 2 2





Justice Binnie m 2 2
# of females and scores 2 4 4 0
# of males and scores 7 10 10 5
CASE 39 Weighting 2
M. (K.) v. M. (H.) (1992)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker \ Gender | Supportiveness Score Gender
in s t i l  Pubs f  **
4 m
f
m m m m k m m ™  2
4
4 m
Justice Gonthier m 2 4









# of females and scores 2 4 8 2
# of males and scores 5 10 20 2
CASE 40 Weighting 2
R. v. Mannion (1986)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Dickson m -2 
Justice Beetz m -2 
Justice Estey m -2 
Justice McIntyre m -2 
Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice Wilson f  -2 








# of females and scores 1 -2 -4 0
# of males and scores 6 -12 -24 1
CASE 41 Weighting 2
R. v. McDonnell (1997)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
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Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice La Forest m 2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 
Justice Sopinka m -2 
Justice Gonthier m 2 







f 2 4 f
Justice lacobucci m -2 
Justice Major m -2
-4
-4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 7 -6 -12 1
CASE 42 Weighting 2
Moge v. Moge (1992)
Policy Area: Family law-support Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice La Forest m 2 4
Just ce L’Heureux-Dube:::: |f 2 4 f
Justice Gonthier m 2 4




Justice lacobucci m 2 4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 2
# of males and scores 4 8 16 0
CASE 43 Weighting 2
R.v. Mills (1999)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2
-4 m
4




m 2 4 m
Justice Major m 2 
Justice Bastarache m 2 




# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 6 8 16 2
CASE 44 Weighting 2
Miron v. Trudel (1995)
Policy Area: Discrimination Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 -4




Justice Sopinka m 2 4
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Justice lacobucci m 2 
Justice Major m -2
4
-4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 2
# of males and scores 7 -2 -4 1
CASE 45 Weighting 2
R. v. Morgentaler (1988)
I Policy Area: Abortion Win for Women I
\Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
m 2 4 m
m 2 4 m
Justice Estey m 2 
Justice McIntyre m -2 
Justice Lamer m 2









# of females and scores 1 2 4 1
# of males and scores 6 4 8 3
CASE 46 Weighting 2
R. v. Morgentaler (1993)
|Policy Area: Abortion Win for Women |
| Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m 2 
Justice La Forest m 2 




m 2 4 m
Justice Gonthier m 2 
Justice Cory m 2 
Justice McLachlin f  2 
Justice lacobucci m 2 






# of females and scores 2 4 8 0
# of males and scores 7 14 28 1
CASE 47 Weighting 2
Native Women's Assn. of Can ada v. Canada (1994)
Policy Area: Discrimination Loss for Women |
\Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice La Forest m -2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f -2 
Justice Sopinka m -2 
Justice Gonthier m -2 
Justice Cory m -2 
Justice McLachlin f -2 
Justice lacobucci m -2 










# of females and scores 2 -4i -8 2
# of males and scores 7 -14 -28 1
CASE 48 Weighting 2
Norberg v. Wynrib (1992)
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Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
m 2 4 m
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 4
Justice Sopinka m 1 2 m
m 2 4
Justice Cory m 2 4
f 2 4 f
# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 4 7 14 2
CASE 49 Weighting 2
R. v. O'Connor (1995)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 -4 m
Justice La Forest m 2 4
Justice: L' Heureux-Dube f 2 4 f
Justice Sopinka m -2 -4 m
Justice Gonthier m 2 4mmmmmmm,m 1 2 m
f 2 4 f
Justice lacobucci m 1 2
Justice Major m -2 -4 m
# of females and scores 2 4 8 2
# of males and scores 7 0 0 4
CASE 50 Weighting 2
R.v. Osolin (1993)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 -4 m
Justice La Forest m 2 4
f 2 4 f
Justice Sopinka m -2 -4
Justice Gonthier m 2 4
Justice Cory m -2 -4 m
JUtUWMWM Hllllllllllll f 2 4 f
Justice lacobucci m -2 -4 m
Justice Major m -2 -4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 2
# of males and scores 7 -6 -12 3
CASE 51 Weighting 2
R. v. Park (1995)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gendermmmmmm m 2 4 m
Justice La Forest m 2 4
Justice L'Heureux-Dube: :: f 2 4 fmmmmmmmm 2 4 m
Justice Gonthier m 2 4
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m 2 4 m
Justice Major m 2 4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 7 14 28 3
CASE 52 Weighting 1
Peter v. Beblow (1993)
Policy Area: Family Law Property Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice La Forest m 2 2
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 2
Justice Sopinka m 2 2
Justice Gonthier m 2 2
m 2 2 m
f 2 2 f
Justice lacobucci m 2 2
# of females and scores 2 4 4 1
# of males and scores 5 10 10 1
CASE 53 Weighting 2
R. v. R.A.R. (2000)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 -4 m
Justice L'Heureux-Dube: ::: f 2 4 f
Justice Gonthier m 2 4
Justice McLachlin f 2 4
Justice lacobucci m -2 -4
Justice Major m 2 4
Justice Bastarache m 2 4
Justice Binnie m 2 4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 6 4 8 1
CASE 54 Weighting 2
R. v. R.N.S. (2000)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score GendermmmMmmmm 2 4 m
f 2 4 fmmmmmm.m 2 4 m
f 2 4 f
Justice lacobucci m 2 4
Justice Major m 2 4
m 2 4 m
Justice Binnie m 2 4
# of females and scores 2 4 8 2
# of males and scores 6 12 24 3
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CASE 55 Weighting 2
R.v. B. (F.F.) (1993)
[Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women I
\Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 -4 m
f 2 4 f
Justice Sopinka m -2 
Justice Gonthier m 2 




# of females and scores 1 2 4 1
# of males and scores 4 -4 -8 2
CASE 56 Weighting 2
R. v. Robertson (1987)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Win for Women |
\Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Dickson m 2 
Justice Beetz m 2 
Justice Estey m 2 
Justice McIntyre m 2 






Justice Wijsdh : : f  2 4 f
Justice Le Dain m 2 
Justice La Forest m 2
4
4
# of females and scores 1 2 4 1
# of males and scores 7 14 28 0
CASE 57 Weighting 1
Schachterv. Canada (1992)
Policy Area: Ul-Parental Leave Loss for Women |
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
m 1 1 m
m 1 1 m
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 1 
Justice Sopinka m 1 
Justice Gonthier m 1 
Justice Cory m 1 






# of females and scores 2 2 2 0
# of males and scores 5 5 5 2
CASE 58 Weighting 2
R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme ( 1991)
I Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women I
Decision-maker | Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice La Forest m -2
-4
-4
f 2 4 f
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Justice Sopinka m -2 
Justice Gonthier m 2 
Justice Cory m -2 
Justice McLachlin f -2 
Justice Stevenson m -2 







# of females and scores 2 0 0 2
# of males and scores 7 -10 -20 0
CASE 59 Weighting 2
R. v. Shearing (2002)
Policy Area: Sexual Assault Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice McLachlin f  -2 -4
st f 2 4 f
Justice Gonthier m 2 
Justice lacobucci m -2 
Justice Major m -2 
Justice Bastarache m -2 
Justice Binnie m -2 
Justice Arbour f  -2 








# of females and scores 3 -2 -4 1
# of males and scores 6 -8 -16 1
CASE 60 Weighting 2
R. v. Sullivan (1991)
Policy Area: Abortion/Foetal Rights Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
m 1 2 m
Justice Wilson f  1 2
Justice La Forest m 1
f  9
2
Justice Sopinka m 1 2
T
Justice Gonthier m 1 
Justice Cory m 1 
Justice McLachlin f  1 





# of females and scores 3 4 8 1
# of males and scores 6 6 12 1
CASE 61 Weighting 1
Symes v. Canada (1993)
Policy Area: Tax-Child Support Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice La Forest m -2
-2
-2
m lE ijdJj*-: i g f 2 2 f
Justice Sopinka m -2 
Justice Gonthier m -2 




st lie : . E C l l h f  2 2 f
Justice lacobucci m -2 -2 m
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Justice Major m -2 -2
# of females and scores 2 4 4 2
# of males and scores 7 -14 -14 1
CASE 62 Weighting 2
Syndicat des employes de prcRuction du Quebec et de I'acadie v. Canada (1989) |
Policy Area: Discrimination Loss for Women |
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Dickson m 2 
Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice Wilson f  2 




-4m f  2 4 f
Justice Sopinka m -2 -4 m
# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 4 -4 -8 1
CASE 63 Weighting 2
Thiabaudeau v. Canada (199£ )
[Policy Area: Tax-Child Support Loss for Women |
| Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
|Justice La Forest m -2 -4m f  2 4 f
Justice Sopinka m -2 
Justice Gonthier m -2 




.)|j t̂|4£|lH<t|-H< h|i i f  2 4 f
Justice lacobucci m -2 -4 m
# of females and scores 2 4 8 2
# of males and scores 5 -10 -20 4
CASE 64 Weighting 2
Tremblay v. Daigle (1989)
Policy Area: Abortion Win for Women |
\Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m 2 
Justice McLachlin f  . 2 
Justice Sopinka m 2 
Justice Gonthier m 2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 







m 2 4 m
Justice La Forest m 2 
Justice Wilson f  2
4
4
# of females and scores 3 6 12 0
# of males and scores 6 12 24 1
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CASE 65 Weighting 2
Trociuk v. British Columbia (2003)
Policy Area: Discrimination Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice McLachlin f -1 -2
Justice Gonthier m -1 -2
Justice lacobucci m -1 -2
Justice Major m -1 -2
Justice Bastarache m -1 -2
Justice Binnie m -1 -2
Justice Arbour f -1 -2
Justice LeBel m -1 -2
Justice Deschamps f -1 -2 f
# of females and scores 3 -3 -6 1
# of males and scores 6 -6 -12 0
CASE 66 Weighting 1
Vriend v. Alberta (1998)
Policy Area: Sexual Orientation Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m 2 2
f 2 2 f
Justice Gonthier m 2 2
m 2 2 m
Justice McLachlin f 2 2
m 2 2 m
Justice Major m 1 1 m
Justice Bastarache m 2 2
# of females and scores 2 4 4 1
# of males and scores 6 11 11 3
CASE 67 Weighting 2
Nova Scotia v. Walsh (2002)
Policy Area: Discrimination Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice McLachlin f -2 -4
2 4 f
Justice Gonthier m -2 -4 m
Justice lacobucci m -2 -4
Justice Major m -2 -4
Justice Bastarache m -2 -4 m
Justice Binnie m -2 -4
Justice Arbour f -2 -4
Justice LeBel m -2 -4
# of females and scores 3 -2 -4 1
# of males and scores 6 -12 -24 2
CASE 68 Weighting 2
Weatherall v. Canada (1993)
Policy Area: Penal System Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
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m 2
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2
Justice Sopinka m 2
Justice Gonthier m 2
Justice McLachlin f 2
Justice lacobucci m 2
Justice Major m 2
# of females and scores
m
# of males and scores 10 20
CASE 69
R. v. Wells (2000)




























# of males and scores 16
CASE 70
R. v. Whitley (1994)












# of females and scores










# of males and scores 14 28
CASE 71
Willick v. Willick (1994) 
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Justice lacobucci m 2 2
# of females and scores 2 4 4 1
# of males and scores 5 10 10 1
CASE 72 Weighting 2
Winnipeg Child and Family Se rvices v. G. (D.F.) (1997)
Policy Area: Abortion/Foetal Rights Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m 2 
Justice La Forest m 2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f 2 
Justice Sopinka m -2 






Justice Cory m 2 4







Justice Major m -2 -4 m
# of females and scores 2 4 8 1
# of males and scores 7 6 12 1
CASE 73 Weighting 2
R. v. Sharpe (2001)
Policy Area: Child Pornography Win for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice McLachlin:: f  2 4 f
mmmmmmmT 2m 2 44 fm
Justice lacobucci m 2 
Justice Major m 2
4
4mmmmmmmm 2 4 m
Justice Binnie m 2 
Justice Arbour f  2 




# of females and scores 3 6 12 2
# of males and scores 6 12 24 2
CASE 74 Weighting 2
R. v. Malott (1998)
Policy Area: Spousal Abuse Loss for Women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness Score Gender
Justice Lamer m -2 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube f -2 
Justice Cory m -2 
Justice McLachlin f -2 
Justice lacobucci m -2 







# of females and scores 2 -4 -8 1
# of males and scores 4 -8 -16 1
CASE 75 Weighting 2
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Newfoundland v. N.A.P.E. (2004)
Policy Area: Discrimination Loss for women
Decision-maker Gender Supportiveness 
Justice McLachlin f  -2 
Justice Major m -2 
Justice Bastarache m -2 
Justice Binnie m -2 
Justice LeBel m -2 
Justice Fish m -2 









# of females and scores 2 -4 -8 0
# of males and scores 5 -10 -20 1
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Table 5.0
>Core Analysis Summary.
Total female decisions 159
Total male decisions 433
Total female score 388
Total male score 472
Female Average 2.44 
* ¥  1.09 




(65 cases w ith  a max/min score o f +4/-4 and 10 cases w ith  a max/min score o f +2/-2)
Table 5.1
Unweighted Weighted
Violence against women (sexual assault/spousal abuse)
Total cases 39 39
Total female decisions 79 79
Total male decisions 227 227
Total female score 115 230
Total male score 159 318
Female Average 1.46 2 91 
Male Average 0.70 1.40
Family law  support and custody cases
Total cases 6 6
Total female decisions 14 14
Total male decisions 31 31
Total female score 19 26
Total male score 35 36
FemaeAveiaye 1.36 1.86 
Male Average 1.13 116
Abortion and fetal rights
Total cases 7 7
Total female decisions 15 15
Total male decisions 44 44
Total female score 18 38
Total male score 41 83
Fema.e Average 1 20 2 53 
Male Average 0 93 1.89
Discrimination
Total cases 14 14
Total female decisions 31 31
Total male decisions 77 77
Total female score 21 40
Total male score -19 -38
Fema.e Average 0.68 1.29 
MaleAveiage -0 25 -0 49
II
Tax and benefit programs affecting pregnancy/child expenses and support payments
Total cases 3 3 1
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Total female decisions 6 6
Total male decisions 17 17
Total female score 10 14








Total cases 2 2
Total female decisions 5 5
Total male decisions 13 13
Total female score 10 20







Total cases 1 1
Total female decisions 2 2
Total male decisions 5 5
Total female score 4 8








Total cases 3 3
Total female decisions 7 7
Total male decisions 19 19
Total female score 12 12

































Total cases 65 65 Percentage
Total female decisions 137 137 26.8%
Total male decisions 374 374 73.2%
Total female score 358 179 46.1%
Total male score 418 209 53.9%






Max/min average is +4/-4
Table 5.3
FREQUENCY OF: Women Men
Majority opinions favouring women 19
Concurring opinions favouring womer
Dissenting opinions favouring women m
% OF TOTAL OPINIONS Women Men
Majority opinions favouring women 11.9%
Concurring opinions favouring womer
Dissenting opinions favouring women m
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Table 5.4
W ithout With
Justice Aiboui [0 Weighting Weighting
Total Cases 11 11
Total Score 8 14
Average Score 0.73 1.27
Justice Deschamps(f)
Total Cases 2 2
Total Score -3 -6
Average Score -1.50 -3.00
Justice L'Hcuruux-Duhc if)
Total Cases 69 69
Total Score 109 203
Average Score 1.58 2.94
Justice McLuchlin (f)
Total Cases 61 61
Total Score 74 137
Average Score 1.21 2.25
Total Cases 16 16
Total Score 21 40
Average Score 1.31 2.50
Juslico Bdstdiuche im)
Total Cases 20 20
Total Score 18 30
Average Score 0.90 1.50
Justice BeeU (in)
Total Cases 6 6
Total Score 7 14
Average Score 1.17 2.33
Justice Binnin im)
Total Cases 20 20
Total Score 14 25
Average Score 0.70 1.25
Justice Chomuid (in)
Total Cases 1 1
Total Score 2 4
Average Score 2.00 4.00
Justice Cory (mi
Total Cases 41 41
Total Score 25 42
Average Score 0.61 1.02
Justice Dickson (m)
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Total Cases 14 14
Total Score 18 34
Average Score 1.29 2.43
Justire Estey im)
Total Cases 3 3
Total Score 2 4
Average Score 0.67 1.33
Justice Fish im)
Total Cases 1 1
Total Score -2 -4
Average Score -2.00 -4.00
Justice Gontluei im)
Total Cases 61 61
Total Score 68 129
Average Score 1.11 2.11
Justice lacobucci (ml
Total Cases 52 52
Total Score 29 46
Average Score 0.56 0.88
Total Cases 51 51
Total Score 8 12
Average Score 0.16 0.24
Total Cases 49 49
Total Score 38 74
Average Score 0.78 1.51
Justice LeBel (m,
Total Cases 9 9
Total Score 2 2
Average Score 0.22 0.22
justice Lc Duin tm1
Total Cases 2 2
Total Score 4 8
Average Score 2.00 4.00
Justice Majoi (m)
Total Cases 46 46
Total Score 7 11
Average Score 0.15 0.24
Justice McIntyre (ml
Total Cases 10 10
Total Score 9 18
Average Score 0.90 1.80
Justice Sopinka tm)
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Total Cases 43 43
Total Score 11 17
Average Score 0.26 0.40
Total Cases 4 4
Total Score 3 6
Average Score 0.75 1.50
Total female decisions 159 159
Total female score 209 388
Total male decisions 433 433
Total male score 263 472
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Average Score W ithout Score w ith
Total Cases W ithout Weighting Weighting Weighting
Justice L'Heureux-Dube (f) 69 1.58 1 2.94
Justice Wilson (f) 16 1.31 2 2.50
Justice Dickson (m) 14 1.29 3 2.43
Justice Beetz (m) 6 1.17 5 2.33
Justice McLachlin (f) 61 1.21 4 2.25
Justice Gonthier (m) 61 1.11 6 2.11
Justice McIntyre (m) 10 0.90 7 1.80
Justice La Forest (m) 49 0.78 9 1.51
Justice Bastarache (m) 20 0.90 8 1.50
Justice Arbour (f) 11 0.73 10 1.27
Justice Binnie (m) 20 0.70 11 1.25
Justice Cory (m) 41 0.61 12 1.02
Justice lacobucci (m) 52 0.56 13 0.88
Justice Sopinka (m) 43 0.26 14 0.40
Justice Major (m) 46 0.15 17 0.24
Justice Lamer (m) 51 0.16 16 0.24
Justice LeBel (m) 9 0.22 15 0.22
** NOTE ** Justices with fewer than 5 cases were excluded from the above rankings
has**
Number of Cases Resulting in a Win for Women 46
Number of Cases Resulting in a Loss for Women 28
Moot Cases 1
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